

Nicholas Walter

Secret forces: International espionage and the fight against it during the World War and at the present time. (compilation)

Walter Nicolai and his contribution to the development of German and world intelligence

Walter Nicolai - an outstanding German intelligence officer, a star of the first magnitude among the leaders of the special services of the 20th century, left a noticeable mark on the history of German intelligence and counterintelligence with his activities. Not a single book about European espionage of the 20th century is complete without mentioning his name. Not a single book about German espionage can do without mentioning his merits.

In his work *Secret Forces* (Geheime Mächte), which was published in Berlin in 1923^{1}, Nicolai examines the work of German military intelligence and counterintelligence on the eve and during the First World War, in which he himself was a participant. This book is one of the few sources on military intelligence that are

considered serious. It not only formulates many principles of intelligence activity, but also offers rich historical material useful for understanding. In Soviet Russia, Nikolai was considered an expert in the theory of intelligence, and his works were promptly translated. ^{2}K.K. a very valuable contribution to the literature on intelligence issues.... The work of Nikolai deserves to be familiarized not only with intelligence workers, but also with the command and political staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. This work contains many very instructive facts and examples from the activities of intelligence or "secret power," as Nicolai calls it." At the beginning of the last century, the German General Staff came to the conclusion that the reconnaissance stations created along the western and eastern borders of the German Reich did not [10] justify the hopes placed on them. The practice of using reserve officers in the border districts did not allow solving new, more and more complex tasks. In March 1906, the General Staff submitted to War Minister Karl Einem a plan for the reorganization of military intelligence, which provided for the replacement of elderly retired officers with the most energetic and educated officers of the General Staff. It was proposed to subordinate them to the command of the border corps, and not to the Landwehr districts, so that in case of war they would head

the intelligence service at the corresponding army headquarters. From the intelligence officers who were staffed by the staff departments of Ic, a service was created, which, as time showed, was a fundamentally new step in the field of organizing military intelligence. Among the young intelligence officers of the General Staff was Lieutenant Nikolai. ^{4}

Walter Nicolai was born in Germany in 1873, in an ordinary Protestant family, far from Prussian aristocratic traditions and connections. His father was an officer and a descendant of Brunswick pastors. The son was brought up in the spirit of traditional German conservatism and devotion to the emperor.

Most researchers ^{5} give conflicting data on his biography, so we will limit ourselves to presenting the most transparent stages of his professional career. After studying for several years at the Dome Gymnasium in the city of

Halberstadt, Nicolai then graduated from the cadet corps and in 1893, with the rank of lieutenant, was enlisted in the army. Hardworking and diligent, but reserved, the young officer soon drew attention to himself with his outstanding and professional qualities. He avoided drinking parties, preferring a quiet life with his family. Serious, he only perked up when they talked about Germany! Then he ardently joined the debate.

Around 1896, Nicolai visited Russia for the first time, which [11] gave him the opportunity to improve the Russian language and, on his return, present a report, receive the rank of captain, and the opportunity to study at the military academy in Berlin (1901-1904). In his report on modern methods of conducting intelligence, Nicolai demonstrated deep, accurate, intelligent judgments and high culture. Nicolai recalled: "After a three-year course at the military academy, in 1904 I was sent to the Great General

Staff. on state and international law, but did not hear anything about the foundations of our century, about modern politics. They did not find out for us - officers intended to continue working in the General Staff - even the relationship between the countries of the Bismarck era, did not have any influence on our attitude towards internal political affairs, did not pay our attention to Germany's political or economic competitors. We were soldiers and only them. We felt called to do, like our great military models, our duty at a moment we only suspected the coming. Our eyes were turned to the main way to the past, only militarily - to the present and in no way - to the future. The armies surrounding Germany, including the armies of the Triple Alliance, were only a secondary subject of teaching. France was the enemy. We are not yet accustomed to Russia's hostility. England and America were considered maritime powers. It was sometimes said about the essence of a war on two fronts, but never about a world war. "When the German General Staff compiled lists of intelligence officers to be sent to Japan, Captain Nicolai was included in it. At this time, the Japanese army won one victory after another in battles against the Russians on land and sea.

Nicolai recalled: "The German General Staff decided to send officers to Japan in order to study [12] the military experience of the Japanese army there. I was among the officers selected to study the Japanese language. Despite the war, there were a large number, we achieved that we learned Japanese to a sufficient extent. Surrounded by the envy of our comrades, three of us entered the service of the Japanese army. Their task later turned out to be unenviable. They did not meet a particularly warm-hearted person in the Japanese officer corps reception and, in contrast to how Japanese officers were received before in Germany, they were not allowed to actually familiarize themselves.

Being the only married officer in the Japanese language class, I once received a short notice that my assignment to Japan would not take place and that I should stop learning the language. The aimless hard work of a year and a half was a heavy blow even for a selfless Prussian officer.

The head of the Russian department III-b, Colonel Lauenstein, came to the conclusion that Russia, having been defeated in the war against Japan, would send weapons against Germany. It was necessary to create a strong secret service in the East, and he decided to entrust this task to Nicolai. Confirmation of the correctness of the colonel's choice of the candidacy of a young officer was a report lying on his desk, which contained information about the movement of Russian troops on the border, information from French intelligence about the rearmament of the tsarist army, and strategic plans for the Franco-Russian alliance against Germany. The author of the report was Nicolai. In July 1906, Nicolai became the first intelligence officer of the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps in Königsberg. Before taking up his

official duties, Nicolai again undertakes a trip to Russia in order to refresh his knowledge of the country and people, since he believed that without this his task would be insoluble.

Returning to Königsberg, Nicolai set to work. [13]

Deep disappointments awaited him in the Germans of the regions bordering Russia - almost all of them were engaged in smuggling and were corrupted by Russian intelligence. In this region, well-placed Russian intelligence was opposed by German intelligence, which had only one General Staff officer in Berlin and a few completely unsuitable, inactive officers on the border.

Due to the fact that the Russian service for monitoring foreigners was well set, it was necessary to radically change the methods of work intelligence information from Russia had to be supplied by agents from the local population. As a result of hard work, Nikolai manages to quickly deploy an agent network in the border regions of Russia. The first results were so promising that his actions were recognized as exemplary, and a year later, from the summer of 1907, full-time intelligence officers were also assigned to several other frontier corps. This was followed by the expansion of the entire system of the military intelligence service. A few years later, Nikolai's agents were introduced into almost all areas, including political parties and the entourage of the Russian emperor. Among them were secular ladies and ladies of the demi-monde, professors and theater actors, entrepreneurs and prominent revolutionaries. {7} No wonder Nikolai once said: "I keep the Russians in my fist." {8} In 1912, Nikolai wrote a truly visionary line regarding the work of the secret services: "The government, whose General Staff can foresee the minimum fluctuations in shares of copper, steel, cotton, wool on the stock exchange, as well as monitor the production of gasoline and foodstuffs needed for the army - such a government wins the battle before it starts the war. {9}

Kaiser Wilhelm II appreciated Nikolai, considering him a secret war genius. After seven years of hard work, in March 1913, forty-year-old Major Nikolai was appointed head of the intelligence department III-b. {10} He is confident that a pan-European conflict is inevitable in the foreseeable {14} future, and it is necessary to prepare for it in advance. A year and a half remained before the start of the First World War ...

Nicolai recalled: "After my assignment to East Prussia, a two-year military service followed as a company commander in central Germany. In July 1912, I was transferred to the General Staff, and in early 1913 I was appointed head of the intelligence department of the Great General Staff. as such, I had to simultaneously lead, together with the police authorities, the fight against enemy intelligence. The choice of an officer so young for this position showed the insignificant size of the system, which he was supposed to be in charge of. At the same time, however, this appointment indicated the desire of the General Staff to catch up with fresh forces, since General Ludendorff had, as Chief of Operations, a leading influence in the General Staff.

It can be said without exaggeration that with the appointment of Nikolai in history German intelligence began a new stage ...

"If Stieber is considered the founder of German intelligence in its successful practical application, then Colonel Walter Nicolai is called the father of the organizational structure of German military intelligence. He created not only the theory of intelligence, he created something more - the ideology of intelligence, laid the foundations of its moral culture, and finally brought up their employees, which is no less valued. {11} Intelligence historian David Kahn in his book "Hitler's Spies"

("Hitler's Spies", 1978) described Nicolai as follows: "... an energetic staff officer, fair-haired, of medium height, about thirty-five years old in appearance ... He ran intelligence in the same way as he would have commanded a regiment in battle, for he was hereditary a Prussian officer who is accustomed to doing his duty in any sector." {12}

Before starting work in a new position, Nicolai traveled for a short time to France. He {15} was very impressed by the excited mood against Germany, which he observed everywhere, and

the purpose of which was to constantly remind the population "... about Alsace and Lorraine, on the one hand, and to mislead them about Germany's military preparations, on the other."

Returning to Germany, Nicolai began to study the state of espionage conducted by France and Russia against Germany, creating his own agent network. The organization created by Nicolai consisted of hundreds of agents operating in both enemy and neutral countries. She processed information that also came from other divisions of the General Staff. After the "Redl case" {13} Nicolai reorganized intelligence, so a significant part of the intelligence network remained undiscovered and successfully operated both on the Western and Eastern fronts. The names of the vast majority of agents remained unknown to the general public - such is the specificity of the work. Some have become world famous. Probably the most famous agent of Nicolai was Mata Hari {14}, although there is still a controversy in the espionage literature about whether she was in fact an agent of German intelligence. The memoirs of "Fräulein Doctor" speak of the introduction of Mata Hari into German intelligence, but the date is not specified. It is possible that this happened during the dancer's tour in Berlin. The controversy surrounding the execution of Mata Hari did not stop for a long time. In her memoirs, Fraulein Doctor wrote: "No, there was no miscarriage of justice. The verdict was correct and corresponded to wartime. But the tribunal mistakenly thought that it had dealt an irreparable blow to German intelligence. In reality, the H-21 agent did not harm France "Not one of her reports was used, not one of her messages had political or military significance for us. That is why her fate is tragic - she risked her life in vain."{15}

Fritz Karl Regels, a specialist in German intelligence, has a different point of view: "Mata Hari brought Germany great benefits. She was a courier in the intelligence chain [16] in Europe. She took money, checks, orders to them, received information and transmitted most herself. She was well versed in the military situation, having been trained in one of our best intelligence schools. She was a real intelligence officer who served the interests of Germany. "{16}

Perhaps this is the key to Mata's courageous behavior.

Hari before being shot - she was dying like a soldier who had done his duty.

The oldest and one of the most successful agents was Baron August Schluga, who served in human intelligence for half a century, rendered invaluable services to Germany and, unlike many of his colleagues, died safely on his estate at the age of 76. And the most legendary agent of the service of Walter Nicolai is considered to be Elisabeth Schragmüller {18}, who brilliantly proved

herself when performing numerous intelligence missions in France, Switzerland, Belgium, England, Italy ... At the same time, she was distinguished by both outstanding analytical thinking and extraordinary personal courage. Repeatedly, Elizabeth was on the verge of arrest, but she always managed to escape. And she was on her way again. In 1914, Elisabeth was appointed one of the leaders of the intelligence center, an assistant to Matthesius, in charge of the intelligence network that worked in the French rear and on German territory. "She selected agents and trained them, sending them to perform tasks in neutral countries. She had an excellent instinct - she made unmistakable choices, understood psychology, had the ability to organize. She was a fanatical patriot. When necessary, she sacrificed a scout for the cause." {19} Rasputin {20} and Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin {21} can be safely classified among the outstanding agents of Nicolai in Russia, who can be classified as an "agent of influence". The First World War was not a surprise for Nicolai - he had been preparing for it for a long time. And the intelligence organization he created functioned perfectly, fulfilling the tasks assigned to it, as General Ludendorff testifies in the book [17] "Memories of the War": "... Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai was instructed to manage the press, monitor the mood in the army, strengthening the spirit of the soldiers. Besides, he had to

control the work of the post office, telegraph, telephone network, take measures against economic espionage. Nicolai coped with all the assigned tasks, serving his fatherland" .{22}

Among the six most important departments, III-b was directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, who in turn was directly subordinate to Wilhelm II. The scope of department III-b's authority was so wide that, as Nicolai noted, it included "many things that, properly speaking, should have been the function of the War Cabinet..." a limited closed department", and was engaged in intelligence work, counterintelligence, the press and political work in the army. He was also entrusted with all communications with foreign military attachés, as well as monitoring foreign embassies in Berlin. Within the framework of the department, a special bureau was created to collect materials on anti-monarchist propaganda. The counterintelligence officers from III-b were also engaged in the perusal of the correspondence of the Germans with foreign countries.

Thus, Department III-b led the entire intelligence system.
bodies in the army and the

country. "The High Command needed not only an intelligence service that could look behind the iron curtain of enemy fronts, into the economic and political life of various opponents," Nicolai wrote. "All departments in the army and at home that received information about the enemy were supposed to goals of the high command to be united into a single organism. This dual task was assigned to III-b.{24} Since III-b was not just a military intelligence agency, but a nationwide intelligence and counterintelligence military-political department, not only officers, but also civilians - "representatives of the business world who know foreign and foreign languages", and [18] also employees of the diplomatic service. As Nicolai testifies, department III-b was directly related to propaganda activities. In accordance with this, the department included the Military It was headed first by Major Deuttmoser, and after he was appointed head of the press department of the Foreign Ministry, by Major Shtotten. The department was divided into three departments: for the

domestic press (headed by Deuttmoser), for foreign press affairs (headed by Gervart) and the censorship department (headed by von Olberg). Thus, control of the press in wartime, intelligence processing of foreign press materials, censorship of newspaper information, and propaganda abroad were concentrated in the War Office of the Press, Section III-b. Serious attention was paid to the processing of foreign press. In addition to the fact that all information was sifted by intelligence officers, replenished and enriched the department's card index, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Herwarth, voluminous bulletins "Foreign Press Reports" were issued, which were sent to military and civil authorities, as well as to large monopolies - for information and press organs - to organize counter-propaganda speeches.

In 1915, Nicolai founded the service of internal intelligence (counterintelligence), recruiting informants in large German industrial concerns, institutions, and even in private organizations and groups. At first, they were also planned to be used to collect indirect information about foreign states, but as the political situation in Germany itself worsened, Nicolai began to value information about the internal enemies of the "fatherland" more and more. (In the same year, counterintelligence uncovered 35 enemy agents). Nicolai was interested in everything, he saw everything, immediately eliminating errors in the work of the secret service, bringing the intelligence service abroad to perfection.

There is an opinion that Nicolai underestimated the United States of America as a potential adversary in [19] the world war and did not pay due attention to the creation of an agent network in this country. Noted intelligence historian David Kahn claims that Nicolai "turned his attention to the United States as an operational field only a few months before the US entered the war." e. in April 1917. But von Papen's memoirs and documents

testify to the contrary.

Captain of the General Staff Franz von Papen has been the military attache in the United States since 1913. In his memoirs, he writes: "... most of the preparatory work was done by my predecessor (comrade Herwarth {26} - VF). An office was prepared in New York with the aim of receiving and transmitting military information." {27} We are talking about the company Amzink, co-owned by the American German Henry Willink, Jr., and about which Gervart reported to a colleague intelligence officer: "... At one time I had a lot of business with the company Amzink ... I trained military personnel there reconnaissance post New York in case of mobilization..." {28} Other examples could be cited showing that Section III-b had established an extensive intelligence network throughout the United States long before von Papen's appointment. And this network was used not only

for work in America, but also for subversive activities in Europe, in the rear of Germany's opponents. So, in one of the letters to von Papen, Herwarth reports that at the same time he is sending him a package with leaflets. "You can try to send this leaflet for distribution in France in the newspapers or letters sent through Adolf Pavenstedt {29} or the Americans, whose friendly attitude towards Germany and reliability are not in doubt," Herwarth wrote. {30} Even in the highest government spheres, Nicolai had agents. One of them was Muriel White, the daughter of a well-known high-ranking American diplomat. The name of Henry White is known to everyone who studies the history of the USA of the 20th century. The noted historian Bailey writes: "White knew Europe, European statesmen and European problems. [20] Having lived for many years in England and France and had a daughter who was married to a German nobleman and

suffered from an Allied blockade, he could understand points of view especially well. both sides". {31} The memoirs of the Italian Prime Minister Orlando, published in 1960, say that White, along with US Secretary of State Lansing and General Bliss, was one of the three "without a doubt the most authoritative" members of the US delegation in Paris. White was among President Wilson's friends and, as the only Republican on the American delegation, was regarded there as representing the Republican

majority in Congress. His daughter, Muriel, was born in France in 1880. She was interested in politics and took part in her father's meetings with colleagues. So, for example, in the spring of 1907, she was present at a meeting between White and former Prime Minister

Arthur Balfour and kept a record of the conversation. Muriel married the Kaiser's colonel, Count Zeer-Toss. When and under what circumstances Muriel began to cooperate with Section III-b, we do not know. But Gervart's archives of the colonel preserved documents testifying to the fruitful work of the countess as an agent.

quite a few

Counselor to the US Embassy in Berlin, and later secretary of the US delegation at the Paris Conference of 1919, Joseph Grew wrote in his diary that on the evening of March 20, 1915, he gave "a very successful dinner in honor of the Colonel and Mrs. House; other guests at the table were the ambassador (Gerard), Montgelas (head of the American department of the German Foreign Ministry), the Gherardi couple (US naval attaché in Germany) and Muriel Seer-Toss. However, it was not only a high-society dinner with the closest friend of President Wilson - Countess Seer-Toss also performed a special task ... On this day, Muriel handed over to Theodore Roosevelt, the ex-President of the United States, the answer to a letter previously received from him.

What did she write to one of the influential American [21] politicians, your father's old patron?

An excerpt from the letter has been preserved in the archives of Herwart, marked with the incoming stamp III-b and entitled: "The German point of view is explained to Roosevelt." The purpose of the message was to relieve Germany of the blame for the invasion of Belgium. It should be noted that Roosevelt, as an ex-president, enjoyed great influence in the United States, especially among adherents of his party, and both belligerents

camps tried to win him over to their side. On the German side, the daughter of Henry White actively participated in this operation. Muriel also regularly copied her father's letters and forwarded them to III-b.

After the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, the US government sent a very sharp note of protest to Berlin. Gerard writes that shortly thereafter he dined with Secretary of State Zimmerman: "Among those invited was an American woman, a charming woman who was married to a German ... I happened to hear excerpts from a conversation she had with Zimmerman." After the secretary of state left, the American told Gerard the contents of the conversation. Zimmerman told her allegedly about the telegram from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the United States, Dumba. Dumba reported that the American note should not be taken seriously, since it "only pursued the goal of calming public opinion in America and did not express the true opinion of the American government." {32} Gerard went to the Foreign Office to see Zimmerman, and he actually showed him such a telegram. "Of course I telegraphed the State Department and wrote to President Wilson," Gerard recalls. {33} In his opinion, this prevented the war between Germany and the United States in 1915. As

we see, at a very tense moment after the sinking of the Lusitania, the German government undoubtedly needed to know whether the United States was really ready to start a war in the event of a repeat such attacks by German U-boats or American threats are simply a bluff. And this task Muriel brilliantly completed.

In the autumn of 1916, Countess Seer-Toss made [22] a two-month trip to the USA. In the highest circles of Washington and New York, where she had long been a member due to the position of her father, the Countess talked with many people, about which she regularly reported in her letters. The countess wasted no time, even when she crossed the ocean on the steamer, she continued to collect information. In addition to her own reports compiled on the basis of conversations, Muriel copied a number of important letters received by her father from statesmen of England: Lord Curzon, Lord Newton, and others. section III-b.

The fall of 1916 was not chosen by chance for Countess Zeer-Toss's trip across the ocean. It was a period of a sharp increase in the activity of the secret diplomacy of the warring powers. Already in the spring of 1915, American

diplomacy was considering various options regarding Germany. Colonel House, who visited the German capital in March, was of the opinion that "the United States cannot allow the defeat of the allies, leaving Germany the military factor dominating the world." In this his conclusion was similar to that of Gerard, and this was precisely the direction of House's recommendations in Washington at the end of the trip. But House also carefully considered the US-German rapprochement. In this respect, the conversation he had with Herwarth at the American embassy in Berlin on March 21, 1915, is interesting.

possibilities

"I sat next to House and then, after eating, talked only with him ...", Gerwart reported to his boss Nikolai. {34} The meaning of the conversation was as follows: Herwarth urged the United States "to make Germany our friend and prepare the way for a future agreement, which ... absolutely necessary in the interests of Christian-Teutonic culture and its ideals." House listened carefully to Herwart and stated that he saw things in a new light. "He further expressed the hope," says Gervart, "that we would not lose sight of each other and asked me to write to him ... He will ask the ambassador to send him my letters [23] unopened, and I can be sure that he I'm sure he'll get them." Herwart asserted confidently: "I consider it extremely important to inform you that from now on there is a direct bridge between the General Staff and the White House in Washington." {35}

Nicolai answered Gervart: "Your messages about the colonel's stay here House interested me a lot." {36}

In December 1915, after several scandalous revelations, von Papen and Boy-Ed, caught red-handed in organizing sabotage and sabotage, were defiantly expelled from the United States. Von Papen returned on the ship, carrying with him extensive documentation. During a stop in the English port of Falmouth, searches were carried out on ships of neutral states. Despite his diplomatic immunity, British intelligence decided to take an "active measure" - to seize the archive confirming the actions of German espionage in the United States. It happened on January 2, 1916. The military attache protested: "I was on the territory of a neutral state, on a Dutch ship. Admiral Hall's actions do not comply with international law ...". But the British scouts did not listen to Papin's exhortations and continued the search. The action was a success, and the British obtained priceless documents. Of course, this was a serious blow to the III-b department. At the end of January 1916, Bernstorff sent a letter to Berlin, in which he substantiated the need to interrupt contacts with German saboteurs in the United States that compromised the embassy.

"If persons are sent here with the task of planting bombs, etc., then they must be provided in their homeland with all the necessary means and they should be strictly forbidden, even indirectly, to have contact with the German official institutions located here," the German ambassador wrote. If before that Bernstorff did not hesitate to cover up for German secret agents who arrived with sabotage missions, now he was clearly afraid that some scandal would not occur during the upcoming negotiations.

And the Countess Zeer-Toss successfully continued her mission. Talking with Gru on November 26, 1916, she managed to extract from him the following information, which was immediately transferred to the head of III-b Nicolai: "The American government is very interested in everything that would indicate a tendency here to conclude peace; he (Gru) was instructed to report all the details about the peace plans and wishes (of Germany) ... He got the impression that Germany was inclined towards peace ... In this sense, he informed his government. {37} Grew also expressed the opinion that "Wilson now has a serious intention of taking part in bringing the war to an end, and in any case, that a conference of the belligerents will be convened, where various wishes, goals and compensations would be discussed." {38}

However, the countess soberly assessed the situation. "No victory for Germany, no victory for England - such is the policy of America," she summed up in her report. In his memoirs, Nicolai ignored the activities

of Section III-b in spreading their propaganda in America. And it was carried out so openly and on such a scale that already in 1916 a book entitled "German Propaganda in the United States" was published in France.{39}

The German embassy in the USA was directly in charge of this propaganda. Ambassador Bernstorff himself, Bernhard Dernburg, who until then had lived in the United States for a quarter of a century, worked for a long time in New York banks and had extensive connections in the financial and political circles of America, as well as Professor Munsternberg, actively participated in it. They worked closely with Boy-Ed, who until then for a number of years was a staff propagandist under Admiral Tirpitz, holding the post of head of the press department of the German Admiralty, and von Papen.

The methods of German propaganda in the United States during the First World War were quite typical of the so-called "gray" and even "black" propaganda, closely linked with [25] reconnaissance and sabotage activities.

On September 28, 1914, the Dernburg press office was opened. The meeting was attended by a high-ranking representative of the Kaiser embassy Albert. The main task of the press bureau was: "Imperceptibly and unobtrusively to influence local public opinion in order to incline it in favor of the German cause." Already on September 30, the press bureau began to work. The intensity of the work of the bureau can be judged from the report on the first month of its activity. During this month, the bureau prepared 302 articles, and the weekly

"Fatherland" sent out its bulletins with articles in the editors of 2800 American newspapers. {40} All articles were reviewed and edited by Albert and Clausen.

In March 1915, von Papen wrote to Herwarth: "What we lack most - and this is the great omission of the last 15 years - there is no major newspaper published in English!" In a response letter, Herwarth, who by that time was working in the General Staff, sent a memorandum from Berlin to von Papen and Boy-Ed, in which he outlined his views on the development of German propaganda in the United States. A special propaganda bureau, *Überseedinst*, was set up in Berlin to send propaganda materials to

America. Propagandists with professorial titles were sent to the USA and reports to the US leaders delivered. German propaganda were able to take over all the newspapers in the United States that were published in German (for example, the *New Yorker Staatszeitung*, the *New Yorker Morgen*, the *Illinois Staatszeitung*, and others). In addition, the publication of the English-

language newspaper "Vital Issue" was launched. German propagandists also used the publication of their materials and articles in the American press, which were paid as advertisements. Among the American journalists recruited are George Eustis {41}; Passer Stromme {42}; Herbert Corey. {43} [26] One of the elements of the indoctrination of the Americans was propaganda addressed to US citizens in Europe. In Berlin, Rome, Geneva and Rotterdam, the *Continent Times*. An American Newspaper in Europe was published in English, funded by the German

Foreign Office. This newspaper, clearly pro-German and sharply anti-English, was designed to attract the sympathy of Americans to the side of Germany. Hurst's press also

made a great contribution to the cause of German propaganda in the USA, whose newspapers participated in all the campaigns that were carried out by the German embassy in the USA and were directed successively against France, England and Russia. Particularly fierce were the campaigns against the United States granting a \$1 billion loan to the Entente powers in 1915 and in connection with arms supplies from the USA. Hearst's propaganda was personally supervised by Count Bernstorff, who wrote in his memoirs: "... I often visited Mr.

Hearst, as he was the only major newspaper owner who maintained a neutral position throughout the war." {44}

In November 1914, US State Department adviser Chandler Anderson visited Berlin. He was accompanied by Chandler Hale, a former Assistant Secretary of State for the United States, who by this time held a diplomatic post in London. Anderson and Hale had lengthy conversations with Herwarth in Berlin about German propaganda in the United States. As is clear from the recording of these secret conversations, American diplomats pointed out the mistakes made by German propaganda in America. Gervart reported back to Nicolai at length about the content of these conversations, as Anderson and Hale gave much specific advice.

Thus, despite Nicolai's claims about the lack of propaganda abroad, the documents and testimonies of politicians indicate the opposite ... One of the most brilliant operations of German intelligence

was a revolution in Russia... [27]

On March 9, 1915, Parvus, {45} - an ally of Lenin, a Russian revolutionary and an agent of German intelligence, - prepared a memorandum, a plan for preparing a revolution in Russia. This program took him more than 20 pages of text. {46} He described in detail how, by what methods, by what means it is possible to withdraw Russia from the war with Germany. Lenin's slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war is the fruit of Parvus' program. {47} Preparing his plan, the "director of the Russian revolution" was based, in particular, on the resolution of the conference of the foreign sections of the RSDLP, held in Bern on February 14-19, 1915, in which Lenin wrote: "In each country, the struggle with its own government, leading imperialist war, should not be deterred by the possibility of revolutionary agitation

defeat of this country. The defeat of the government army weakens the given government, contributes to the liberation of the peoples enslaved by it, and facilitates civil war against the ruling classes.

As applied to Russia, this provision is especially true. The victory of Russia entails an intensification of world reaction, an intensification of reaction within the country, and is accompanied by the complete enslavement of the peoples in the already occupied regions. Because of this, the defeat of Russia under all conditions seems to be the lesser evil." {48} With a memorandum, Parvus arrived at the German Foreign

Ministry. He was received by Secretary of State Jagov... The plan was approved...

"Already on March 17, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yagov telegraphed to the State Treasury: "Two million marks are required to support revolutionary propaganda in Russia." A positive answer comes by return mail two days later. Then to his accounts in Copenhagen. There he founded a commercial empire, which is engaged in trading operations. Including illegal transactions for the sale of coal, metals, weapons to Germany, Russia, Denmark and other countries. From them he received huge incomes, which [28] left in Russia or transferred to accounts in other countries. Parvus invests most of the funds in the creation of mass media around the world. They were supposed to set the world and the population of Russia against the tsarist regime. In Russia in the spring of 1916. That is, by this time, Russia will be so weakened as a result of organized destructive actions from outside and inside the country that it will itself ask for peace. {50} In the summer of 1916, in the reports received by the department

III-B, it was reported that discontent reigned in the Russian army and among the population. The time has come for decisive action...

Intelligence historian E. Boyadzhiev testifies: "Nikolai agreed with Ludendorff that within six months he would prepare a plan for a broad political operation on the Eastern Front. Starting to implement this plan, he strengthened ties with Russian Marxists and Social Democrats who were in exile. He began to pay them a salary from the funds of the Russian Department of the Third Bureau. {51} Among this company, who became "suspended" by German intelligence, was a certain Ulyanov (Lenin) - a very ardent and passionate propagandist. So this extraordinary revolutionary in 1910 German intelligence paid 125 marks a month to get information from him about the Okhrana working in the West. {52}

The Russian section of the Third Bureau was led by Bartenwefer. He received information that the military potential of Russia is still strong, but the defeatist mood is growing ... Ludendorff realized that the time had come to use the explosive power of the Russian Marxists, under the leadership of Lenin, to unleash a civil war in Russia. In Lausanne, Nicolai, together with officers of the Third Bureau Nasse and Hagen, experts on Russian problems, met with a

group of revolutionaries. The operation was financed by several American bankers who collaborated with the Germans. The intelligence agencies of the Entente countries knew about this plan, but considered it impossible.

However, the seriousness of the project was obvious - the funds [29] were distributed by the German-American banking group, the names of major German industrialists participating in this action were known. The collapse of the tsarist empire was helped by American banks, subsidizing millions of dollars. London, in turn, hoped that the republic that arose on the ruins of the empire would not be able to comply with the treaties signed by Nicholas II regarding the territories, which forced England to enter the war. The policy of England was indirectly influenced by the Third Bureau, throwing disinformation into British intelligence. On March 2, 1917, the Reichsbank sent an order number 7433 to representatives of German banks in Sweden. Here it is: "We hereby certify that requests for

funds intended to promote the end of the war in Russia will come through Finland. The recipients of the amounts will be the following

persons: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sumenson, Kozlovsky, Kollontai, Stivere and Merkalin, on which, in accordance with our instruction "2754, accounts are opened in branches of German private banks in Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. These documents must have two signatures - Dirhau and Milkenberg. Each request of the above Russian representatives must be carried out immediately. " The historic arrival of a train with Russian revolutionaries from exile was organized by the Third Bureau. The train calmly crossed

Germany, no sealed cars - ordinary passenger cars, in which officers of the German counterintelligence and secret services of

the German General Staff launched a stormy activity. The train was carrying 110 Russian emigrants according to the list compiled by Lenin, and exactly the same number of agents of the Third Bureau. All passengers were provided with official documents issued by the German authorities. For the successful completion of this large-scale operation, the German General Staff called in its best agents. The total number of agents exceeded 400, including [30] agitators and propagandists. They entered Russia through Sweden, having received funds from banks allocated by

German intelligence. Ludendorff calculated that about 70 million marks were spent on organizing the Russian Civil War. But a few hours of military operations on the Western Front cost so much.

American bankers amassed fabulous capital: having borrowed 12 million dollars to Russian revolutionaries in exile, over the next four years they received 600 million gold rubles.

And on the battlefields, this operation also gave the desired result. In the spring of 1918, Ludendorff sent all available reserves to the Western Front, making a breakthrough in the Anglo-French direction.

{53} In 1918, Ludendorff recalled: Russia has fallen." What this

operation turned out to be for Russia is known, but let's not blame Ludendorff and Nikolai - they fought for the survival of their country, their Germany.

Nicolai and the German General Staff correctly calculated the forces in this operation, but despite this they could not prevent the defeat of Germany in the First World War. The war ended in defeat, the country faced a revolution... In

his memoirs, Nicolai writes: "When the revolution that followed finally betrayed

Germany to the enemy, I began to insist on my leaving the post, as I considered it my duty, caused by the enormous danger of unlimited penetration of enemy intelligence to Germany. However, the high command considered the political burden of military intelligence too heavy for me to stay. The War Office did not even agree to my appointment to the border guard. I was dismissed. The high command transferred to Kolberg [31] tried to attract me to cooperate, at least with regard to the use of my experience. However, from the political side, this was not allowed either."

But Nicolai did not resign. He belongs to those Germans who believed that Germany did not lose the war, but was betrayed ... He begins a new stage in his activity. At a secret meeting attended by Ludendorff, Hindenburg and a group of

officers of the General Staff, Nicolai said: "This is a defeat, but if we do not want the defeat to turn into a real disaster for Germany and the General Staff, then we must blame it not on the soldiers, but on the leadership. If necessary then we will sacrifice the emperor and the empire!".{54}

On November 9, 1918, the first part of the plan developed by Nicolai was implemented - in the morning, Reich Chancellor Prince Max of Baden published an official message about the decision of Wilhelm II to abdicate and the appointment of Ebert, the leader of the Social Democrats of the majority, as Reich Chancellor. Now it was necessary to take urgent measures to normalize the situation in the country,

prevent slipping into the abyss of revolution.

Immediately after the abdication of Emperor Nicholas, Hindenburg and Groener met at a meeting in Spa and discussed the main issue - how to suppress revolutionary uprisings. {55} Late in the evening, the phone rang in the office of the new Chancellor. Ebert knew where

they were calling from: the device connected Berlin with the headquarters of the Supreme High Command in Spa. Ebert heard over the phone: "Groener is talking to you. Is the government ready to protect Germany from anarchy and restore order." {56} This was the voice of the quartermaster general, that is, the chief of staff of the army, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Groener. {57} History knows many paradoxes. But the telephone conversation between Berlin and Spa, carefully recorded by Groener's adjutant Major Volkmann, is one of the most incredible: the Kaiser's General Groener ordered the Social Democrat Ebert to be a Republican! Ebert was excited, but controlled himself: "Yes, of course!". [32] Groener continued: "Excellent! In this case, the high command takes responsibility for the discipline of the troops and the restoration of order in the country." Ebert readily agreed. This unprecedented pact went down in history under the name of the Groener-Ebert pact. The first years of the existence of the Weimar Republic passed under the banner of this pact.

...

There are different versions about the further fate of Walter Nikolai... It was rumored that he was one of the numerous victims of the Nazi regime in Germany in 1934, and many foreign reference books define this date as the date of his death. There are sources that describe his activities in 1939. {58} Boyadzhii writes in his "History of espionage": Until his death in 1935, the former head of the secret department III-b remained the Führer's adviser in all matters relating to the secret war. {59} The French researchers Faligot and Koffer literally put the following in their book: "... according to Gerd Buchheit, Abwehr historian, Walter Nikolai has been in the USSR since 1945, but as a prisoner in a camp, where he dies. Only a study of Soviet archives can clarify the matter. " {60} Unfortunately, they were right. Teodor Gladkov testifies: "... in the city of Halle, none other than ... Colonel Walter Nikolai, the same head of German military intelligence during the First World War, whose portrait adorned the office of the chief of the Abwehr, was discovered and detained in the city of Halle Admiral Canaris... Nikolai was subjected to numerous but correct interrogations. However, the old wolf from intelligence after Hitler came to power was out of work, and could not tell anything important to the officers interrogating him. Soon he died. {61} Vladimir Fedko, researcher [33]

Editor's Preface (to the Russian edition)

The book of Nikolai brought to the attention of the reader, despite its rather large shortcomings and gaps, its willful and involuntary inaccuracies, is a very valuable contribution to the literature on intelligence issues. So far, the intelligence service during the World War has not been covered in any country. True, individual journal articles have appeared in some countries, and several pamphlets on intelligence issues have also appeared, but in most cases they are not of a serious nature. They are preferred by Pinkertonism, descriptions of individual juicy episodes from intelligence activities. It is, of course, not only the authors of this literature who are to blame for this, but,

authors

study

mainly, the fact that, firstly, the topic itself is already very sensitive, and secondly, the former Entente considers it necessary to carefully hide everything that it did in the field of intelligence during the world war, because both employees and the system, and the techniques of this service may still be useful to her in the future. It is as if Germany has nothing more to fear from all this, for her entire intelligence organization has been smashed,

partly exposed. It would seem, therefore, that Nicolai would be truly and completely frank and lift the veil over this mysterious special intelligence. This would be extremely interesting and instructive, because until now everyone has held, and still holds, the opinion that the only country in which intelligence has been raised to the proper height and performed miracles is Germany.

But Nicolai is far from frank, sincere and objective. To be such, apparently, is prevented by an unquenched thirst for revenge. This thought runs like a red thread through the entire book. Some places in this book, where he, carried away [34] by the propaganda of the idea of revenge, moved away from the topic, we considered it necessary to simply cross out, since they are of no interest. Nicolai inflates and praises the organization and activities of the Entente intelligence, in particular Tsarist Russia, to incredible proportions, and deliberately, to the point of naivety, downplays that of the Germans.

His book, with regard to Germany, is written so diplomatically and vaguely that, after reading it, you will never get a clear picture of the organization, methods and activities of German intelligence. Only in some places, with careful reading, one can catch contradictions that are imperceptible at first glance. So, for example, Nicolai keeps saying that German intelligence was in a terrible pen, no one paid attention to it before the war, it was corroded by departmental antagonism, it was not given funds, it had no political leadership, etc., etc., and at the same time, several times he clearly and definitely emphasizes that intelligence always provided all the information needed by the German command exhaustively and in advance. The question is, what else is needed? After all, this is the ideal of every intelligence service - to give the command the necessary comprehensive information and on time.

Further. Nicolai writes that in peacetime the Germans did not have a well-established and well-established agent network in the Entente countries. But a few lines below, he states that during the war the agent of German intelligence was the commandant of one fortress, although, however, during the war, "national feelings" spoke in him and he refused the offer of the Germans to surrender the fortress to them.

With regard to Russia, Nicolai categorically asserts that the Germans did not have anything serious in it by the beginning of the war. But this, of course, is not true. Even according to the weak tsarist counterintelligence, the Germans in Russia, long before the war, had a well-established and firmly established agent network. Thus, French counterintelligence established in 1916 that the German insurance companies maintain close ties with the insurance companies of Russia. These latter, under the plausible pretext [35] of reinsurance, quite openly forwarded insurance bordereaus to Germany. According to these borders, German intelligence had a complete picture of the Russian military industry, military shipbuilding, and so on.

During the war, Russian counterintelligence discovered a rather impressive number of German intelligence agents among the officers of the Russian army, up to and including the rank of general, for example, Colonel Arthur Stürmer (hanged at the beginning of 1916), Colonel or General Ivanov; in general, until March 1916, 87 Austrians were discovered on the Southwestern Front alone. and German spies. It is clear that they were drawn into this work in peacetime. Nicolai denies the guilt of Gendarme Lieutenant Colonel Myasoedov, who was executed by the Russians as a German spy. He is inclined to argue

that the Myasoedov case is similar to the Dreyfus case in France, only with a much more tragic ending. True, the matter is extremely dark and confusing. But, judging by the materials that appeared in the press and which were intended to prove

the complete innocence of Myasoedov, it turns out, on the contrary, the impression that he really had a connection with German intelligence. Nicholas is also silent

about the role of German intelligence in various high-society and court salons in Petrograd. But Russian counterintelligence had certain information that these salons, both in peacetime and during the war, were used by the Germans for intelligence purposes.

He also says nothing about the role in German intelligence of that huge number of German colonists, consisting of dual citizenship, with whom the Russian regions bordering on Germany and areas of fortresses were flooded.

And their tasks and role are well known. Nikolai

also says nothing about how his fellows treated Rasputin. I. V. Gessen on this occasion conveys the following statement by A. N. Khvostov, the tsarist Minister of the Interior (dated February 1916).

"I did not interfere in his (Rasputin's) behavior before, but [36] then became convinced that he belongs to an international espionage organization, that he is surrounded by persons who are registered with us and who invariably come to him as soon as he returns from Tsarsky, and they ask him everything in detail.

If we recall the relationship of Rasputin with the royal court, then one can easily imagine what value he was for German intelligence. So we also have irrefutable evidence that Wilhelm II himself was not only interested in the results of his intelligence, not only gave her guidance and tasks, but even he himself did not disdain to engage in intelligence in those circles where it was impossible for his other intelligence agents to penetrate. He "processed" the monarchs, presidents and court circles of different countries, and, I must say, quite successfully. He does not hesitate to write to Nikolai Romanov that the President of America, Roosevelt, "informed him about this and that", that "the mother of the Emperor (Nikolai) constantly informs me of everything", etc.

In August 1905, during a visit by the British fleet to German waters, he orders his fleet to "relentlessly follow the British and, when it anchors, stop close, give them (the British) dinner, give them as much to drink as possible and find out from them, what you need and then leave. Wilhelm secretly informs Romanov about this plan of his. Wilhelm in almost every letter informs Nikolai Romanov of this or that "intelligence news". Either they are from a "private source", then "from

a source that is completely trustworthy", then "from a familiar and devoted German, sent by me to follow the Entente", then newspaper information, a magazine article of such and such an influential person, etc., etc. Dr. Wilhelm, under a pseudonym, writes articles of a military-political nature in newspapers with the aim of inspiring his neighbors. He himself chooses and sends his representatives to other countries, gives characteristics to people who are necessary and valuable to him, suits them. He himself appoints military attachés in the countries he needs and maintains personal contact with them. Furthermore. From day to day he "works" [37] Nikolai Romanov so deftly that, on his orders, he appoints as his ministers, ambassadors, military attachés, governors of the provinces bordering Germany, etc. persons desirable for Wilhelm. The latter opens hospitals on the border with Russia, furnishes them impeccably in all respects, lures them there

under a plausible pretext - the treatment of Russian subjects - and his scouts find out everything they need from them. For Russian officers and dignitaries useful to him, he does not spare orders, money, affection and represents them in the eyes of Nikolai Romanov as the most devoted subjects of the last.

Any intelligence officer can learn from Wilhelm how to collect the necessary information. He studies people in detail, gropes for their weaknesses, which he skillfully plays on. So, for example, in relation to Nikolai Romanov, he uses the following technique. During the Russo-Japanese War, he needed to weaken the Russian troops on the German border and find out what troops Romanov intended to use.

strengthen your Far Eastern army. He does not pose the question directly, because it will be immodest, and Nikolai may not give a direct answer. Therefore, he pulls the latter, as they say, by the tongue. He writes him a diplomatic letter, in which he indicates the number of divisions in the Far East from Japan and Russia. In order to gain an advantage over the Japanese, he offers Romanov to send so many more divisions to the Far East. At the same time, Wilhelm clearly hints that these divisions must be taken from the German border. Whether Nikolai Romanov understood Wilhelm's back thought is not known, but the fact is that some units were indeed sent to the Far East from the German border, and moreover, as follows: artillery was snatched from one corps, an infantry brigade, a sapper team from another, etc. This caused significant damage to the combat capability of the corps located on the German border.

Thus, Wilhelm's goal was achieved: the Russian troops on the German border were weakened and so far harmless. It was beneficial for Wilhelm to quarrel Russia with France [38] and England. He carefully selects facts and facts, gives them his own coverage and, with his conclusions, presents them to Nikolai Romanov. When all this does not affect Nikolai Romanov strongly enough, Wilhelm begins to systematically play on his weakest strings. He writes to him: France, they say, is a republic, England is a liberal monarchy. They want to destroy the monarchy in Russia and Germany, therefore they give refuge to the revolutionaries of the latter. Consequently, no friendship with these countries, only Russia and Germany should be in friendship and act together against the Entente. And Wilhelm continues this peculiar processing of Nikolai Romanov in each of his letters.

Of course, we are far from asserting that all this was done and written only personally by Wilhelm himself, that all this is the fruit of his thought. No, German intelligence (gen. Wedel) and diplomacy were certainly hiding behind his back and speaking through his lips - and Wilhelm was their obedient and rather

talented performer.

Quite a few examples of this kind can be cited, and it is unlikely that Nicolai will be able to refute them. The mistake of German

intelligence, which led to some of its disorder at the beginning of the war, was in the system of building an agent network, namely, that the Germans were based mainly on their compatriots and even in a dream did not allow the possibility that the tsarist government in the first days war proved capable of hiding them almost without exception in prisons and in Siberia. However, the Germans quickly recovered from this blow, contacted the surviving agents, and work began. Nicolai is stubbornly silent about this, not wanting to give out to everyone the well-known secret of building German intelligence organizations. Nicolai claims that the Germans did not engage in active (destructive and annihilating) intelligence. He says that German intelligence has repeatedly received the most serious proposals to kill this or that high-ranking person in the enemy camp, to blow up factories,

warehouses, etc., but the Germans allegedly [39] always refused such proposals. But this is not true either. Entente counterintelligence has a large amount of data on this subject. The only truth is that the Germans did not always manage to put such intentions into practice. So, for example, German intelligence tracked down the English Lord Kitchener and the German submarine sent him to the next world, but Nikolai Nikolaevich and Nikolai Romanov, no matter how much the terrorists of German intelligence hunted for them, failed to catch. German intelligence killed quite a lot of people for such enterprises.

And how many military factories, warehouses, bridges, steamships, etc., the German active intelligence launched into the air in the rear of its opponents - Nicolai is silent about this, and for good reason. Nicolai claims that German intelligence was

extremely weak in agitation and propaganda in the ranks of its opponents. But this is also not true. More organized and real agitation and propaganda than

Germans, during the war, hardly any of the belligerents led. In this respect, the Germans were inimitable masters. Recall, for example, the "Russian Messenger" and a lot of different proclamations, leaflets and caricatures with which the Germans bombarded the Russian trenches, etc.

How widespread agitation and propaganda was among the Germans can be seen from the words of M. Erzberger that already in October 1914 in Germany there were "at least 27 bureaus or departments" involved in German propaganda outside Germany. According to Erzberger, each of these bureaus or agencies engaged in propaganda at their own peril and risk, without any unifying idea. But gradually all these bureaus were united into one central bureau for propaganda work abroad. The total amount of expenditure spent during the war by the Germans on propaganda is unknown. But Erzberger's statement that his bureau alone spent 12,000,000 marks on propaganda indicates that the total expenditure on propaganda was enormous. The Germans very skillfully used every suitable occasion for agitation and [40] propaganda: lack of weapons, a lost battle, the mood of soldiers, national contradictions, the composition of governments, etc., and did not even disdain organizing and supporting uprisings and a "revolutionary" movement in the camp of enemies. . Quite extensively and in detail, one of

these enterprises is described by Nikolai's compatriot Captain Karl Spindler in the book "The Mysterious Carrying Weapons to the Irish

ship",
nationalist revolutionaries.

Nicolai also passes over in silence the misinformation of the enemy, well-placed by the Germans in peacetime. So, for example, back in 1908, the Germans sold the "Note on the distribution of German armed forces in case of war" to Russian intelligence. This note, although not entirely well drawn up in form and style, but with the original signatures of the then chief of the Great General Staff Moltke and Wilhelm himself, was evaluated by the Russian General Staff as the most authentic, beyond any doubt document. 2nd Chief Quartermaster of the Russian Gen. of the headquarters, Major General Borisov then wrote about this "linden": "... It is very interesting for us. In my opinion, we can vouch for its authenticity. It was compiled very seriously and with a true military look and enthusiasm, unfortunately not accepted in our dry formal orders ...".

But it is precisely this side of the document that betrays that it was fabricated for sale and misleading the enemy. Russian gene. the headquarters did not bother to compare the style and tone of this document with the real German documents that it had and fell for the bait. But is this the only "linden" slipped by the Germans on their opponents for a lot of money? During the war, the Germans were very clever in deceiving their opponents also by spreading false information through double agents, the press, etc. Even Ludendorff writes about this in his Memoirs.

All this must be kept in mind when reading Nicolai's book, otherwise the German intelligence service and its [41] activities will be misrepresented.

Nicholas painted the intelligence of tsarist Russia in such a way that the reader can really get the impression of its exemplary organization, staging and work. In fact, the situation was completely different.

First, the assertion that Russian military intelligence spent from 13 to 25 million rubles, obviously not true,

Until 1905, 113,650 rubles a year were allocated to the military ministry, excluding the maritime department, for secret expenses, and from this amount, starting from 1885, it was issued with the "highest permission", to the full and direct disposal of the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian military district, for reconnaissance in Turkey and Persia -56.890 rubles, i.e. 50% of the total amount. The remaining amount (56,760 rubles) was released to the disposal of the main department of the gene. headquarters and was distributed as follows: Headquarters of military districts - 51,000 rubles.

Consul in Bombay - 1.200 - For the maintenance of a military dovecote in Denmark - 3.000 - For the acquisition of random information - 1.560 - In addition, official military agents received funds for their personal existence under other budget items of the War Department.

In 1913, the secret estimate of the Ministry of War under the article "for the use known to His Imperial Majesty" was approved in the amount of 1,947,850 rubles.

Of this amount, about 180,000 rubles were spent on reconnaissance against Germany and Austria. It can be assumed that approximately the same amount was spent on counterintelligence against these countries.

Nicolai's statement that before the war German intelligence received only about 450,000 marks is not true, since, despite Nicolai's complaints, in Germany there was always the closest contact between military intelligence and intelligence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and [42] the latter for secret needs received about 1,500,000 marks a year.

In addition, one must also take into account the free exploitation by German intelligence of their compatriots abroad, especially merchants and manufacturers, as well as the amounts that were received from disinformation material sold to other intelligence agencies.

Nikolai knows perfectly well about the organization and activities of Russian intelligence from the Russo-Japanese War. True, after the unsuccessful outcome of this war, the alarm was sounded in Russia about the badly placed intelligence service. But at that time, Russian political and military circles were also infected with Nicolai's current disease - the desire for revenge in the Far East. Only since 1912 did this desire subside, and the main attention turned towards the West - Germany and Austria. Nicolai illustrates his story about how Russian intelligence worked in the West with a very typical example of Russian intelligence - the failure of its own valuable employee in the Austrian Gen. headquarters. German intelligence did not make such gross mistakes and did not

destroy its valuable employees so frivolously. Nicolai points out that the Germans found documents at the border points of Russian intelligence, indicating that the Russians had a lot of valuable data about Germany. There is no doubt that Russian intelligence should have had something: after all, people worked and money was spent. But he is silent about how many of these documents that the Russians had were fabricated by German intelligence. The most indicative of

the weak setting and disorganization of Russian intelligence on the eve of the war is the following fact.

On July 9, 1914, the main department of Gen. headquarters categorically forbade the military attache in Italy to engage in reconnaissance against Germany and Austria-Hungary, on July 20th the same General Staff sends a hysterical [43] telegraphic order to the same military agent by all means until July 25th to establish on which front - to the western or eastern, - the internal German corps will move, and for the successful completion of this order on time, a reward of 25,000 rubles was promised. The military agent accidentally managed to fulfill this order, but it cost 35,200 Italian lire and 25,000 rubles. The question is whether such a game of chances is admissible under good

organizing and staging intelligence?

It can be categorically stated that with the outbreak of hostilities and the departure of military agents from Germany and Austria, the Russian General Staff found itself with nothing, that is, without any information about the enemy, without any agent network. There was also no plan for the work of intelligence during the war. What we see in the first period of the war is not organized intelligence activity, but some kind of chaos and confusion. Deep foreign military intelligence is beginning to be dealt with by everyone who does not

laziness. One enumeration of all these bodies can lead to horror: 1. Main Directorate of the General Staff;

2. Main Directorate of the Naval General Staff; 3. Headquarters of the supreme commander; 4. The supreme head of the sanitary unit, Prince of Oldenburg (for gases); 5. Headquarters of all fronts; 6. Headquarters of all armies;

7. Headquarters of some military districts; 8.

Headquarters of some corps. All these institutions, each independently and independently, sent their agents to neutral countries and, in most cases, connected them with Russian military agents - the main leaders of the agents of the main directorate of Gen. headquarters. They were connected not so that the latter could manage and coordinate their activities, but simply as a legal point of contact. [44]

This chaos and confusion reached the point that the XI Army planted its network in Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, North. America and Argentina, and the II Army - in Canada. In this state of affairs, there is

nothing surprising in the fact that the German counterintelligence could expose whole batches of Russian intelligence agents. At first, agents of various organizations, driven to neutral countries like herring in a barrel, began to decipher and fail each other. Then, gradually, all this subsided and, left to themselves, the agents, as it were, united, began, with the help of the good fellows from Nikolay's counterintelligence, to fabricate various fictitious reports and transfer them each to their own institution. At the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, the impression was that since all the reports from different sources hit the same point, it means that they are true. Only later, with the help of Entente intelligence information, did the headquarters realize what was happening.

At the end of 1915, the "Inter-Allied Bureau" (Bureau Interallie) was created in Paris under the French Ministry of War. The tasks of this bureau were: "Joint study and development of common measures to combat enemy espionage, smuggling and propaganda, as well as the centralization of all information about the enemy." A young Lieutenant Colonel Count Ignatiev (whose brother was at that time a military

agent in France), who had previously been the head of the agents of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front in Paris, was appointed representative of the Headquarters of the Russian commander-in-chief in this Bureau. Naturally, agents of all the above-mentioned Russian intelligence agencies, scattered throughout Switzerland, France and Holland, reached out to him. By the end of 1916, the Bureau already united 28 independent organizations. But in fact, Count Ignatiev at that time led these organizations only in part, and mainly was an intermediary between them and their owners on Russian territory. At the beginning of 1916, the General Staff realized that the situation with intelligence was more than bad, and began to insist [45] on subordinating all deep foreign intelligence to itself. On this issue, he wrote on January 18, 1916 ("102") to the Headquarters of the

Commander-in-Chief: "In July 1915, the main department of Gen. headquarters received alarming information from our military agent in Copenhagen that the group of intelligence agents of the former headquarters of the North-Western Front, who were in this city, was behaving so carelessly, visiting places of entertainment and revolving in the society of suspicious persons, which attracted the attention of local residents " .

Further, it is said that, thanks to this, the Germans out of 11 agents lured 9 people into their service, and as a result, the Germans in Warsaw discovered and executed 8 agents of Russian intelligence. In conclusion, it is proposed, in order to eliminate these and other abnormalities, to unite all agents in the hands of Gen. headquarters. The Commander-in-Chief replied quite reasonably to this that, in principle, of course,

he did not object to such a centralization of all deep undercover intelligence in the hands of Gen. headquarters, but the latter must prove that he is able to cope with this matter. In explanation of this slap in the face, Gen. headquarters says that

"... at the beginning of the war, foreign intelligence in the sense of covering the position of the enemy to the armies did not show itself at all, and it seemed that it did not exist at all. Information about the enemy delivered by military agents was limited to an empty enumeration of trains passing through one or another point. The information of military agents regarding the concentration of up to 450,000 Austrians in Bukovina has already borne fruit. Persistent information about the formation of an army of 275 regiments in Germany cannot be called detailed work. Such information, of course, killed in the field headquarters any belief in the possibility of obtaining any correct information, and therefore the fronts were forced to plant their intelligence abroad behind enemy lines.

As if in his own defense, Gen. the headquarters writes to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief: "... By the time the war began, due to a particularly unfavorable situation, perhaps due [46] to some defects in the organization of the case itself, foreign intelligence in countries hostile to us actually ceased to exist and the military agents in neutral countries had to hastily arrange an intelligence network from the elements at hand ... ". Correspondence on the transfer of all deep undercover intelligence to Gen. the headquarters dragged on until June 1917, when, finally, this transfer took place. Gen. the headquarters received at its

disposal approximately 40 independent intelligence organizations, each with 5-15-26 people, and about 450 individual agents. The right to independently conduct reconnaissance was reserved only for the Caucasian front.

When hiring agents, the General Staff tried to take into account the results and cost of the work of this vast intelligence organization. Of course, with the chaos that reigned in intelligence at that time, it was not possible to fully fulfill this intention. However, something rather juicy came to light. Firstly, it was established that German counterintelligence had penetrated quite deeply into the Russian agents, which extorted money for information fabricated by Nikolai's administration. For example, among the network of the military attaché in Italy, Colonel Gen. Enckel's headquarters (who was the chief of the general staff of Finland until the end of 1924), an entire organization, the so-called "Roman", was discovered, consisting of former employees of the international sleeping car society and at the same time in the service of Nicolai, giving information fabricated by the latter and absorbing for 1.5 year about 2.000.000 Italian lire.

Conducted in August 1917, a survey of the results of the work by that time of the largest Russian intelligence center in Paris - the Bureau gr. Ignatiev, gave the following picture: during the period from May 1 to August 1917, he sent a total of 324 reports to Russia, of which: - valuable - 38, - useless - 87, - frivolous - 28, [47] - incorrect - 154 - belated - 17. In conclusion, the

commission that

conducted the survey

writes: "The commission

recognizes such an

insignificant percentage

of satisfactory information as a fact indicating serious shortcomings in the organization and activities of the Bureau named (Count Ignatiev). The success of the work with the existing organization of the Bureau's affairs is completely responds neither to the tasks entrusted to him, nor to the especially large sums allocated for his maintenance. Colonel Krivenko, who was part of the Russian military mission at the French headquarters, wrote about the work of the Ignatiev Bureau on September 26, 1917 in Gen. headquarters: "... I only consider it necessary, in view of the

seriousness of the issue, to note that the intelligence material of this Bureau, sent,

by the way, to the main French apartment, remains there in unopened envelopes as useless ... ". Things were no better with the rest of the Russian intelligence

organizations.

Nicolai writes that Russian intelligence was also involved in organizing a revolutionary movement in Germany, murders, sabotage, explosions, etc. Nicolai is right in this matter, in his own way; attempts of this kind actually took place, and ended very sadly ... for the Russian General Staff. Here are the largest of such a series of attempts: At the end of 1916, the interpreter of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain Bragin, came up with a plan to organize a revolutionary movement in Germany. This plan was built very widely, up to the publication

of underground newspapers, leaflets, agitation in factories, the creation of printing houses, commercial enterprises, banks, etc., etc. To put this plan into practice, Bragin demanded only ... 40,000 .000 rub. in year. The project, despite all its absurdity, was accepted by all instances, and Bragin had to start putting it into practice. But the chief, Gen. Headquarters Averyanov found the amount too large and offered Bragin to reduce something. He flatly refused. In the meantime, the February Revolution broke out, and Bragin's [48] project remained as such.

After the February Revolution, Moscow professor R. I. Vonglovsky submitted a memorandum to the commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, in which he proposed to establish a special committee for processing Austrian and German prisoners of war in the "revolutionary" spirit and, after processing them in one way or another, to fuse them to their V homeland with instructions to lead them there revolutionary propaganda. The memorandum reached Kerensky himself, received his approval, and stopped there. Finally, the third adventure - on the "revolutionary" (?) indoctrination of Turkey - was carried out by the headquarters of the Odessa military district in 1916. This "revolutionary" indoctrination in its program had: "the beating of the German staff and the Young Turks loyal to the Germans, the explosions of

bridges, railway lines. roads, tunnels, warehouses of firearms, arson of provisions and clothing stores, obstruction of the timely delivery of firearms and food supplies, etc.". The program also provided for appropriate agitation among the various tribes inhabiting Turkey, which had nothing to do with the revolution. The executor of this plan, a certain Georgy Alexandrovich Fardi, at the end of 1916 informed the headquarters of the Odessa military district that his organization had committed murders: von der Goltz Pasha, Abdul Pasha, von Münzner Pasha, Ahmed-Zade, Selim Bey ; assassination attempts on Enver Pasha and Sanders Pasha; massacres of German-Turkish officers in Sivas on June 15, etc. Fardi received 86,900 rubles for this. and henceforth demanded 50,000 rubles a month.

The headquarters of the Odessa military district and the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief believed this obvious lie of Fardi. He did not kill anyone, did not encroach on anyone, did not agitate anyone, but was in the service of Nikolai, extorted people's money from Russian intelligence and gave out agents to German counterintelligence. But only on September 23, 1917, the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief learned about this from Pototsky, a military agent in Copenhagen. [49]

The work of the current president of one of the republics that emerged as a result of the world war was more successful. During the war, this current president was actually a recruiter of agents for Russian intelligence and led the disintegration of the army of one of Germany's allies. It cost a lot of money to Russian intelligence, but it also caused a lot of harm to the enemy.

For agitation by the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief in Stockholm and Romania, under the leadership of a well-known Polish journalist, now a senator, Vladislav Rabsky, a "press bureau" was created under the name "Nord-Sud", but the results of his work were so insignificant, and the costs were so great that in 1916 this institution was liquidated. True, Russian intelligence had several rather solid agents, both in terms of their social status and value, but they were not able to

make them work, didn't know how to use them. So, for example, agents of Russian intelligence consisted of: one of the prominent generals of present-day Poland and one of the former ministers of the same Poland in 1923 (at that time they were both deputies of the Prussian Sejm). But both of them did not give anything of value.

Here is a brief and general picture of the work of Russian deep foreign military intelligence during the war. It can hardly be considered even satisfactory. Now a few words about Russian tactical front-line intelligence. Despite the

bitter experience of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian General Staff still believed that the cavalry could handle such reconnaissance. But already at the beginning of 1915, disappointment set in, and the allies suggested that it was necessary to conduct reconnaissance through agents across the front line, to engage in undercover interrogation of prisoners (among the prisoners to plant your agent to eavesdrop on their conversations), eavesdrop on the enemy's telephone conversations, and so on.

The reconnaissance departments of the headquarters of the fronts, armies and, to some extent, corps took up this matter. But even here, until the end of the existence of the tsarist army, positive results could not be achieved. The main trouble was the absence [50] of people who knew and loved this business and the general organizational confusion. For example, when the Russian troops left Lvov, the junction of two armies converged there. The recruiters of the intelligence departments of these armies interrupted each other's agents, inflating their value and, of course, corrupting them. Such phenomena took place all the time. A lot of money was spent and a lot of people were ruined, but the results were the most miserable, not to say - equal to zero.

The following figures for the V Army speak best of all about this! During the period from 1/XI-1915 to 28/VIII-1916, 137 agents were sent across the front behind enemy lines, 23 agents returned with information, and 4 of them brought important information, 16 unimportant, the remaining 3 agents - doubles (worked for the Germans); 72 agents did not return at all, 32 agents did not go through the front. As you can see, the results are the most deplorable. The Germans took into account the weakness of Russian intelligence in this area as

well and won most of the agents over to their side by a more dexterous and vital approach to them. Only a few of these agents confessed this to their first masters, the Russians. The majority remained silent and passed on the correct data to the Germans, and to the Russians data fabricated by the German counterintelligence. The Russian military counterintelligence could not pose a great danger to German intelligence, because it was relatively young (it was

created only in 1911; before that, the Ministry of the Interior, represented by the police department and gendarme departments, was engaged in military counterintelligence), without experience and skills, did not have trained personnel. personnel, as a result of which, despite the antagonism between the General Staff and the Ministry of the Interior, she tried to ride gendarmerie officers. The latter, on the other hand, leaned towards political investigation and adhered to the methods of provocation and surveillance familiar to them. In most cases, they had little idea of military intelligence, and in the fight against intelligence they used methods of the Okhrana, which turned out to be completely unsuitable for this purpose. [51] How low was the level of military counterintelligence workers of the tsarist general staff, shows the following fact, told by S.M. Captain P. According to agents, indeed, a mass of spies and agitators filtered through the Danube under the guise of refugees from the areas conquered by the Germans to Izmail. to the crowd, which of them was really a refugee, which

was a spy, seemed to me quite impossible. But Captain P. was convinced that there was nothing easier than that. "You can see a spy in the face," he assured me. then the agent, a former bailiff in Izmail, demoted by the (February) revolution, convinced him

that the Germans put special

brands that he allegedly saw for himself on some confessed spies. Captain P. believed this nonsense and therefore looked not only at the face, but also at the ass, looking for this peculiar visa on it.

In Russian counterintelligence there were quite a few people like this captain P. Settling personal scores, inventing and inflating cases, with the aim of serving in the eyes of the authorities, obtaining orders, ranks and getting more money for expenses - these are in most cases the main motivating impulses of the workers of the tsarist counterintelligence .

It is clear that such counterintelligence was not very dangerous for enemy intelligence, and he could drive it with impunity by the nose. In this respect, the Germans were inimitable masters. This is, in general terms, the picture of the organization, construction and work of Russian military intelligence before and

during the World War. It is impossible to cover this issue in a more thorough and detailed way in a brief preface; this requires a special work, much more voluminous than the work of Nicolai. For the same [52] reasons, we had to pass over in silence the question of organizing reconnaissance of the Entente, and also did not have to dwell in more detail on the reconnaissance of Germany and the allies. For the same reasons, we have not been able at the moment to identify and point out all the conscious or unconscious distortions of facts by Nicolai and their tendentious and one-sided coverage. We had to focus only on the larger ones. Nevertheless, despite all the above defects, the work of Nikolai deserves to be familiarized not only with intelligence workers, but also with the command and political

staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. In this work there are many very instructive facts and examples from the activities of intelligence or "secret power", as Nicolai calls it. True, as mentioned above, some of them are inaccurate, or even incorrect, but it is quite easy to establish the truth, at least from memoirs and memoirs about the war, of which a fairly large number have appeared in recent years.

K. K. Zvonarev. Moscow,
March 1925 [53]

Author's Preface

To my Fatherland - for warning.

Anyone who wants to help him regain his freedom, and who, because of this is threatened by enemies - for teaching.

In the description of my activities during the World War, published in the spring of 1920, I devoted relatively little space to the intelligence service, although the direction of military intelligence and the fight against espionage in Germany constituted my only task since 1912, and during the war my first and main task in General Staff. The "press service", with which in Germany the "intelligence service" was often confused and confused, became one of the departments of the General Staff only during the war, before that it was not prepared

by any institution and was also not taken over by the government, but meanwhile without the military command decisively could not do without it.

If, thanks to this, only the General Staff was able to accumulate experience in the "press service" and appreciate the role of the press in the world war, then this applies to a greater extent to the intelligence service, since Germany did not have, like its opponents, a single political, economic intelligence service, led by the government. Thus, it seemed to refuse to use the political state of the enemy and to influence neutral countries through propaganda, its intelligence service was controlled and used almost exclusively in the military direction. That's why I've been asked many times

to share my experience specifically as the head of the intelligence service of the German High Command. However, until now, and especially at the time when I was compiling the above-mentioned work, I believed that publication of this material should be refrained from. Since then events have changed my point of view. Everywhere, and above all in Germany, intelligence work, in full bloom

blossomed during the World War, in full swing. [54]

During this time, Germany's opponents also managed to boast of their successes in intelligence. However, they have so far avoided removing the cover from that grandiose military, economic and political organization of propaganda and espionage to which they owe their success and in which they excelled Germany in the decades before the war. Germany, unfortunately, cannot claim to have realized in time the significance of intelligence and its development, that she had taken sufficient account of

its political role before and during the war. Moreover, it is necessary to admit the mistakes made quite openly. Apparently, even the experience of the war did not bring any change in this area. And what the General Staff was able under the given conditions to create or accumulate in the form of experience in its own field of activity, as a result of the known outcome of the war, for Germany, went to dust or remained unused. If the outcome of the war corresponded to the sacrifices of the German people and the work of their military command, then the General Staff would very persistently petition the government to use this experience. Alien intelligence, instead of corroding the foundation of the German state and the future of the German people, would again be uprooted. It seems to us, therefore, that a comprehensive acquaintance with

the methods and ways of German intelligence is necessary both in the event of an independent action by Germany and in order to successfully repulse enemy intelligence.

This also applies to those states that, having no intelligence of their own, do not have a sufficient idea of it and therefore do not suspect what danger their political freedom and national independence are endangered by those powerful states that emerged from the world war as true masters in the field. intelligence and the political propaganda generated by it. The secret further strengthens this danger. Therefore, it is quite correct that the description should be given precisely from the side of Germany, which had to contend with an intelligence [55] far superior to its own, and which,

therefore, it had the opportunity to study comprehensively. Of the victorious countries, France is especially interested in hushing up those means that contributed to her victory. England, and above all America, must beware of French intelligence, which they strengthened simultaneously with the strengthening of the military position of France.

Knowledge of what happened in the field of intelligence is also necessary for the historiography of the World War. Without this knowledge, history cannot pass its correct verdict, just as politics cannot draw the full benefit from the experience of the world war.

If for all these reasons I decided to supplement my first work, mentioned at the beginning, then I can still sketch a picture only with large strokes, since years are already separating us from these events and, moreover, I do not have sufficient information accumulated over time. war with a huge amount of factual data.

Nicholas.

Berlin. June 1923 [56]

I. Historical development

Military origins of espionage. France, as the creator of military-political intelligence. Louis XIV. Friedrich II. Napoleon III. Bismarck. The decline of German intelligence, the advancement of British and American intelligence.

The origin of espionage is military. Good knowledge, supplemented by espionage with the enemy, was always and everywhere a necessary auxiliary means of military struggle, since ignorance or an erroneous idea of what was happening with the enemy or about his intentions threatened with surprises, and, hence, with the loss of a battle, on which the fate of the state often depended and people. For such a primitive intelligence service, a couple of brave fellows were enough, whose cunning and reliability could be relied upon, who were tempted, for the most part, by large monetary rewards, and who, after completing the task, were willingly dismissed in order to hide the fact that the glory of the military success was based on the successes of cunning or betrayal. In this way, Napoleon I, thanks to the services of the famous spy Schulmeister, quickly and without shedding blood, occupied the fortress of Ulm. But already this first of the famous spies of modern times experienced all the ingratitude of his trade. Elevated for his services to a Corsican from a Bavarian smuggler to the police president of Vienna and the owner of a castle in Neudorf near Strasbourg, he died in the deepest need. His grave is located in the Saint-Urbain cemetery of the German city of Strasbourg, treacherously given to Louis XIV.

But only politically weak or young states could confine themselves to an intelligence service in wartime or be content with military intelligence alone. Already during the wars of Louis XIV and the Napoleonic era, intelligence also moved into the political sphere: espionage made its nest in the secret offices of diplomacy, and secret intelligence became an integral part of

part of politics.

France is the creator of permanent military-political intelligence. Napoleon III, under the influence of the ever-increasing [57] power of Prussia under Bismarck, for the first time gave the military intelligence service a solid form. In 1855, he created a uniformly organized and distributed throughout France special police, which became the main bearer of espionage during the Franco-Prussian war. After the war, the republic placed it at the disposal of the General Staff, whose "Second Bureau" took over the systematic organization of the intelligence service ("Service de renseignements") against Germany. At the present time, at the height of her military power, France is the consummate master and absolute master in this field. The leadership of intelligence is in the strong hands of a consciously powerful policy. Only then, Germany had statesmen with a similar political will, did the rudiments of espionage working in the service of politics appear in it. Such espionage existed in the era of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. The former no longer relied on the reports of his official representatives abroad and on the assurances of foreign diplomats who were at his court, but obtained independent and reliable information about the state of affairs through his own trusted people. When in the same way inquired about the military armament of his political opponents. So did Bismarck. During the war, under his political leadership, in Germany there was that complete agreement between military and political intelligence - as between military and political leadership in general - which then made it easier for Germany, and in the world war for its opponents, the path to success. Just as Bismarck was aware of the political situation and led it, so Moltke's military orders were systematically carried out on the basis of correct information about the enemy. His decision to lead the advancing German troops to the right to Sedan was based on intelligence information from Paris about MacMahon's move from Chalons, about his intention to bypass the right wing of the German army in the direction of Metz. Getting acquainted with the tasks of the intelligence service, I [58] got acquainted with intelligence veterans of that time. Having hitherto had a philistine idea of the low character of spies, I was amazed to meet them in the highest spiritual and social circles. I met people with a completely finished social training, highly cultured, and with an extensive general and

political education. Talking to them was of great psychological and political interest; he introduced the greatness of the past era and at the same time indicated the conditions under which only successful intelligence could be successful in the future. Since these conditions were realized as a result of the German wars of unification, German intelligence could then remain within narrow personal limits, especially since its goals were limited, and its forces, thanks to Bismarck's statesmanship, were always concentrated against one enemy. Bismarck's Germany was not known for working on all sides and attacking from all sides. Relations with England, and especially with Russia, were friendly. This was expressed in the fact that neither in relation to Russia, nor in

relation to England was conducted any intelligence beyond the official information. Russia itself, threatened not so much by external as by internal enemies, organized a purely political intelligence service directed mainly against these internal enemies and distributed throughout Europe in the form of a police organization - the famous Okhrana. Although the latter did not initially pursue the goals of military espionage, it was still capable of starting work at any time for military needs. Only the Russo-Japanese War brought Russia into the ranks of states consciously conducting military intelligence. The alliance with France put at the disposal of Russian intelligence the great experience of its ally, but at the same time turned it into a servant of French intelligence against Germany. The latter, however, did not take this development into account. Its political intelligence languished in the hands of diplomacy, which recruited and acted from the point of view of social considerations, strictly adhering [59] to correct paths and being content with what it found on these paths. The personal aristocratic way of thinking was transferred to the business conduct of operations. The saying "Wright or wrong - my country" did not take root among the Germans, due to competition with England. Military intelligence has lost political leadership,

and with it the understanding and support of political factors. This could not be compensated for either by the military attaches, included everywhere in the framework of diplomacy, or by the fact that, along with the German navy, the intelligence service of the Admiralty also grew up, which, although to a greater extent than the intelligence of the General Staff pursued political goals, but, in essence, was also military intelligence. In addition, it developed independently of the intelligence of the General Staff, next to it and only in weak contact with it, since both did not have either a general or political leadership.

The fact that Germany became, out of false political motives, the military teacher of other peoples, primarily the Japanese, caused the greatest harm to German interests. Japan was content with what she obtained without any effort in this way. She did not need any other intelligence, except for the one that Germany created for her. During this decline, disintegration and violation of German military interests, France strained all its forces for "revenge". She tied Russia to herself for this

purpose. Frightened by the economic flourishing of Germany, England broke with the old principle of balance of power ("balance of power") and untied the hands of the French policy of revenge against Germany.

As a world power, Britain has long had to maintain extensive intelligence. She knew and appreciated its significance in the struggle for world domination. Lord Fisher, who was First Lord of the Admiralty from 1904 to 1910 - at the same time as Edward VII created "entente cordiale" (cordial consent), writes in his memoirs:

"It is sad to see how unsatisfactory our spies and our intelligence agencies were, not only in [60] the last war, but especially in the war with the Boers. The words of the Sultan made such an impression on me that I independently set to work and was able, thanks to the patriotism of several Englishmen who occupied a prominent position in the trade on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, to organize in Switzerland a private, secret

intelligence center. Providence was pleased that I should be able, thanks to a happy coincidence, to receive the keys to the ciphers and all the encrypted messages emanating from various foreign embassies, missions and consulates.

English continental, Russian, French intelligence joined the military-political and economic intelligence. As in general in the Entente, England began to play a leading role in intelligence. Prudently freed, thanks to France and Russia, from military concerns, she subsequently limited herself mainly to the economic preparations for a world war and carried out her leadership with the help of political propaganda, in which she became the teacher of her allies and America. America before the war was interested, in general, only in the naval armaments of the great powers of the continent. With regard to the German land forces, she was content to be aware of the successes of this best, but not the greatest army in Europe.

It could, therefore, confine itself to the general point of view and official reports which Germany itself met halfway, and not resort to the detailed work of espionage. But the main reason, however, was the fact that before the war American intelligence did not have that hostile attitude towards Germany, which inspired the intelligence of England, France and Russia. At the same time, the days of decisive military battles for Germany passed, as well as the times when military intelligence was enough to prepare and conduct a war. Along with the army and politics, technology, industry and science came forward. In the internal life of states [61], new social problems have appeared, which have become both objects of awareness and objects of influence for intelligence.

The World War proved that the struggle between peoples grew out of the narrow framework of solving the case with weapons and became a struggle of all popular forces in the political, economic and military fields and, not least, in the field of the moral state of the people. Military intelligence was replaced by intelligence of the state against the countries surrounding it. It spread equally to all areas in which a stronger state could operate - to the economy, to politics, to armed force. Intelligence was no longer content with the purely negative work of informing, but moved on to positive action in the economic struggle, as well as in domestic and foreign political propaganda.

II. War preparation

Russian intelligence in the service of France. German intelligence in 1906-1914. French intelligence, neutral countries as a base. Belgian intelligence. Punished spies. Separate cases of state treason. The Dreyfus affair. Joint activities of the Entente and the Triple Alliance in the field of intelligence.

After a three-year course at the military academy, in 1904 I was sent to the Great General Staff. At the higher military school, I studied Russian and, along with lectures on military sciences, listened to lectures on the geography of distant countries, on the history of bygone centuries, on state and international law, but I did not hear anything about the foundations of our century, about modern politics. They did not explain to us - officers intended to continue the work of the General Staff - even the relationship between the countries of the Bismarck era, did not have any influence on our attitude to internal political issues, did not pay our attention to Germany's political or economic competitors. We were soldiers and only them. We felt called to do, like our great military models, our duty at the moment whose advent we

only suspected. Our eyes were turned mainly to the past, militarily only to the present, and in no respect to the future. The armies surrounding Germany, including the armies of the Triple Alliance, [62] were only a secondary subject of teaching. France was the enemy. We are not yet accustomed to Russia's hostility. England and America were considered maritime powers. The essence of a war on two fronts was sometimes spoken of, but never about a world war. My first assignment at the General Staff was a topographic survey of a locality in the Vistula valley near the Graudenz fortress. Having been in close contact for months with the

country and with the people in the Eastern border region of Germany, I learned about the anxiety that inspired the population with suspicious phenomena of constant Russian espionage and the stubborn struggle that the Poles waged to advance into the German country by buying and settling, spending large sums on this. sums of money. When, in the performance of official duties, I had more than once to enter into relations with the Polish inhabitants, the latter, excited by the instigators, treated the Prussian officer coldly and almost hostilely. In the Far East, rising Japan fought Russia for hegemony on the Asian continent. Far from their German teacher, the Japanese army defeated the Russian army. This resolute people applied German strategic and tactical principles and the latest achievements of military technology; they were first tested by the two great military powers. The German General Staff decided to send

officers to Japan in order to study the military experience of the Japanese army there. I was among the officers selected to study Japanese. After a year and a half of work at the Eastern Seminary and private lessons with the Japanese, of whom there were a large number in Germany, despite the war, we reached the point that we learned the Japanese language to a sufficient extent. Surrounded by the envy of our comrades, three of us enlisted in the Japanese army. Their task then turned out to be unenviable. They did not meet with a particularly cordial reception in the Japanese officer corps and, in contrast to how Japanese officers were received before in Germany, they were not allowed to really familiarize [63]. Being the only married officer in the Japanese language class, I once received a short notice that my assignment to Japan would not take place and that I should stop learning the language. The purposeless hard work of a year and a half was a heavy blow even for a selfless Prussian officer. My head of the department, Colonel von Lauenstein, a former military attache in St. Petersburg, consoled me with the new assignment given to me. There was a need for reconnaissance against Russia, which, immediately after the lost war with Japan, directed its armed preparations against Germany. As the first officer to receive training at the General Staff, I was to be assigned to a military district in the East and try to organize intelligence and counterintelligence there against Russia.

In the summer of 1906 I went to Königsberg. Before starting work, I made a trip to Russia, which was still under the influence of the revolution of 1905, in order to get acquainted with the country and people whom I had not yet seen, without this acquaintance my task seemed to me insoluble. I had no reason to hide my rank as a German officer in Russia. As a consequence, however, I came across everywhere the conviction that I had come to Russia for the purpose of military intelligence. During my stay in the fortresses, I was placed under supervision. In one large city, they were quite surprised by my stay in it, since the city was not at all a fortress. One of the senior officials, to whom I conveyed greetings from his relatives living in Germany, immediately took me aside and asked what I would like to know. The officers I met expressed comradely concern for my fate. Everywhere in Russia it seemed self-evident that an officer traveled abroad only for espionage. I received an explanation for this on my return from Russia, when I began my task of organizing the struggle

with Russian espionage in East Prussia [64] and gradually revealed it more and more. Prior to the Russo-Japanese

War, Russian espionage against long-term friendly Germany was not very active. However, during this war, his activities intensified, due to fear of the hostile attitude of Germany. This fear was politically supported by France and brought Russian intelligence closer to the French. The restoration of the Russian army on French instructions and with the help of French money finally subordinated Russian intelligence to the influence of French espionage, which had long been continuously working against Germany, and gave it the opportunity to familiarize itself with the entire experience of the latter. The autocratic, police and bureaucratic Russian state, more than anything else, approached this new task assigned to it. Added to this was the circumstance that the funds supplied by France for armaments provided the strongest support for espionage. The sums promised to spies and state traitors were extremely large in comparison with the state of affairs in economical Germany. Most often, however, everything was limited only to promises. Those who were on a Russian salary actually received, for the most part, meager pay.

Most of the funds were absorbed by their own organization at home and abroad. The consequence of its large size was the lack of leadership and supervision, which, in turn, contributed to the corruption of the Russian police officials and officers involved in this matter. Russian intelligence owed its success not so much to its qualities as to the fact that the emergence of espionage in the East took the German military and police authorities by surprise, who were accustomed until the beginning of the century to deal only with French intelligence. Insufficient, as a result of this, the defense on the part of Germany soon delivered noticeable successes to the enemy and prompted him to ever-increasing activity. The leadership of intelligence was in the hands of the General [65] Staff in St. Petersburg. From there, in contact with the military attaché and consulates, the processing of Berlin, Vienna and, in general, abroad took place. Each military district on the Russian western border

had an intelligence section consisting of 6-10 officers, headed by an officer of the General Staff. Intelligence departments in St. Petersburg and Vilna worked against Germany, in Kyiv - against Austria, in Warsaw - against both countries. They "processed" the highest headquarters of the German and Austro-Hungarian troops stationed in the border area. As intermediaries, they were subordinate to the border guards and the border gendarmerie, which, in addition, were entrusted with petty espionage work in the border strip as in the alleged theater of military operations. The Russian secret police, the Okhrana, recruited agents in all European capitals, whom it sent to military attaches for further use. Military attachés also worked from Germany against Austria and found fertile ground for this work in national contradictions.

The German border population was decomposed by smuggling and Russian intelligence money. The organs of the latter, with indescribable shamelessness, penetrated deep into Germany. The real ruler in the German border zone was a Russian border officer. The head of the border gendarmerie in Verzhbolovo, Colonel Myasoedov, worked especially successfully. The fact that he was every year a guest of the German emperor in Rominty during a hunt interfered with his activities just as little as the fact that they were specially seconded to the person of the German emperor interfered with the military attaches. On the contrary, it even contributed to their activities, as it surrounded them in the eyes of the German authorities with a halo that was difficult to fight.

All German authorities demanded, before taking action, accurate evidence, despite the fact that they would have to intervene at the slightest suspicion and deliver this evidence themselves, or at least prevent espionage by [66] timely intervention. The activities of the German police were also harmed by the fact that they wanted to catch and forward spies, but did not feel called upon to block the path of spies. For

To prevent espionage from noticing that they were being followed, everything was done without the participation of glasnost. Although, nevertheless, it was possible to subject numerous spies and traitors to severe punishment, but the safety of the secret remained imperfect. Enemy intelligence was being harmed but not warned.

The audacity of Russian espionage agencies in Germany went so far as to demand protection from the German police, both from the detectives who were watching them instead of taking them on, and from the public that was becoming distrustful. Therefore, the fate overtook the above-mentioned Colonel Myasoedov not on German soil, but only later in his own homeland. During the war, he was executed in St. Petersburg for high treason in favor of Germany. This verdict, like many similar ones, was erroneous. He never rendered services to Germany. Since this interested me, I tried to establish the reason for this sentence. The colonel apparently fell victim to his love for women, and the charge brought against him was only a particularly convenient pretext during the war to eliminate the rival of another high-ranking person. This Russian intelligence was opposed until 1906 by German intelligence, which had one officer of the General Staff in Berlin and several completely unsuitable, inactive officers on the border. While Russian intelligence had almost unlimited resources, the German Reichstag annually provided the General Staff for all intelligence

and counterintelligence with only 300,000. While in Russia all the authorities were at the service of intelligence, the German authorities were the more distrustful of the aspirations of the German General Staff, the higher these authorities were; institutions subordinate to the Foreign Office were even negatively treated, since both their own [67] intelligence and defense against foreign intelligence were considered as harmful to Germany's "friendly relations" with other countries. The conditions for the organization of German intelligence in Russia were, for the first time, favorable. Among the Jewish population that dominated the Russian border zone, one could easily find numerous elements ready to carry out espionage missions and serve as intermediaries in relations with high-ranking officials and officers. The Jewish merchant and usurer already played a fatal role in these circles. Added to this was the negative influence of extensive Russian espionage, as a result of which it entered the blood of both the border population and officials and officers. Here I first noticed the harm that my own nation suffers when the population is used for

espionage without plan and system, and subsequently learned to understand why England and France used mainly neutral foreigners for their espionage. While Russia was corrupting itself, they kept their people away from this poison and corrupted neutral hostile peoples, especially in Austria-Hungary and Germany.

If, consequently, in Germany the authorities did not want to believe in espionage, and the population lived in the rear quite calmly, having only a fantastic idea of espionage, then in Russia, the latter was for the authorities and for the population something self-evident and everyday. It would be wrong, however, to think that German intelligence could benefit significantly from this. She did not have the means that Russian circles demanded of us, who wanted not so much to deliver reliable information to Germany and do work dangerous for themselves, but to earn large sums of money without difficulty. Obviously, in Russia espionage was considered as a source of money, first of all, regardless of whether money was scooped up in the service of Russia or against it.

The Jew, as a spy in Russia, was not familiar with military affairs and therefore could not work independently. And as [68] an intermediary, he was often fraudulently deprived of his earnings by those Russians whom he approached for the purposes of high treason. For the most part, he addressed such persons who were already known to him for their frivolity and cheerful lifestyle and

who depended on him. But they often, however, got rid of their old debts, threatening the tempter with extradition to the authorities, since attentive police hovered over all those interested in exploiting intelligence and draconian laws against espionage threatened every traitor.

But regardless of this, the Russian officer corps and bureaucracy, despite the moral harm caused by their own espionage, showed a strong national consciousness, so that with all the relationships that were established, it only very rarely came to real services to German intelligence; for the most part, there were only attempts to cheat her. In contrast, it was established that the Germans recruited by Russian intelligence worked conscientiously and efficiently, even as traitors, and were modest in their claims. At the same time, they were kept in strict obedience with threats that they would be extradited to the German authorities if they were unscrupulous, rebellious or immodest, and thus made them quite compliant. The large number of traitors in Germany made it possible to carry out these threats without sensitively violating their own interests. Thus, they got rid of the fulfillment of all inconvenient and unprofitable promises. Due to the fact that the military and civil authorities, the entire police force and Russian missions abroad participated in supporting their own intelligence, attention to every sign of Germany's intelligence activity in Russia entered into their flesh and blood. As a result, it turned out to be almost impossible to send Germans to Russia on intelligence missions. Military affairs were shrouded in a thick veil of secrecy. Reliable information could

only be given by very capable and knowledgeable observers. Foreigners were in Russia in plain sight. They were there in small numbers [69] and almost exclusively for business purposes, in contrast to Germany - a large country lying on the way of international communications and with international visitors to cultural centers and resorts; due to this, foreigners, who played such a large role in the intelligence of the Entente states in Germany, were not suitable for intelligence in Russia. My posting to East Prussia was followed by two years of military service as a company commander in central Germany. In July 1912 I was transferred to the General Staff, and in early 1913 I was appointed head of the intelligence department of the Great General Staff. As such, I had to simultaneously lead, together with the police authorities, the fight against enemy intelligence. The choice of an officer so young for this position showed the insignificant size of the system, which he was supposed to be in charge of. At the same time, however, this appointment indicated the desire of the General Staff to catch up with fresh forces, since General Ludendorff had, as Chief of Operations, a leading influence in the General Staff. Before taking up my new position, I

went to France for a short time, wishing at least to have an idea of the country and the population, before the borders of this state are also closed before me, against which, along with Russia, intelligence was organized by the General Staff. The French regulations on the registration of German officers, which I carried out with particular conscience, attracted such attention from the authorities to me, even approximately similar to which foreign officers were not shown in Germany. My rank as an officer of the General Staff further increased this attention. At the same time, the authorities did not cease to be exquisitely polite. I was strongly impressed by the excited mood against Germany, which I could observe everywhere, especially in the theaters, and the purpose of which was to remind the population of Alsace and Lorraine, on the one hand, and to mislead them about the military [70] preparations of Germany, on the other. . I cannot recall any similar government arrangements in Germany before the war. Returning to Germany, I received in Metz and Strasbourg from the

authorities, who were entrusted with the fight against French intelligence, information about modern

state of espionage conducted by France against Germany. Along the border, behind a thick veil of special commissars looking for agents who kept in touch with them and watched them, the intelligence departments of the General Staff worked at the governorates of the fortresses of Belfort and Verdun and at the command of the XX Army Corps in Nancy. Already in 1887, the case of Schnebele led to serious political consequences. This special commissar neglected the necessary precautions to such an extent during his numerous personal information trips to Germany that he finally even aroused the attention of the German authorities and was arrested while crossing the frontier. The excitement aroused in France by this unusual measure on the part of Germany increased under the influence of the Minister of War Boulanger to the danger of war. In order to eliminate it, Bismarck ordered the release of the commissioner, who continued his intelligence activities from Nancy as a language teacher. This incident revealed, moreover, that this commissar was an active member of the monarchist party. This did not prevent him, however, from entering the service of the Republic for intelligence against Germany, just as it did not prevent the Republic from protecting him for this and rewarding him.

The German police in Alsace-Lorraine are completely inadequate to deal with the infiltration of French spies. This was not surprising, since the expenses for the police were approved by the Landtag, and the latter included elements like Vetterle, Blumenthal, etc., who were suspected of providing treasonous services to the French, and who, at least, were not at all interested in reinforcement of the German police. Thus, the German border police were opposed on the French side by ten times more numerous. And the reconnaissance branches of the French General Staff with numerous officers that existed since 1875 [71] were for the first time in 1910-1913 opposed by German reconnaissance officers in the three districts of Alsace-Lorraine. Left to their own devices, they had to simultaneously take over, in contact with the central police headquarters in Strasbourg and under the direction of the Grand General Staff, the fight against French espionage. The population, especially in Alsace, strenuously went towards the French aspirations. Numerous Alsatians moved, at the onset of military age, to France. French intelligence used their German education, their kinship and acquaintance with the Germans. Many French officers also grew up in German schools and were very suitable for intelligence in Germany. Many areas for hunting were leased to the French. Thanks to this, and also thanks to the French owners of estates, castles and houses, there were always many French in the region, who were kept, at least with the help of "regional laws", away from the fortifications. The German monasteries in Alsace-Lorraine also depended on the French main institutions.

In contrast to Russian intelligence, which suffered from all the shortcomings of a young, excessively swollen and corrupted organization with other people's money, the French showed even then the skill that corresponded to centuries of experience and was distinguished by rudeness, corresponding to the hatred and political courage of France. Burglaries of institutions and officers' quarters were not uncommon, in relation to which it could be proved that the burglary tools were delivered by French espionage. The latter did not stop before working with intoxicating substances and poison. The depictions of spies in crime novels and cinematographic films were inspired by the passionately pursued pre-war French intelligence service. As early as 1894, there was evidence that [72] French intelligence had built its nest among the German military. Since, however, the counterintelligence police were in small numbers only near the frontier, the actual data were limited mainly to Alsace-Lorraine, and only occasionally it was possible to prove that French espionage had already jumped over the border strip and took root inside Germany. But this has also been found in some cases. As an example of how far

the work of the French General Staff, we will give only the story of the special commissioner Tompas. His father settled after the war of 1870-1871 in Munich as a dealer in French wines. The son received a German education. He then became acquainted with Germany while in the service of the International Sleeping Car Society. Having reached military age, he was called up by the French General Staff and trained in the intelligence service. He had to see to it that his German contacts were scattered throughout the empire. He made every effort, in particular, to get his Munich girlfriends to move to Berlin and establish relations with young officers, mainly from military schools. Two cases became known when German officers succumbed to the systematic seduction of this organization. Under French leadership, they completely robbed the artillery and engineering schools. What should not have been lost was photographed with the help of the French.

A particularly abundant source of military information about Germany was the German deserters who fled to France for French intelligence. Even before the war, special attention was paid to the use of this source. By a joint circular of the ministries of the interior, military and naval of June 1, 1913, the previous orders were canceled and detailed instructions were re-developed. Particular care was taken that each defector be thoroughly interrogated "from a military point of view" by the designated officer, and that he, in cases where it can be assumed "that the defector is in a position to deliver particularly interesting information," send him [73] for further questioning to the War Office in Paris. Regarding interrogation, there were detailed instructions, in relation to deserters - starting from 1909. The protocol of interrogation of a deserter had to contain, depending on the type of weapon of the interrogated, certain numerous questions, the answers to which could provide valuable information about German military institutions. It is worth mentioning that care was also taken to persuade deserters to hand over their military and other documents, which were sent to the Intelligence Directorate and used by its agents when they entered Germany.

The ease of espionage in Germany increased the zeal of all its organs, which received, in addition to earnings, honorary distinctions. In contrast to Russian intelligence, French intelligence paid large sums and achieved in this way greater successes than those that Russian intelligence owed to its action through and inattention to the fate of people. But French intelligence also fell into frivolity. And its officers did not stop at personal activities on German soil. In December 1910, an intelligence officer from Belfort, Captain Lux, was arrested, unable to resist the attractive force of the shipyard of Count Zeppelin in Friedrichshafen and the ambition that prompted him to independently produce the necessary intelligence. Awarded by a German court to a knighthood in the Upper Silesian fortress of Glatz, he escaped from there with the help of French intelligence in eastern Germany and Bohemia. It turned out that long before the war, France had built a nest there too. On the other hand, Russian intelligence also operated in the west of Germany in close contact with the French. For leadership, a special department was organized in Switzerland under the command of senior officers, who felt especially confident away from Russia and threw large amounts of money. Their activities were, therefore, almost all known, and the harm they did to Germany was not great.

But even without this, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland and [74] Luxembourg have long been a fair of Entente intelligence agencies working against Germany since 1910 and mutually supporting each other. These countries provided the representatives of intelligence with a pleasant and amused place of residence, and their agents with the best opportunity to travel unnoticed to Germany. The more the leadership of espionage was transferred to neutral countries, the more their own population was spared and spies were recruited among the population of these countries.

The largest spy bureau was maintained by France in Switzerland. It was in Geneva; its chief was at first Lieutenant Colonel Largie, and

then Lieutenant Parshe. It was served by approximately 90 people. Basel was for decades the seat of an intelligence agency against southern Germany. At the beginning of the war, the ^{auxiliary} Swiss police discovered a French spy nest there, which was supposed to blow up German technical railway facilities.

The "Intelligence department" of the British General Staff maintained its largest spy bureau in Brussels, st. Darshard, 7, under the command of Captain Rendmart von War-Start. For the most part, and with great success, the engineer Herbert Dale Long, who worked in intelligence and in many other places under the names: Lessing, Lane, Dale-Herbet, Leior, Gong, acted mainly abroad. This spy bureau had branches in Holland, mainly in Amsterdam, where most of the negotiations with spies took place. However, Belgium, Holland and the northern states were themselves objects of British intelligence. The latter, therefore, acted here with extreme caution. For espionage in these countries, she also used German subjects. It was easy for her to recruit people in Germany and among the Germans traveling through the British Empire or living there, since the latter believed that they were not doing anything dishonorable and, in any case, contrary to the interests of their homeland, receiving large rewards, like English spies, or else felt flattered[75] by the trust placed in them by England. For British intelligence, they were also valuable because she could renounce them if they failed. British intelligence went so far along this path that they tried to persuade German officers to spy abroad, having great confidence in their value and integrity. It was an extremely clever game of England, aimed at hiding their world espionage and at diverting suspicion to Germany. Long before the war, England was no doubt aware of the military and naval power of Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, had firm plans in case these countries should also be actively involved in the war, and had in these countries the prerequisites for commercial and economic wars with Germany. Only Russia competed with England in terms of intelligence in the northern states. The center of her foreign espionage was in Copenhagen, which was favored by relations between the Danish and Russian courts. Spying there was led by General Ignatiev, and in the last years before the war - Assanovich. The latter worked more successfully than his predecessor and repeatedly transferred the field of his activity to Stockholm. He was a capable student of British intelligence and, just before the war, began to use the Germans for espionage in neighboring states.

Overseas, French intelligence was supported by military and naval attachés and consulates, especially those located in less observable posts. Thus, for example, the joint activity of Consul Robei in Bremen with the naval attaché Farramond in Berlin could be proved. In 1910, Jornet Fuchs was appointed French Consul in Berlin, although as early as 1892 he had been expelled from Alsace-Lorraine as one of France's most zealous political agents. Germany protested, but was satisfied that he was transferred to Nuremberg. There he was always under suspicion of espionage. It was confirmed during a search in his apartment at the declaration of war. The consuls who were in Switzerland, all without exception worked on intelligence. Consul Wikstram in Malmö must be noted as particularly diligent. [76]

Belgian intelligence against Germany began to show itself only from 1912. Despite the connection with French intelligence, it had all the hallmarks of a young, still inexperienced organization. Its goals did not go further than the nearest border strip, and its successes were seemingly small. It was rather evidence of direct military training and is interesting in that even before the outbreak of world war Belgium was already in the ranks of the Entente.

Within the indicated organizational framework, the intelligence work of the Entente has been going on since 1910, with the delimitation of the areas of this work. Russia accounted almost exclusively for the military intelligence of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan states. France was entrusted, along with the military,

political intelligence of Germany and Italy. England was taken care of military matters, she was limited to naval intelligence. She found out, first of all, economic and political issues and prepared political propaganda against Germany.

In the military intelligence of the Entente, its offensive tendency was striking. She was not content with reconnaissance of the strength of the German army and navy and their offensive strength.

British intelligence found out mainly the possibility of landing on the German and Danish coasts and operated in Belgium and Holland. In 1910 and 1911 Lieutenants Brandon and Trench were arrested, along with attorney Stewart. They were to explore the Kiel harbor and the North Sea channel. English officers traveled around Belgium and the French border area, accompanied by French ones. The "Intelligence department" was opened in the Spa. Russian intelligence was fully acquainted with the eastern fortresses of Germany and with the entire railway and highway network of eastern Germany. In Austria and the Balkans, it has everywhere taken strong roots

among the Slavic nationalities. In the northern states and in Switzerland, it was closely intertwined with the intelligence of England and France. French intelligence dominated Belgium, [77] Luxembourg and Switzerland. She was interested in the entire German fortress system on the western frontier, the Rhine bridges behind it, and especially in the possible crossings over the Moselle between Diedenhofen and Trier. Carrier pigeons were released from Holland

along the Rhine and as far as Switzerland. Observers were installed on the river bridges, who, in case of war, were supposed to report on the distribution of German military forces between the eastern and western fronts. The German war on two fronts was the basis of many questionnaires for agents. Pigeons were also trained from Holland to fly along the Hanover line. Schneidemuhl-Thorn. And observers stood on this path to report on the distribution of German forces between the eastern and western theaters of operations. German counterintelligence could be convinced of these facts already on the basis of the material that increasingly came to it before the war in connection with The first military events destroyed enemy plans of attack and devalued the results of this espionage. One after another, victorious battles for the Germans transferred the war in the west from the very beginning to the enemy country; in the east, the German armies drove back the menacing masses of the Russian army to the east. In the enemy fortresses and cities - in Brussels, Warsaw, Vilna and Bucharest, at the parking lots of the French commands and special commissars, acts and documents were seized that confirmed

the organization, joint work and intelligence goals of opponents already openly fighting against Germany. The spoils of war after the Battle of Tannenberg provided a particularly large amount of evidence of Russia's offensive preparations, which lay in the hands of Russian intelligence.

military

The number of people arrested and sentenced by German civil courts for espionage grew rapidly. [78]

Years	Arrested	Condemned	1907	?	?
3	1908	66	9		
1909	47	6	1910		
103	10	1911			
119	14	1912	221		
21	1913	346	21		
1914	(in the first year)				
154	51	Total:	1056		
people	135	people			

Among the convicts were 107 Germans, of which 32 were Alsatians-Lorraine, 11 Russians, 5 Frenchmen, 4 Englishmen, 3 Austrians, 2 Dutchmen, 1 American, 1 Swiss, 1 Luxembourgier.

Espionage was carried out in favor of France in 74 cases, Russia - 35, England - 15, Italy - 1, Belgium - 1 and in 9 cases in favor of several of them at the same time.

These figures show the enormous growth of intelligence before the war itself. At the same time, it should be taken into account that espionage is carried out very carefully and was carried out all the more carefully, the more energetically the German counterintelligence acted. The facts established can therefore be regarded as only a very small part of the espionage that actually took place. To this it must be added that the most severe cases of high treason, in which services were rendered to the enemy by German soldiers, were dealt with by military courts and are not included in the above figures. Data on the nationality of spies and traitors show to what a horrific degree espionage succeeded in establishing itself among the German population, and how, in particular, the Alsatians-Lorraine supported French espionage. If only a few

neutral foreigners appear in this report, this is due to the fact that they were most easily able to elude German surveillance. France leads the way with 74 cases. This figure deserves special attention, since French intelligence was the most solid, and therefore it was possible to prove its activity to such a large extent. [79] Russia, with its clumsy intelligence, did not even give half that number. At large enterprises, the entire experience of French intelligence was put into play. Here are some cases of Franco-Russian intelligence activities that have been fully disclosed and established by the courts:

In 1912, when Russian intelligence intensified its activities against the eastern fortresses of Germany, the first clerk of the governorship of the fortress of Thorn was placed in an office building to protect secret plans and documents. A short time later, Russian intelligence found out about it. The intelligence department of the Warsaw military district, under the leadership of Colonel Batyushin, who worked especially actively and successfully, succeeded in attracting the clerk appointed for protection to his service. Equipped with photographic apparatus, he delivered everything that was available to him. Colonel Batyushin did not stop before his personal visit to Thorn and Breslavl for instructions, where he also had the clerk of the fortress in his service. It turned out to be a fateful trip for the Thorn traitor through Austria-Hungary and Switzerland to Warsaw and Paris to deliver his material. On his way back from Paris, he was arrested in Germany and sentenced to the highest penalty of 15 years in prison. The Russian money found with him was relatively small, while the French

significant.

At the beginning of 1914, a letter arrived back in Berlin, addressed to Vienna - Nicetas on demand, which was not received by the addressee. The letter was opened. It contained Russian money. Its content indicated that the money was intended for treacherous purposes. The Austrian General Staff was notified of this. He established supervision of the respective post office. A letter received at the same address was received one evening by a man whose identity, due to an unfavorable set of circumstances, could not be immediately identified. He left in a car, and the criminal officer who was watching was only able to determine the number of this car. He followed him [80] in another car, but overtook him only when the rider had already left. The only point of support was a penknife lost in the car. It was owned by Colonel Redl, chief of the General Staff in Prague, who committed suicide after confessing his betrayal in favor of Russian intelligence. He was recruited from Berlin through a Russian military attache.

Almost simultaneously, letters arrived in Berlin, at the General Staff, in which some stranger from Geneva forwarded parts of documents that were

according to him, copies of secret German military material sold to France and Russia. At first it was taken for a fraudulent trick. But additional shipments showed that these were indeed copies of German preliminary works in case of war. The sender refused to give more precise instructions or to come to Germany for this purpose. This circumstance made a number of institutions and military units suspect that they had committed treason. In the end, the evidence concentrated on one higher institution, located first in Königsberg, and at that time in Poznań, and in particular on its former clerk, who had already completed his military service and was a respected official, as well as on the clerk of a cavalry regiment. For the final clarification of the issue, an intelligence officer from Königsberg went to a stranger in Geneva. There he met, under an assumed name, the former secretary of the Russian consulate, von Eck, who was previously known to our officer. Using his official position in the consulate in Königsberg, von Eck persuaded to treason in 1911-1913. German military personnel, including those mentioned above. Now he was in Geneva, trying to monetize his knowledge a second time. Both clerks were sentenced to the highest punishment - 15 years in prison. Only one of them received more or less large sums, while the other received almost nothing and after the first service was used by Russian intelligence without remuneration. Von Eck also overtook [81] his fate. During the war, he was arrested while crossing the Tyrolean border. In April 1914, counterintelligence from St. Petersburg reported that the General Staff was negotiating the purchase of plans for the German eastern fortresses there. According to more accurate data, the betrayal must have come from one central institution in Berlin. Within 24 hours, the culprit was found in the person of one senior clerk. He confessed to having committed treason at the suggestion of the Russian military attaché, Colonel Bazarov, and through him sent the plans to Petersburg. The immediate communication of the General Staff to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the demand for the immediate departure of the Russian military attaché were obviously unpleasant for the ministry, especially since the attaché denied any involvement

in this matter and considered it an insult to his position and his personality that the fact that his statement was opposed by evidence of what - a sergeant major. It took another message to the Russian embassy that the courier who brought the plans to St. Petersburg on behalf of the attaché was already on his way back on a German steamer that did not have a stop between St. Petersburg and Stettin and did not have a wireless telegraph; that therefore it is impossible to communicate with the courier, and that the German captain of the steamer is already aware of what his passenger is like. If Colonel Bazarov wishes to wait for the return of this courier, then he is allowed to do so. After this message, the Russian military attaché left Berlin and his post on the same day. He thus followed the same path as his predecessor, Colonel Mikhelson, who was convicted of complicity in treason. The sergeant major lured by Colonel Bazarov was also sentenced to the highest punishment. His reward was 800 marks. It is natural that the German General Staff, in its struggle against enemy espionage, came to demand both an increase in the means for this struggle and the creation of its own [82] intelligence, and that it did not share the belief in the peacefulness of political institutions. The proposal made in January 1912 under the personal influence of Colonel Ludendorff spoke of an increase in the funds assigned to the intelligence department of the General Staff. 450,000 marks were provided for the year instead of 300,000. From these funds it was necessary to support intelligence and counterintelligence. Of this insignificant amount, 50,000 marks were still saved in 1913 in case of extraordinary political complications. The Entente hid the sums released by the states for exploration. Only Russian spending data was captured. Judging by them, Russia spent about 13 million rubles on its intelligence in 1912, and in

pre-war half-year 1914 to 26 million. Even without relying on an insignificant release of funds, it clearly follows from the general situation and from the preponderance of opponents that German intelligence was not able to reach sizes even approximately equal to the sizes of the intelligence of the united states of the Entente, although the latter were able, after the outbreak of war, to present in their propaganda the case in such a way that German intelligence was superior in volume to their own. In reality, the German General Staff at the beginning of the war had only intelligence against Russia and France. Time and money did not allow the creation of such in England. The organization of intelligence in the latter was to be the next step in the organization of German intelligence. This step was interrupted by the outbreak of war. It goes without saying that intelligence against America or against neutral states was out of the question. An extraordinary concentration of forces was also required in order to carry out at least sufficient coverage of France and Russia. The paths along which the German General Staff was forced to follow differed essentially from those of the Entente states. Since it was built on a few trustees, it could not catch up with other countries that outstripped it in terms of the size of their work; he had [83] to confine himself to the bare necessities and systematically direct his limited forces to strict and expedient work. Being free from secondary and aimless utilities, he was able, perhaps, to surpass other general staffs in bringing out the most essential.

The situation in Russia has already been described. It was completely different in France. The country, cut through by numerous railroads, and the busy international circulation of travelers made superficial observation quite possible. The real military secrets, the revelation of which is the main task of espionage, were in France, although with less publicity than in Russia, but they were quite well guarded. In the fortresses, in the offices, in the military factories and in the parts of the troops, ideal supervision prevailed everywhere. And here it turned out that both the state and the population had long ago become accustomed to understanding the significance of military secrets, the existence of espionage and its danger.

As a special police, a dense network of trained police forces, trained by the French General Staff and the French government, based on their own experience in intelligence, was distributed throughout the country. But still, in France, it was possible to conduct reconnaissance that went beyond the limits of superficial

observation. Not only in Paris, but also in other large cities, the ever-increasing high cost of living had a corrupting effect on French society, which was already showing the negative results of international communication. The lack of solidity also affected the French officer corps and their personal attitude towards the republic was not distinguished by the devotion that the Russian officer corps was distinguished by in relation to its monarch. In France, a woman often played the part. In general, the circumstances of intelligence work in France can be defined as more delicate than those in Russia. The Dreyfus affair made the greatest impression, in view of [84] its political complications. It is useful to recall this case in more detail, since it is characteristic of clarifying what role espionage played in France and how it was used domestically for non-military purposes.

In September 1894, the French counterintelligence in Paris received a "bordereau", that is, a cover letter in which the traitor offered to forward various important and secret military documents. The bordereau was addressed to the German military attache in Paris, Major von Schwarzkopf, who, however, never saw him. The way in which the counterintelligence got this bordereau was depicted during the investigation in two ways. It was once claimed that this happened "in the usual way", i.e. - from the wastebasket kept by the attache, the contents of which are regularly

handed over to a secret agent by a bribed cleaner. This statement is false, since the attaché never had this paper in his hands. The second statement is true, that the letter was stolen before reaching the military attaché. The French General Staff kept a secret agent, the Alsatian Brucker, to monitor the German military attaché. Brooker sought and achieved more than friendly relations with a certain Madame Bastion, the wife of the porter attaché. Thus, the attaché and his correspondence were under close supervision. Brooker understood from the contents of the letter that he had taken possession of a very important document. He brought it to the head of the intelligence department, Henri, and demanded a special payment for the delivery of this especially important document. In view of the fact that Brooker already knew about the paper, Henri was not in a position to destroy it, which he would no doubt have willingly done. He introduced her to her superiors to Generals Gonz and Boisdefre, Assistant Chief and Chief of the General Staff. Experts concluded from the content of the bordereau that the writer must be an artilleryman, since it was a new secret brake for the gun carriage, and that he must be a probationary officer of the General Staff. Thus, suspicion fell on the Jew Dreyfus, who was already noticeably disliked in the General Staff [85]. The Minister of War, Mercier, was notified and assigned the investigation to Major du Paty de Clan. Samples of Dreyfus's handwriting were brought in and compared to the bordereau. The real expert Gobert could not give an opinion on the handwriting about the authorship of Dreyfus, while the head of the Paris identification department, Bertillon, stated, on the contrary, with complete certainty, that this handwriting was identical with Dreyfus' handwriting. After that, Dreyfus was arrested in mid-October 1894. A search of the detainee's home yielded no results: in particular, no paper was found that would correspond to the paper of the bordereau. The latter was written on especially light and thin paper, which could not be found in any store and which was used as letter paper by only one officer - Major Esterhazy from the Intelligence Directorate. No one knew about this, except Henri, who kept silent about it. Whether the bordereau was written with a provocative purpose or represented a serious proposal, it remains

unexplained.

Further military investigation did not give any definite results, and the Minister of War suggested that the case be dropped. Then Henri, at the end of October 1894, set out on a campaign the newspaper "Libre Parole". A press campaign was launched that prompted Mercier, the minister of war, to turn the military investigation into a court case. The main meeting at the end of December took place behind closed doors. The head of the intelligence department, Henri, gave his testimony in the absence of the accused and his defense counsel, who did not know, therefore, what was brought against the accused. Dreyfus was sentenced to life exile, imprisonment on the Black Island and demoted. The condemnation took place on January 5, 1895, with full publicity and with the usual French theatrical pomp. On July 7, 1895, Picard became the head of the intelligence department. A letter addressed to the German attaché, sent by pneumatic mail, fell into his hands. He compared the handwriting with the bordereau and with the handwriting of Esterhazy and was amazed. [86] Henri struggled with the emerging suspicion. He met in Bazad with a representative of the German General Staff, who sought this

meeting in order to explain that Dreyfus was innocent. At the same time, the German representative hinted at the culprit so clearly that the French could easily guess that it was Esterhazy, if Henri had not interrupted his interlocutor every time he wanted to point out the real culprit. In order to better prove the guilt of Dreyfus, Henri fabricated a letter that became known as the

"false Panizardi". Panizardi was the Italian military attaché in Paris. The letter was composed of his old letters and pointed to Dreyfus in it. This forged document was used against Picard. He had to atone for his suspicion against Esterhazy by being removed from

General Staff and received a battalion in Tunisia after preliminary long trips to the border and to the south. Before leaving for Africa, he entered into relations with the lawyer Leblois, wishing to dedicate at least one person to the true state of affairs in case something happened to him in Tunisia. Leblois, as well as Senator Cherer-Kastner and Mathieu Dreyfus, the brother of the condemned man, took up the matter again. The latter

openly accused Esterhazy. A case was brought against him in November 1897, but in January 1898 he was acquitted, after the chairman of the court declared that the Dreyfus case had been finally decided and that it was only necessary to investigate whether Esterhazy was also a traitor. This was followed by "I accuse" Zola. It led to a court case against Zola. From his work, only the sentence that "Esterhazy was acquitted by order" was used for the prosecution. Henri acted as a witness. Zola was found guilty. The uproar made

the Minister of War instruct Major Guinet to investigate the acts and secret documents. The latter established the forgery of the aforementioned letter [87] of Panizzardi: this was not particularly difficult, since the letters on the basis of which this imaginary document was drawn up were written on paper of different grades; a serious investigation would have discovered

it sooner. On August 30, 1898, Minister of War Cavaignac personally interrogated Henri. The next day, the latter committed suicide. Esterhazy fled to England.

This was followed by a revision of the process, first in the criminal department and then, when nothing came of it, in the "Chambres reunites", which led first to the fact that Dreyfus was transferred to France. From August to September 1899, the Dreyfus affair was retried at Rennes. His opponents operated there with a "bordereau with Wilhelm's notes", a new forgery, of course, which, however, led to a new condemnation of Dreyfus.

Only Minister of War André initiated a new revision of the process, which led in 1906, 11 years after the conviction, to the acquittal of Dreyfus. Dreyfus was awarded the order and promoted to the rank of major. True, he voluntarily resigned, but he served again in the World War. Just as German intelligence had to make a lot of efforts at home to defend even the most

necessary interests of the General Staff before the political authorities, things were no better abroad. The clearer the aggressive intentions of the opponents emerged from acquaintance with enemy espionage, the clearer it also became that in the event of war the enemy ring would alienate Germany from the rest of the world like an iron curtain. The German Empire did not have a central intelligence agency. The General Staff, therefore, had to look for new ways of its own. Incessant political crises, beginning in 1912, prompted numerous trips to neutral countries in order to seek there, with the help of German representatives, contacts that would provide the General Staff during the war with reliable information about the surrounding world. The reception accorded me by the German representatives [88] abroad, from a purely secular point of view, was impeccable. But the impression was created that the seriousness of the purpose of my visit interfered with someone. In business terms, our General Staff was actually deprived of support. While the intelligence services of England, France and Russia, which created their agent networks around Germany, enjoyed the versatile support of

all their foreign institutions, German intelligence had to look for assistants and agents on its own. Moreover, our official representatives did not recommend me to engage in such searches, considering them unpromising. For some reason, it was believed that the General Staff had no right to demand from Germans working abroad that they put their business interests and security at stake. But without official support, our General Staff could not create its own intelligence in other countries ... During the war, the Germans abroad did not trust the German

representations were partly not justified. Their attempts to help the oppressed fatherland and its military command remained, however, futile, as they took place without leadership. For the same reason, they have become fatal for many. Entente intelligence threatened the interests of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in equal measure. The common danger required joint defensive actions. Since 1910, the Austrian and German general staffs have been exchanging information about Russia that came to them. Between the German and Italian intelligence services, such an exchange of information about France began only in 1914. In May of that year, at the invitation of the Italian General Staff, I went to Rome to conduct appropriate negotiations, where I was received with sincere goodwill. The chief of the General Staff, General Pollio, and the heads of departments were especially friendly, while relations between the Austrian and Italian General Staffs were rather tense. In particular, both sides constantly monitored each other. Therefore, in our tripartite alliance, it was not even necessary [89] to dream of the unity of intelligence services, which the Entente countries had.

...

The incessant political crises of the pre-war era were a good school for the young German military intelligence. The deployment of the Russian and French armies, their weapons, training and equipment, the structure of the system of fortresses and the strategic network of railways and highways, as well as the expected performance of both armies, were known to the German General Staff by the beginning of the world war.

...

Since the General Staff could independently develop its activity in the field of military intelligence, there, despite all the obstacles and restrictions, success was possible. The combined warnings and demands of the General Staff and the Admiralty succeeded only after prolonged efforts in obtaining a stricter law on espionage and introducing especially trained police forces into the fight against espionage. Politics worked only for peace and forgot about preparing for war. The leadership of the war and everything connected with it was regarded as an exclusively military matter, and the political authorities took every care to ensure that the highest military authorities did not get involved in politics. The trial of captured spies and discovered traitors always took place in the absence of publicity.

Only representatives of the General Staff, the Admiralty, the Prussian Ministry of War and the Naval General Staff took part in the trial as experts. Thus, only these "non-political" authorities had an idea about the military preparations of their neighbors. The Reichstag treated military warnings with great distrust. He did not allow any influence of the military authorities on the police for fear that it would not serve political purposes. Germany had an imperial army, an imperial navy. [90]

The espionage trials were carried out by the imperial court. But there was no imperial police in Germany. Power over the police belonged to the allied states and they were not inclined to give up even a part of it. Germany was cut through by the boundaries of five large police regions of individual states. Under these conditions, the German police could conscientiously cope with individual cases of espionage, but it was impossible to create a large organization like that of the enemy. The cases of espionage discovered before the war, Germany, therefore, owed not so much to its good organization of counterintelligence as to a large number of spies.

III. The beginning of the war

Kiel week. Assassination of the Austrian Archduke. German General Staff. Emperor's Nordland Journey. Russian mobilization. Return of the Emperor to Berlin. German mobilization. The center of gravity of reconnaissance is transferred to the front. Emperor, General Staff, government. The beginning of enemy propaganda. Spy fear.

At the end of June 1914 I was present at the Kiel Week. Representatives from all countries and parts of the world gathered for a peaceful competition. The presence of the English squadron attached particular importance to the sports festival supported by the German emperor. The Emperor was to set out from there on a journey to the north, which was also prepared for this year. On Sunday, June 24th, I returned after lunch from a motor ride along the imp. Wilhelm in Kiel. Before that, the motley festive picture of the Kiel Bay had noticeably changed. Flags were flown at half mast on German warships. On land, I was informed of the murder of an Austrian archducal couple in Sarajevo by a Serbian student that morning. The emperor, who took part in the races in the outer bay on the Meteor, received this news through the head of the naval office. The latter drove up to the imperial boat that was in front of everyone and sent a message. The Emperor immediately left the race and returned to the Hohenzollern. All celebrations and competitions have been cancelled. A deep silence reigned over the bay in the evening. The outlines of the English warships loomed in black spots, which, early in the morning of the next day, raised their anchors and set sail. The lights shone only on the steamer, on which the guests of the emperor were accommodated. "Kiel Week" ended prematurely under the influence of the assassination of the prince. The emperor returned to Berlin. He intended, before his trip to the north, to take part in the mourning celebrations in Vienna. But the Austrian government reported that it could not adequately ensure his personal safety. The allied government's perception of the extent of the unrest, the report that the assassins' trail led to official Serbian institutions, and the Austrian diplomacy's opinion of the necessary steps indicated the seriousness of the political situation that had developed. The emperor decided, in view of this, to abandon his trip. But Reich Chancellor von Bettmann reported to him that this would increase political

tension. Thus, against the will of the emperor, the trip took place. July 6 "Hohenzollern" sailed, accompanied by the cruiser "Rostock" and the destroyer "Sleipner" to Norway. The political barometer in Berlin was set to peace. The General Staff had long been accustomed to political crises. The crisis that now broke out was, it is true, especially serious owing to various circumstances. The prevailing opinion did not consider that in the person of the murdered heir, Germany had lost an unconditionally true friend. There was, however, the conviction that in his face a pronounced personality with a strong will was eliminated, which Germany needed in case the death of Emperor Franz Joseph, expected in the near future, would entail severe upheavals in the complex state life of the allied Austria-Hungary. The new heir, Archduke Karl, was young and inexperienced. Added to this were reports from Russia about movements of troops from Siberia into European Russia, still poorly controlled and denied by the Russian government, and about trial mobilizations that increased the combat readiness of the Russian army. Despite this, the password of the political authorities about the need to avoid any

further [92] excitation of public opinion remained valid for the General Staff.

Nothing has been changed in the allocation of time provided for the summer. Preparations for the autumn imperial maneuvers on the Rhine between the 7th and 8th Army Corps were completed and vacations in the General Staff were distributed. So, for example, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General

von Moltke insisted on his stay in Carlsbad in July. Thanks to this state of affairs, the belief prevailed that this political crisis, like the previous ones, would pass without a call to arms. An extraordinary increase in intelligence against Russia was not yet considered necessary, and the leave granted to me from the beginning of July to the middle of August was not canceled. I spent it with my family in the Harz. I was kept informed of the official point of view. It was much more reassuring than the view of the press,

although military intelligence and consulates reported from Russia about military preparations. Until July 24, the information communicated to me stated that there were no reasons to interrupt the vacation. It was not until July 25 that I was summoned to Berlin to attend a conference with General von Moltke, who had returned from Carlsbad. But even now it was said that I would return to my family the very next day. Equipped with only the bare necessities, I went to Berlin. The meeting with the Chief of the General Staff was limited to an assessment of the available information, which even now was not yet considered unconditionally serious. For me, however, in my position, they were so serious that I remained in Berlin and obtained an order to put into action, provided for in the event of an imminent military danger, the strengthening of intelligence against Russia and at the same time against France.

The coming days intensified the flow of information from Russia and revealed the rapid progress of Russian mobilization. Despite this, I left my wife and children until July 31 in the Harz, as I saw the efforts and aspirations of General von Moltke, Reich Chancellor and Emperor to keep the peace. Only when, on July 31, an intelligence officer from the Russian border reported that [93] Russia was mobilizing in full against Germany as well, did war seem inevitable. But even then I met General von Moltke's doubts, engendered by a sense of responsibility. It took the insistent assurance of this intelligence officer that he was personally responsible for the accuracy of his report in order for him to be finally believed. General von Moltke conveyed this news to the emperor in Potsdam by telephone. Since July 11, the latter has been on board the Hohenzollern at Sonefjord near Balholm. Returning from a walk to the ship, he learned from a Norwegian newspaper about the military preparations of Serbia and the transfer of the Serbian government to Nis. Without waiting for messages from the Foreign

Office, he ordered to raise the anchor. On July 27 he arrived at the New Palace near Potsdam. Having received the message that full Russian mobilization against Germany was definitely established, he went to Berlin to see the Reich Chancellor. General von Moltke got into the car to wait for him there. But already on the way he was overtaken by a train of imperial cars, in the first of which there was an imperial couple. They were not going to the Reich Chancellor's palace, but to the Royal Castle. The meeting was held in the marble hall, mainly on questions of martial law. The campaign of the Russian military forces, which was already beginning, represented an extreme danger for Germany. The advantage that the German army had over the Russian army, which was distributed over a large area and had only insufficient railway lines for the offensive, was melting daily and hourly. This danger became especially serious if Germany had to wage war on several fronts. True, reports from France spoke only of such military measures that Germany was eventually forced to carry out: the return of vacation pay, the concentration of troops in their camps, etc. Political reports from France left no doubt, however, that the General Staff has to reckon with a war on two fronts. The messages received entailed my constant personal communication with the Chief of the General Staff. I [94] witnessed the struggle waged in him by the desire for peace and a sense of responsibility. It was only through an enormous effort of willpower that General von Moltke forced himself on the afternoon of July 31 to announce the "imminent military danger." Thus, twenty-four hours of preparations were begun in case of mobilization. General von Moltke called together the officers of the Great General Staff in the library hall, announced to them the imminent danger of war, and added: "If

a little hope for the preservation of peace, then this means mobilization for tomorrow and thus - war. Go now everyone to your work; the fatherland knows that it can rely on its General Staff." The last words were barely audible due to the general's inner excitement. Everyone left the library hall with solemn seriousness. This was the last meeting in it of the officers of the Great General Staff, who so often listened to lessons there the great Generalfeldmarschall von

Moltke and Count Schlieffen. The General Staff did not return to its home after the war. The fact that it became the home of the Reich Ministry of the Interior is symbolic for the course of the war and for the future. The General Staff put the finishing touches on the preparatory orders for mobilization "He kept aloof from politics. True, he followed political events abroad, but he did not work on Germany's foreign policy. He had influence on it only in so

far as the Chief of the General Staff was in constant contact with the leading institutions of the Foreign Office and spoke on military matters at decisive moments in foreign policy. Along with the War Office, the General Staff was responsible for ensuring that Germany's military strength was in keeping with its political position. The General Staff itself was of the opinion that the economic and political competition of peoples would lead in the near future to an armed clash. His last military proposals in 1912 were only partially approved by the Reichstag. Because of them, the General Staff lost the chief [95] of its operations department, Colonel Ludendorff. He was appointed commander of the regiment. The most important position during the war was not already occupied by the best of the General Staff.

In the spring of each year, the mobilization plans of the past year were burned and replaced with new ones adapted to the progressive military and political development. Thus, the General Staff annually prepared the hour when the military leadership of the German people would be entrusted to it. However, he never aspired to war, least of all - under his last peacetime chief, General von Moltke, whose loyalty to duty was a revered model for all officers of the General Staff. This has been the case in the last 24 hours of the world.

On the 1st of August, in the afternoon, the time expired, in which it was necessary to decide whether we would continue to calmly look at the Russian mobilization, or the German army would be brought into a state of war. More and more intelligence reports testified to the advance of the Russian troops and already reported on the beginning of hostilities on the Prussian border. At the entrance of the royal palace, General von Moltke reported to the emperor that martial law did not allow further postponing the issuance of the mobilization order. The emperor stood before the last decision. After a short internal struggle, he abruptly straightened up. With a characteristic energetic movement of his right hand and a short "good" he gave the general permission. At 5 p.m., he signed the mobilization order in the adjutant room.

The quickly convened Reichstag met on August 4 for its first military meeting. In the evening the English envoy demanded his passports. At the same time, a message was received from von Kleist's adjutant wing, sent to the Italian king, that the king was personally with Germany with all his heart, but that a joint performance with Austria would cause a storm of indignation in Italy; his government cannot risk rebellion. It became clear that Germany, together with Austria alone, was moving towards a fight against a much stronger enemy. [96] The information about the surprisingly naive ideas of the Russian rulers was brought with them by the military representatives of Germany at the Russian court who returned through

Stockholm. They reported that in St. Petersburg they were amazed at the mobilization in Germany and the declaration of war by it. Germany had to understand that Russian mobilization needed more time than German. Germany therefore had to wait before declaring war. Otherwise, the reports indicated that the war with Germany had caused in Russia

just a little inspiration.

Early in the morning, August 16, the emperor left for the army, through Würzburg and Mainz to Koblenz. This detour was chosen in order to hide from the numerous enemy observers in Germany that the high command was heading towards the right flank of the army, which was to be the main point of operations.

Propaganda will only be dealt with in passing hereafter, although it is an essential part of what is to be understood by enemy intelligence. However, it did not fall within the scope of my work. The lack of propaganda and political intelligence in Germany and during the war were not created by the government that decided to fight until victory. An irreparable mistake later was that, at least, at least at the outbreak of war, the lost time was not made up, and the totality of intelligence activities was not united by the government. The war was considered only as a military affair, therefore they were limited only to military intelligence. The General Staff learned only gradually how bad things really were with the intelligence of the political leading institutions. In Charleville, one morning, I had to convey to Reich Chancellor von Bethmann a message from Chief of Staff von Falkenhain. The chancellor asked me to stay a little longer: "Tell me about what is happening with the enemy; I know absolutely nothing about it." The picture was completely different from that presented by intelligence under Bismarck. [97]

The tasks assigned to military intelligence in peacetime were fulfilled with the onset of the war. In peacetime, this reconnaissance was the only means of informing about the military situation of the now hostile states. Now the enemy armies opposed the German one in the theaters of operations. It was believed that the reconnaissance means of the army were called upon to obtain information about the enemy necessary for the battle. What happened behind the enemy troops was considered an economic and political matter. Unprecedented in any of the previous wars, the scale of military operations shifted the center of gravity of command to a large extent to the front and into the hands of outstanding commanders, who, especially in Germany, were accustomed by the General Staff to responsible initiative. There was no solid central point, especially necessary under these conditions. Understanding the importance of armed force and actively contributing to the development of the German army, the emperor, whose historical image

bears, therefore, a pronounced military appearance, was not a soldier either in his essence or in his development. His early accession to the throne interrupted his military education. At a young age, the emperor became the head of the army. True, the General Staff enjoyed his confidence and was honored with distinctions, but the interests of the young monarch followed other paths than the quiet and sober work of the General Staff. Among those around the emperor in peacetime, one could find only a few officers of the General Staff and almost exclusively those who, in addition to soldiers, also showed other abilities. Participating in the maneuvers and strategic games of the General Staff, the monarch played a role that was not suitable for obtaining a thorough knowledge of the essence of the work of the military command. On the contrary, this role contributed to a rather well-known underestimation of the importance of the commander. It is all the more worthy of respect that the emperor, from the very first hours of the war, submitted to responsible military leaders and tried [98] to adapt himself to the field of war alien to him. Only General von Moltke, his personal friend and chief of the General Staff since 1906, helped him at the Supreme Headquarters. the latter was, after the outbreak of war, even more weakened by chronic illness.

These circumstances were also reflected in the intelligence service. And here the whole center of gravity first moved to the front. Of the few officers familiar with intelligence, the best were, in order of awards, released to serve in the military General Staff, and the rest were seconded as

intelligence officers to army commands. The prevailing opinion was that secret intelligence, espionage, would be used primarily in theaters of war. However, in view of the rapid course of the first military events in the West, where a military outcome was expected at first, the command had great doubts about the possibility and usefulness of espionage. They went so far that one of the commands left its reconnaissance officer in Liège, when crossing Belgium, as unnecessary ballast. These officers at first did not find much use and support anywhere. With a particularly strong sense of subordination in the German army, the fact that the head of the intelligence department was the youngest head of department in the Headquarters of the High Command, much younger than the chiefs of the General Staff at the fronts and the heads of departments of the military ministry, was also important, and that the civilian authorities were also accustomed to more authoritative representation of the General Staff. I consider it necessary to identify these personal moments as well, since they contribute to understanding how much effort it took for intelligence to gain influence, and how much it had to lag behind enemy intelligence, which went through a big school in peacetime and was supported by statesmen who decided to go to war to the bitter end. Consciousness of the insufficiency [99] of intelligence prompted, it is true, already in peacetime, to clarify, by means of large strategic military games, on the model of the requirements that a war can impose on this branch of military administration. These theoretical studies, however, remained within the framework of tactics and strategy and, in any case, did not go beyond the military framework. They did not engage in economic and political intelligence, economic and political influence on enemy states, but intelligence on a global scale has never been the object of even theoretical discussion. Reality has therefore left all fantasy in the shadows. The General Staff had the right to assume that only the military leadership of the war would fall to it. In particular, he had nothing to do with domestic politics in peacetime. When the war broke out, he noticed, however, that there was no political leadership of the war either above him or next to him. On August 2, 1914, General von Moltke ordered to find out what had been done in connection with the war to guide public opinion in the rear, especially through the media. I was compelled to report to him that this was limited to a memo, which indicated only what should not be said during the war, but nothing had been prepared for the positive guidance of public opinion.

General von Moltke ordered me to make sure, at least as far as the High Command was concerned, that it would remain sufficiently in touch with public opinion regarding military events. The new task was at the beginning only loosely related to my previous tasks. Its scope seemed then limited. It was impossible to foresee that the German military press office would then develop from it. The implementation, even on a small scale, of the connection between the military and political leadership of the war, which distinguished the activity of the enemy, united by the general concept of the intelligence service, was valued above the receipt of new assignments. The only difference was that with the enemy the joint leadership was in the hands of the government, while in [100] Germany it was in the hands of the high command. General von Moltke made this mistake out of necessity, General Falkenhayn only reluctantly tolerated its further necessary development. Hindenburg-Ludendorff" energetically opposed it. When they demanded that the political imperial power take over the leadership of public opinion, the representative of the Reich Chancellor rejected this, pointing out that Chancellor von Bethmann did not want to have anything to do with the press. And when the demands of the high command concentrated in 1918 on the fact that the German Minister of Propaganda was opposed to enemy propaganda, the command received in June 1918 a response from Chancellor Count Gertling, in which he called the justified demand of the high command "a valuable contribution to the preparatory work that has long been carried out for the purpose of unification all state measures aimed at guiding public opinion

inside the country and abroad". Count Gertling wrote: "I entrusted the preparatory work to the head of my press bureau. The latter is using his two-week vacation beginning August 23rd to complete his project of setting up a new institution. After the draft has been reviewed by me, it will be sent for review and necessary additions and changes to the high command and the interested central imperial authorities. In this regard, I propose to accelerate the final establishment of the general plan to such an extent, if necessary - with the help of commissar meetings, so that it is completed in the shortest possible time, and that practical implementation can be started without delay. "The High Command did not share the optimism of the final phrase Before the project of an imperial government was created, the military leaders were forced to give up hope of forcing the enemy to peace. The enemy's delusion about the possibility of a tolerable peace without resolving the issue by arms won out.

I must mention these events and, moreover, in this [101] place of my presentation, since they make it possible to understand the further description of German intelligence and protect against suspicion of one-sidedness and hushing up many of Germany's actions in order to justify her and accuse her opponents. This assumption would also be wrong, because I consider the reproach of Germany for omission much more serious than the reproach of the enemy governments for helping the trouble in every way, if that can be a reproach at all.

It goes without saying that the weak point of the German leadership of the war did not remain hidden from the enemies. Their propaganda hit this place with force. She was unexpectedly benefited by the fact "that Germany declared war on Russia and thereby initiated the declaration of war, that Germany was the first to enter Belgium and itself called it" illegality ". While the intelligence of hostile states was engaged throughout the world in prepared propaganda against defenseless behind its vast borders of Germany, these hostile states themselves fenced themselves off from Germany with a hermetic wall. The iron ring around the Central European states, formed by a frozen front, was closed in the north by the English-dominated sea. The only narrow gap for German intelligence remained only on the Franco-Swiss border .

After the declaration of war, executive power in the rear passed in Germany to the military authorities. Their duties included the prevention of enemy espionage. In order to really close the way to enemy intelligence, the actions of the military authorities in this direction needed a central leadership. This, however, was absent. The General Staff, which led the activities of the counterintelligence police before the war, was busy working in the theaters of war. A few police officials experienced in counterintelligence also served as army police officers there. The rear was deprived of any experienced guard against espionage. In its place [102] were the well-intentioned but completely ignorant local authorities. Their activities consisted mainly of public warnings. The population heard for the first time about these things from the lips of the authorities. The consequence of this was a wild fear of espionage throughout Germany, leading to funny and sometimes serious phenomena. At the time of the greatest national excitement, the most senseless rumors spread with lightning speed. Particularly devastating was the message that cars with gold were driving around Germany for the purposes of enemy intelligence. They detained each car and took riders under fire. At the same time, senior officials who were traveling on business lost their lives. Within a few days, a state came that called into question the conduct of mobilization. The General Staff was compelled to intervene and put an end to this fight against espionage, which was degenerating into outrages. At the same time, many wrong actions were committed and had to be corrected. Many highly respected persons innocently fell under suspicion due to some circumstances and complained about the injustice committed against them. The result of all this was the general

hang up. The authorities, who had previously acted in an inciting manner, helplessly suspended their activities. The military and civilian authorities of the rear soon turned to the General Staff for advice, as the only competent institution. The result was a new heavy burden on the high command. The head of the German Intelligence Directorate, along with his direct tasks and tasks for the nascent press bureau, also received the task of directing counterintelligence during the war. Just as the connection between intelligence and press services offered some advantages, so was in itself organizationally correct and close connection between own intelligence and counterintelligence. But even here it should be recognized as erroneous the concentration of leadership in the supreme command, which, moreover, was located outside the homeland. [103]

With the enemy, things were different here, too. Their police not only fought German intelligence, but also took part in the intelligence of their country and significantly supported it. Police officials of all levels were thoroughly familiar with the essence of espionage. The first measures in defense of state secrets took place in them, therefore, more noiselessly and more profitably than in Germany. Although even there the mood of the people was aroused against German intelligence, however, from the very beginning of the war it was directed along the right path. The appeal to the mood of the people was aimed not so much at the fear of danger as national propaganda, placing the blame for the war on Germany. In Belgium, too, from the very first day they began to wage war with remarkable energy, and this was manifested not only in the prepared participation of the population in the struggle, but also in the manner of action against German intelligence. Thus, for example, even before the entry of Belgium into the war, the Hamburg merchant Erhardt, sent by intelligence before the outbreak of the war to Antwerp to inform about the behavior of England, was captured there, and although he did not take any hostile actions either against Belgium or against any already present with her in the alliance of the state, he was sentenced to death and shot. He died like a hero and was one of the first German war casualties. In fact, neither in France nor in Russia there was a need for defensive measures, since a strong national feeling forced everyone there to cut off the ties that German intelligence had established with the subjects of these states. Not a single Russian, and especially not a single Frenchman, proved capable of betraying to the enemy his people who had entered the struggle. When the German troops were in front of the fortress,

with the commander of which ties were established in peacetime, the idea easily suggested itself to demand the surrender of the fortress from him. The task was taken over by an intelligence officer he knew. The commander refused. When the fortress was taken a long time later by force of arms, an order was found for the troops, praising and rewarding this very officer for his brave [104] defense.

It was possible, however, to make new connections in the hostile camp. As the war dragged on, the national strength of resistance among other peoples also weakened. But when this was first succeeded - and precisely in France - the number of Germans convicted in Germany for treason had already exceeded 30. On the other hand, the General Staff, when the war broke out, was stormed by all sorts of

individuals who wanted to serve as spies. Motivated in part by the most fantastic performances, most of them were completely useless. Thanks to the firm education of German intelligence in peacetime, it was not difficult for her to separate the chaff from the wheat. Along with the obvious deceivers and major swindlers of an international character, there were also Germans of both sexes who were not inferior to the army in their courage and devotion to the fatherland and gave their lives at the disposal of intelligence. Like the fear of espionage, espionage at one's own risk also flourished, in which, in the absence of appropriate organization, much national will wasted. Therefore, in Germany, when the war broke out, there was no lack of information about the enemy,

but almost all of this information was difficult to use. In addition, they made it easier for the enemy's immediately planted false reports to achieve their goal, especially since they were widely disseminated among the masses. All these impressions confirmed that the situation observed at the beginning of the war had been worked out by the enemy state long before the war itself; it was also confirmed that the Siberian army corps were transferred to European Russia before the general Russian mobilization. While under normal mobilization they could have reached the front only by mid-September, they were already there by the 20th of August. On the German western front, during the offensive, Russian spies were caught - for the most part, [105] Dutch Jews - delivering information from Holland in a conventional cipher. The large number of them and their mode of action showed that what was at stake here was not improvisation, but systematic work, and that Germany's war on two fronts was the basis of the enemy's military plans.

IV. Military intelligence in neutral countries

General remarks. Switzerland. Holland. Northern states. Romania. Intelligence goals. Intelligence of the German General Staff in neutral countries.

The offensive of the troops and the first operations of the world war took place on the basis of preliminary work in peacetime. The German mobilization and the performance of the German army proceeded so systematically that the Prussian Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn, expressed that he could, in fact, go on vacation. Since the performance of modern mass armies cannot be made dependent on information arriving at the last moment, reconnaissance was at first of only comparatively little importance for all the belligerents. Intelligence regained its importance only when the fronts froze and confidence arose in the multi-year nature of the world war. Espionage appeared in the theaters of military operations, which, due to its characteristic originality, will be further considered in a separate chapter. Other were the foundations of great international intelligence, for which the paths across vast fronts

were closed and which, therefore, concentrated in the neutral powers lying between the belligerents. In the ring surrounding Germany and Austria-Hungary, at first a large hole still gaped in the south. But it also closed with the entry into the war of Romania, Bulgaria and Italy; a continuous, impenetrable rampart was formed not only from the North Sea to the Alps, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but also from the south, from Thessaloniki through the Tyrol to the borders of Switzerland. Within this rampart lay the Central European states, surrounded by an alliance of enemies whose intelligence worked concentrically towards the middle of the circle. The German General Staff had [106] intelligence against Russia and France, the Austrian - against Russia and Italy, the Bulgarian - against the neighboring Balkan states and against Turkey. Intelligence against the strongest enemies - against France, England, and then America - thus fell to the lot of Germany, and she also had to conduct predominant intelligence against Russia, since only the northern route through Sweden-Finland remained free, while the southern one was almost completely closed. It is quite understandable that the intelligence of the three great military powers - Russia, England and France - when conquering intermediate neutral countries, turned out to be in the first place, especially since by the beginning of the war it was already completely ready for action. In accordance with the division of roles before the war and during its first period, intelligence against Germany fell primarily to the lot of France and Russia. England watched the German coast and the German fleet. This distribution of roles within the joint military leadership, which removed the last obstacles to the joint work of the general staffs, meant the concentration of

the forces of each of them and, thereby, the increase in these forces during operations. The basic

points: for France - Switzerland, England - the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, for Russia - Sweden. Materials received after the occupation of Rumania showed that from this country, while it was still neutral, such intensive reconnaissance was also carried out against the middle states, which could not be established before. In the further course of the war, the ties of the Entente states in neutral countries continued to expand. It is difficult to describe in more or less detail the vast system of espionage practiced by the Entente through neutral countries. We will try to do this for individual countries. In this case, we will carry out only the most important of the mass of facts.

Switzerland

On the basis of its experience in peacetime and a correct [107] assessment of the significance of its country for the belligerents, the Swiss government tried immediately after the outbreak of war to prevent, by means of strict legislation, the abuse of its neutrality and to reduce the danger that threatened this neutrality from the intelligence work of the belligerent powers on the Swiss soil. On August 3, an allied decree was issued on measures to protect the country and maintain its neutrality. It was followed by orders for punitive measures and for the publication of military information. At the beginning of 1917, Switzerland was compelled to protect its own military secrets by means of a special decree, since, in spite of legislative measures, the intelligence services of the warring powers managed to establish themselves in Switzerland. In view of the fact that the possibility was not ruled out that Switzerland would also be forced to fight, this represented an immediate danger for her.

French intelligence managed to overcome legislative slingshots earlier than others with the help of the formation of small and inconspicuous, but numerous spy organizations. They were led by the military attache in Bern, Colonel Pazho; when he was threatened by the accidental discovery of several businesses, he was replaced by Colonel Morne. The consul general in Geneva, Pascal d'Eu, also worked in close connection with the military attache, who then, also being compromised, had to leave his post.

The vice-consuls Peron and Montjou, subordinate to the consul general, as well as the French consuls Pelignier in Bern, Baron Fougères in Lausanne, Robin in Zurich and Farge in Basel, were, despite their extraterritoriality, in the closest connection with French espionage. They not only obtained independent information about Germany for the military attache, but also mediated between agents located in Germany and spy bureaus located in France, which were under the command of special French intelligence officers and were located on the border with

Switzerland to Ennas, Evian and Pontarlier. Under the guise of consular secretaries, senior agents of French intelligence were seconded to individual [108] consulates. Under this leadership worked, for the most part

independently of one another and often without even knowing each other, numerous spy groups. Let us mention some of them that worked especially successfully. A French dragoon officer, millionaire and banker from Lyon, Count Mougot was in charge of an intelligence bureau in Bern, which worked hard from 1916 to 1918 in Switzerland and Germany. For this purpose, he bought a watch factory in Bavigliar, Switzerland, whose salesmen were engaged in espionage. His most important employees were Georges Clorin, a large industrialist Brevard and trusted Dreyfus, from the Swiss - the director of the riding school in Bern, several Swiss businessmen, the owner of an information bureau, and, finally, employees in Swiss hotels, who worked as intermediaries for the transmission of letters and looked through correspondence guests, from which information about Germany was extracted. This group also tried to destroy factories near Rheinfelden, destroy trains going to Germany with the help of incendiary bombs, and sprinkle poison on the wagons in which cattle were supposed to be transported from Switzerland through the German

border. They worked so boldly in Switzerland that it was impossible to keep the secret for long. The leaders of the enterprise were arrested, Count Muzho himself was released on parole. Violating the latter, he fled to the French shore of Lake Geneva and continued his activities from there. 21 of his employees, including the Bernese lawyer Rudolf Brustlein, who became the head of the case after the flight of Count Mougot, appeared in May 1918 before a Swiss court. Some of the accused, who also spied against Switzerland, were sentenced to years in prison.

The second group, led from Geneva, relied exclusively on Swiss citizens. Its threads converged at the French military attache, in the hands of his adjutant. In 1917, the German postal control found [109] that extremely important espionage information was reported in

chemical ink on newspapers going from Germany to Switzerland. The first intercepted mail was number 79, so 78 messages have already fallen into the hands of the enemy. Once the address was known, it became possible to intercept further reports at short intervals. However, it was possible to find out the organs of enemy intelligence only after a long search. They turned out to be Ross, a retired judicial official in Frankfurt am Main, and two military men, one of whom worked for French intelligence on the western front, and the other on the telegraph office in Mainz. All three were sentenced to death. Their seducers and mediators in Geneva were sentenced by a Swiss court to imprisonment. In Western Switzerland, the interests of France were supported by sympathy for her. It was especially important for French intelligence that it was able to find there, among the police officers, people who had the opportunity to warn and facilitate the timely flight to France of those persons whose activities became known to the authorities. Despite this, during the first three years of the war, 14 French spy organizations were discovered in Switzerland, and regarding 145 people their activities in the service of French intelligence were established, and the relevant material about them was transferred by Germany to the Swiss courts.

As for England, Switzerland was initially outside the sphere of interests of its military intelligence. All the more vividly, however, was England interested in Switzerland from the point of view of economic intelligence and political propaganda; exclusively for this purpose, she organized consulates on the border between Switzerland and Germany, from there she monitored trade relations with Germany and prevented them. The embassy supervised this activity. Organized British military intelligence did not dare to set foot on Swiss soil. In 1916, British military [110] spy bureaus appeared on the French border strip, supplying first from Evian, and then from Pontarlier, the British ambassador in Berne with instructions regarding military intelligence. The rest of England's military espionage in Switzerland was unofficial. Only one single spy bureau was discovered under the very convenient guise of a foreign language school in Bern, with branches in Basel and Zurich. The reason why England did not quite give up her own military intelligence in Switzerland seems to be the interest that Britain had in connection with the air raids to observe the Zeppelin shipyard in Friedrichshafen. Both the Consulate in Basel and the Consulate General in Zurich are interested in this. Consul General Anget was in direct contact with the fitters whom he recruited for his purposes in Friedrichshafen. However, all British intelligence in Switzerland lagged far behind the French.

question turned out to be

Russian intelligence in Switzerland was unsatisfactory both in peacetime and during the war. She didn't have a system. The lack of leadership also made itself felt, due to remoteness from the homeland. The last shortcoming was tried, if possible, to compensate for the "Russian commission" under the French Ministry of War, which, in fact, was only a representative office of Russian intelligence in Paris. Brought a sensitive loss

to the Russians the fact that Gurko, the Russian military attache in Berne, had compromised himself so much at the very beginning of the war with his unceremonious espionage activities that he had to leave his post and be replaced by a novice in intelligence, General Golovan. Russian intelligence was also divided by the fact that it worked simultaneously against Austria and Germany, while France and England concentrated their forces exclusively against Germany. Since it was easier to spy in Austria than in Germany, and since assistants related to the tribe placed themselves at the disposal of intelligence, the Russian work [111] was sent from Switzerland mainly there. While almost one Russian spy sent from Switzerland was found in Germany during the war, quite a few of them were neutralized in Austria.

The United States of North America in the first period of the war had no reason to take part in the reconnaissance of the Entente. Since they were neutral, their representatives had the opportunity to get acquainted with everything that interested the Washington government. Added to this was the circumstance that the German government, striving to preserve this neutrality, went in the widest possible way towards the Americans. When America joined the Entente in 1918, it only had to take advantage of the Allied intelligence that already existed. It was felt that American support for the war also revived intelligence. It seemed that only now the Allies had received the correct information about Germany, only now they knew where they should direct their intelligence and, first of all, their propaganda. America did not give up on its own intelligence. In Switzerland, General Pershing, the military attache in Bern, led it with direct subordination to the main headquarters. He was assisted by consulates in Bern and Zurich.

Italy did not play any significant role in reconnaissance against Germany. She directed all her intelligence forces against the Austrian front. As a result, Switzerland was almost completely out of the scope of Italian intelligence.

Holland

Holland was to England what Switzerland was to France. The Dutch base was all the more important for intelligence because the fatherland was separated from the mainland by a canal. The subordination of British espionage to the military attache in The Hague soon proved insufficient. In the person of Lieutenant Colonel Oppenheim, a special leadership of all [112] intelligence and counterintelligence against Germany was organized. Under his command was the Consul General in Rotterdam, along with him also in Rotterdam there was a larger, subordinate directly to the War Office in London, the spy bureau of the director of a shipping line, Tinsley. Tinsley's bureau housed the most important contacts of British intelligence. More than 300 people worked in it, and it was divided into 4 departments. The first department directed naval espionage, the second - under the personal supervision of Tinsley - espionage against the German army. The third department was dedicated to military equipment and supplied spies with technically impeccable passports and documents. The fourth department was, as a press department, in close connection with the daily Dutch newspaper Telegraaf, which depended on the British, and served primarily propaganda against Germany. The number of agents that the Tinsley Bureau passed daily was great. They were recruited for him by trusted people who were available both in large hotels and in the most insignificant inns, both among the Dutch authorities and among the police, among porters at stations and cabbies and among frontier officials. In addition to the Tinsley bureau in Holland, five more English spy organizations have become known, which, however, cannot be compared either in structure or in results with the above. It had its own bodies and the Reuters intelligence agency, whose work in Germany and Belgium was based on the same foundations as the work of military intelligence. Since all British intelligence

was limited mainly to the German, including the Belgian, coast and the German fleet, it is clear that the huge apparatus put into action for this gave brilliant results. Holland was also a base for English economic and commercial espionage against Germany. It was led by

the British Consul General in Rotterdam, and supported by his trade attaché, Sir Francis Oppenheimer. Since neutral passenger traffic from Germany to Holland and from Holland to England was under [113] British control, British intelligence had at its disposal extremely effective means for extorting

information. Its influence in Holland was much stronger than that of France. There were English agents, therefore, in all walks of life, in all nations, and among all travelers who traveled between Germany and Holland. Only the first organizational structure of wartime English intelligence relied on the help of Dutch Jews. Shortly after the start of the war, this limited base was abandoned, and everything under British influence was used for reconnaissance. Among those passing through Holland were numerous war correspondents from neutral countries. British intelligence paid special attention to them. Thus, for example, the war correspondent of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, Leonhardt Kooper, made eight trips to the theater of operations in Belgium and northern France, and four trips to Germany while in the service of England. He reported his observations both to the Tinsley Bureau, which had given him this assignment, and directly to the War Office in London.

Belgian intelligence was almost entirely driven back by the German offensive to the borders of Holland; only fragments of it remained in Belgium. It was only in 1915 that a Belgian intelligence officer was discovered in Liège, who had the courage to remain at his post all this time and maintain continuous communication with the intermediary institution in Maastricht. And if such a course of action indicated a respectable love for the fatherland and personal courage, then the behavior of this officer at the German military court was so courageous and courageous that the judges, out of a sense of comradely respect, did not sentence him to death, which he deserved by law. . Belgian intelligence was, however, before the war too underdeveloped and too little independent to be able to play an independent role in the spy crowd in Holland. It dissolved almost completely in French intelligence. [114]

The latter fought from Holland on two fronts: on the one hand, against Belgium, and through it - in the rear of the German army in France, on the other - against Germany. It is clear that France preferred to spy in Germany by the easiest way in all respects through her neighboring Switzerland, rather than through a separate Holland, which could only be reached through England. In the first place, therefore, French intelligence in Holland was espionage in the theater of operations. It will be discussed later, and we will show that in addition to the organizations that served for the use of Holland and directed against Germany, English and French front-line espionage also had their own auxiliary forces in Holland.

The proximity of the theater of operations made Holland a rallying point for German deserters and made it possible for enemy intelligence to obtain the most important information from them by interrogation. Along the entire Dutch-Belgian border were located polling stations under British control.

The internment camps established by the Dutch authorities were trusted persons were appointed who continued to question the deserters, establishing their place of residence after their release from the camps, in order to persuade the more suitable of them to return to the theater of operations or to espionage trips to Germany, and instruct them. This source of information was perhaps the most abundant militarily in Holland. The neutral country located in the rear represented for the German military command

a great danger that the Entente did not know. The Russian intelligence

organization in Holland was much more systematic and more dangerous for Germany than in Switzerland, despite the fact that she was far from her fatherland. She owed this to the Russian military attache in The Hague, Colonel Meyer, who personally took an outstanding part in intelligence. His example had an effect on the representatives of Russia in Holland, who actively supported him. He received mainly [115] military information from inner Germany, but he was less interested in the western theater of operations and the fleet. Russian intelligence was helped by the fact that even before the war it had established extensive contacts with Germany from Holland. The division of labor between the intelligence agencies of the various great powers of the Entente in Germany was carried out in the most expedient way. In the northern states, British intelligence dominated, and not only militarily, but also in the fact that it carefully watched Denmark, Sweden and Norway for the purpose of economic and commercial espionage. The executors of this economic intelligence were the English consuls, whose number increased significantly by

the beginning of the war. Thus, for example, the Consulate General in Gothenburg had, instead of one professional consul in peacetime, 7 consuls in time of war. Also in Norway in peacetime there was only

one full-time consul, but during the war there were 33 and, in addition, another 25 vice-consuls. Their only task was to monitor the economic situation in Germany and to stop all trade relations with her. Only Sweden tried to resist the penetration of this espionage. But, despite this, both military and naval espionage, led by the British military attache, and economic espionage, led by the Danish consul, remained viable there. In contact with Germany on land, was a very suitable place for purely military observations. And here, as in Christiania, they were led by an English military and naval attache.

general

France carried on its own espionage work in the northern states in close contact with British intelligence. She showed here rather an independent desire for activity on the part of all officers and officials [116] of a foreign department, rather than a systematic organization, which France did not need, since Switzerland served her as a gateway to Germany, and Holland - a field of inquiry and a base for espionage in rear of the German army. The United States provided military espionage in the northern states to British and French intelligence. They themselves were interested here almost exclusively in the state of the German merchant fleet, the economic situation of Germany, the food and mood of the German people. Systematic reconnaissance was carried out on these matters

under the direction of the maritime and commercial attaches, as well as the consulates general in Copenhagen, Christiania and Stockholm. All Americans leaving Germany, as well as other travelers, were interrogated by these institutions. Distribution of agents, however, was not observed.

The Danish authorities treated Russian intelligence favorably, while the Swedish authorities, in their own interests, fought against it. Copenhagen thus became the center of Russian intelligence against Germany, while its leadership was at times in Stockholm. Faithful to its peacetime system, the Russian General Staff also worked during the war with vast and large organizations. Therefore, relatively few, but all the more significant organizations of this intelligence were discovered. The largest of these was the organization of Dr. Katz from Warsaw, already known in peacetime, which moved its headquarters to Copenhagen at the beginning of the war. From there, part of them went with the help of the British and French through Switzerland to Germany, their work was distributed very systematically. So, for example, the main agent Shapiro was supposed to watch East Prussia, Festennistedt - for Poznan, Vilner - for Berlin, Silberberg - for Bromberg, Blauzvirn - for

Breslau. Most of these chief agents failed to get to work: they were arrested shortly after they entered German soil. This did not stop, however, the Russian leaders from sending more and more new agents, who suffered, for the most part [117], the same fate. Another Russian enterprise was hiding behind the Danish advertising newspaper Expert Revue. It was also led by a Russian Jew. Behind him stood the Russian military attache in Copenhagen and his son-in-law. Since the latter was arrested by the Danish government for fraud, this organization fell apart in its very center. In 1915, a Russian spy group surfaced, in which the Jews Blumenthal and Stukgold played a prominent role, whose specialty was the recruitment of agents in artistic circles. While enterprises based on the Jews did not succeed, due to the dishonesty and cowardice of the latter, Colonel Rasch's organization in Copenhagen, working with the Swedes, Finns and Germans, could note some success. They managed to establish contacts in Germany with the military and in the highest circles of society.

Romania

In Romania, Russia led the joint intelligence of the Entente. After the occupation of the country by German troops, it was possible to establish that even before the war, Russian intelligence had successfully worked from here against the Middle Powers, especially against Austria. She was supported by the Romanian police. During the war, while Romania was neutral, Russian intelligence, in cooperation with the British and French consulates, was directed primarily against the connecting routes between Turkey and Germany in order to monitor the supply of ammunition to Turkey and the transfer of German troops to Turkey.

Tasks

Even during the war, the leadership of the intelligence of the great powers of the Entente remained in the hands of individual general staffs, which were supported in the economic and political spheres by their governments. There appears to have been no joint top management [118]. On the other hand, cooperation was even more complete than in the last years of peace. Parallelism in work was avoided by the distribution of tasks. As already mentioned, military information fell to the share of Russia and France, first of all, while England limited itself to information about the conduct of the war at sea and economic issues. America took a limited part in all branches of intelligence. But with its entry into the war, political intelligence and political propaganda reached a brilliant development. Thus, the political center was in American intelligence, the military center since the organization of the general supreme command - with the French, the economic - with the British, who organized the intelligence center in Folkestone. After the military collapse of Russia in 1917, its intelligence abroad lost its leader. Since it did not serve the purposes of revolutionary propaganda in Germany, it was dissolved in the intelligence of other Entente states.

Due to the fact that during the second period of the war Entente intelligence was entrusted with the leadership of the struggle against all measures of the middle states aimed at harming the combat capability of the Entente, the entire organization of this intelligence was subjected to further concentration. At the same time, the influence of the II Department of the General Staff in France and the "Intelligence Department" in England increased significantly. All government offices at home and all embassies and consulates abroad were, so to speak, militarized and became members of this system. The more, however, international intelligence grew into civilian institutions and the more it served purposes other than purely military ones, the more the latter receded into the background. Military intelligence concentrated more and more on the theaters of war and grew there into a special system, which in the next chapter will be

considered separately.

International intelligence has become, however, not so much a tool for strategic or military decisions as for the general conduct of war. She became the embodiment of Clausewitz's words that [119] warfare and politics are one and the same. Intelligence and governments have worked hand in hand. What was politically established by intelligence was used by propaganda, and the influence of the latter was clarified again by intelligence. Economic intelligence data influenced the blockade of Germany and economic pressure on neutral countries.

Intelligence of the German General Staff abroad

It is clear that Germany, which before the war had neither economic nor political intelligence, whose General Staff only in the last year and a half before the war had a sum of 450,000 marks for the maintenance of its own intelligence and for the fight against the enemy, could not prepare against Russia, France, England and the small neighboring states of intelligence, similar to that which each of them prepared against Germany. Small available forces were concentrated against the closest opponents in the land war - Russia and France. At the beginning of the war, everything created in peacetime was spent on solving this problem. After the first collision with the enemy, which proved the correctness of the information received in peacetime, the German military command found itself in front of an empty place.

In the autumn of 1914, under the most difficult conditions, a new organization of German intelligence was launched. And now it had to be created without any support and even with the opposition of the German authorities abroad. There was nothing to think about that she could, under these conditions, settle in the above-mentioned neighboring countries with a success that was even approximately equal to the Entente intelligence that already existed. True, the funds were now, during the war, unlimited. But it is impossible to build intelligence on money alone, if they want it to bring benefits, and not serious harm. The identity of its employees plays a significant role in intelligence. However, in view of the omissions of peacetime, Germany [120] had absolutely no trained workers, while her opponents had numerous educated officers and the whole system of their well-established foreign representations.

In contrast to the enemy, who conducted concentric reconnaissance against Germany from all sides, the latter had to organize eccentric reconnaissance in all directions. Against Russia, she could use only a narrow and long route through Sweden and Finland. The calculation of time and space played a special role here, if only the information coming from here had any other value at all when it arrived. England was protected by the canal and strictly controlled all traffic from Norwegian, Danish and Dutch harbours. Switzerland was the only transitional country to France. France, therefore, concentrated on the Swiss border all the forces already trained in peacetime in counterintelligence. Not reaching this border, the area of western Switzerland, friendly to France, stretched like an open field, on the police of which France was able to exert great influence. French counterintelligence even reached the German-Swiss border. Everyone who came from Germany to Switzerland was immediately reported to the French border. These circumstances presented a further difficulty for the organization of German military intelligence. forced to be content with staying in Germany and tried to gradually establish relations with enemy countries from there or lead scouts through the slingshots placed by the enemy. There was nothing more unfounded than the Entente's fear of espionage at the beginning of the war. She judged Germany by her standards. It would seem

that from the point of view of the German military command, one should regret the difficulties that stood in the way of German intelligence. In fact, they had to overcome only the fact that,

the German one was supposed to avoid everything [121] superfluous and was forced to work as restrained as intelligence should do, which is obliged to deliver reliable data to the military command.

As we have already written, even before the war, German intelligence managed to establish valuable contacts in Russia and France and maintain them until the outbreak of war. To the credit of the French and Russian peoples, however, it must be said that all the old ties were severed at the very moment of the outbreak of the war, and that a long time passed before it was possible to establish new ones. In France, this became possible only in 1915. By this time, however, 35 Germans had already been sentenced for spying for the enemy. Shameful as this may be for Germany, this fact must be mentioned, since it vividly illuminates the preponderance and enormous work of Entente intelligence in Germany.

The war revealed its corrupting influence, first of all in Russia, and then in France and even in England, so that German intelligence found everywhere few but good contacts.

In neutral countries, she could move only with the greatest caution and could not even dream of conquering the area occupied by the enemy. The Germans in neutral countries, on whom the General Staff placed some hopes, showed good intentions, but it turned out that this was not enough in the absence of the leadership of the official representations of this country. We had to rely on their help less and less, and, in the end, we had to completely refuse it. While Germany refused this opportunity, the Entente built its intelligence in neutral countries through its citizens under the guidance of its official representatives.

The creation of spy organizations in neutral countries, like many of the Entente I have listed, was impossible for Germany. Its "military intelligence bureaus" were located on German soil along the borders with neutral countries. In each of them only a few officers worked, if possible not regular, but reserve, from [122] circles familiar with abroad. Only the leadership of these bureaus was in the hands of active, specially trained officers of the intelligence service. At the main headquarters, the "secret intelligence" was led by a staff officer of the General Staff, subordinate to the head of department III-b and having two employees.

And this shows how limited the role, at least in terms of size, played the actual espionage within the German military intelligence.

Germany was not prepared for a world war, just as all military research in the event of a possible war was not carried out within the framework of later reality. The American army was of only theoretical interest to the General Staff in peacetime. Its development was observed insofar as it was possible to do it on the basis of the press and reports of the military attaches in Washington. However, the conscientious work of the General Staff on the basis of this gave a true picture of the American army. For the organization of permanent intelligence there, there was not only enough money, but also sufficient interest. Nothing has changed in this respect since the outbreak of war. It was only very slowly that the idea of a possible participation of the United States in the world war penetrated into the minds of the political and military leaders of the war. When

this question began to approach its solution, the General Staff still had at its disposal only peacetime data on the military prerequisites for America's entry into the war. Not on the basis of intelligence, but on the basis of mere calculations, an idea was obtained that was confirmed entirely by the actual course of American participation in the war. It is not true that the German General Staff was mistaken about the forces that America should throw on the European mainland, or about the timing of this. This will be discussed in more detail when considering the results of exploration. Nevertheless, an attempt should have been made to obtain [123] a direct picture of America's military preparations. At the same time, it is necessary to separate the first period of the war, when America supported the opponents of Germany

supplies of weapons and military equipment, and the second period when she entered the struggle on the side of the Entente. Even the elucidation of facts of the first kind ran into extreme difficulties. The way to America was closed from the west by England, France and Italy, from the east by Russia and Japan. The world's sea routes of communication were under the domination of England, which subjected them to the most careful control. Sending Germans to America for reconnaissance purposes seemed completely impossible. It remained only to try to obtain the necessary information through South America, but it was impossible to send conscientious persons even there, and it was possible only in isolated cases. The transmission of information from America ran into the same difficulties. Under these circumstances, independent activities of Germany's friends who lived there developed on the American mainland, which, however, could not withstand comparison with organized intelligence and even fraught with great danger, since the sources of Germany's information were not known, and it was impossible to judge their reliability.

Upon America's entry into the war in the spring of 1917, the obstacles to German intelligence in the latter increased even more. On the other hand, however, the need to have information about the military preparations of the United States became even greater. On the direct lines of communication between North America and Europe, the travel of German intelligence agents became completely impossible. All information received through South America was delayed and lost its value. All these circumstances made Germany almost completely give up on costly attempts to maintain intelligence in America itself. It remained only possible to observe the American fighting forces from the moment they entered European soil. Therefore, with the entry of America into the war, German intelligence spread to all the harbors of the French coast. Although the difficulties here [124] were the same as for any intelligence in France, it was nevertheless possible to obtain sufficient information in a timely manner. Of all the belligerent powers, America was the least, if not least, threatened by General Staff intelligence on its own soil. This statement seems to be in contradiction with the information spreading all over the world about German sabotage and propaganda in America. If we discard the exaggerations that enemy propaganda used for its own purposes, then there will perhaps remain a few enterprises that were even less known to the German General Staff than to the United States itself, since they were created by the initiative of

Germany's friends who acted without her leadership. Their sacrificial readiness, therefore, brought relatively little benefit to Germany and concealed from the very beginning the danger of unplanned and aimless activity.

V. In theaters of war

General remarks. Russian theater of operations. Mood in the Russian army. The collapse of intelligence. Propaganda. coup. Kerensky creates a mood hostile to the Germans. Bolsheviks and their propaganda. Balkans. Türkiye. Austria-Hungary. Western theater of operations. The French system, prepared in peacetime, becomes unusable. The theater of war is repopulated with spies. Aviation espionage. Spying through carrier pigeons. Propaganda among the French population, his participation in espionage. French propaganda in the German troops. Socialists. Espionage from Holland against Belgium and Northern France. Circumstances favoring espionage. Sending people to France. relief commission. Church. Belgian population. German espionage on the Allied front. Deserters as spies. Messages from prisoners. The impression of the prisoners. The ratio between prisoners of different nationalities. Defectors. Escaped from captivity. Treatment of captured Germans.

The war radically changes the conditions for the work of military intelligence. Military

the secret, in the first place - going on a campaign and equipment intended only in case of war, known in peacetime only to a few and kept in strict confidence, become apparent. Before the eyes of millions and with the cooperation of thousands of people, solutions are slowly being put into action. It is necessary to obtain information about these incidents from the enemy and prevent him from learning about the situation at home. All extraneous considerations fall away, the only goal of the struggle is victory.

In this struggle, the world war placed before both sides tasks the likes of which had never been given to intelligence. True, during the Russo-Japanese War there were already extensive fronts and battles that lasted weeks, during which espionage could develop, which in maneuver warfare does not play the role of a direct auxiliary means for the military command. The Chinese population, in whose homeland hostilities took place, rendered, [125] as far as we know, significant services to the Japanese related to them by race and caused significant damage to the Russian command, the flanks of the fronts were, however, at that time still free, and the cavalry had the opportunity to take deep intelligence.

The World War created conditions that left far behind everything that had been until then. The cavalry, which was considered in military games, in maneuvers and in regulations, as a weapon of reconnaissance, failed after the very first battles. The fronts stopped and became more and more dense. They moved forward or backward only in the frontal direction. True, aerial reconnaissance has become a new element in the conduct of war. All the belligerents did their best to develop these air weapons. But even it saw only the location of the enemy, marching columns, moving trains, cities, villages and smoking factory chimneys, and, moreover, only in a space limited by the possible range of flight. Their reports made it possible to draw conclusions about the intentions of the enemy command only when they were already being put into action, and often there was no time left for countermeasures. They did not report anything about the mood of the enemy troops, about the situation of the population in cities and villages, about combat training in the rear and, especially, overseas. Nor did they say anything about what military equipment was produced in factories, although it was precisely this information that became the most important as the war dragged on and the importance of technology grew.

The length of the fronts exceeded all peacetime expectations. The battle front of the German troops, 2,400 kilometers long, was opposed by fronts: English - 135 kilometers, French - 800 kilometers and Russian - 1,400 kilometers. All of them had a wide network of communications in their own or in an allied country, while the Germans could only use in an enemy country a network that had been destroyed many times and was of little use. Germany fought in various and remote from one another theaters of military operations, while her opponents - each in a limited and [126] permanent space. Every surprise should have been disastrous for the smaller German army. German intelligence in the theaters of war was, therefore, occupied mainly and to a sufficient extent with the elucidation of purely military facts. However, after the defeats of the Russian army and also the allied armies on French soil, the enemy saw that a military victory over Germany was impossible. The longer the war went on, the more the Entente supplemented the war with political and economic weapons, and the task of the military command was more and more reduced to maintaining

pressure on the German front and using and consolidating the final victory in the economic and political war. Therefore, the intelligence of the Entente in the theaters of military operations was from the very beginning imbued with political goals. It was to her advantage that she could concentrate her reinforcements on the German army, since the defeat of the latter would place the Entente and Germany's allies in the hands.

For the German high command, however, enemy troops in all theaters of war were of varying interest. Only when the information about the enemy was sufficiently exhaustive did the correct

a general picture that makes it possible to judge enemy groupings on fronts of decisive importance. Germany had to support her allies by sending troops and equipment. The distribution of German auxiliaries depended to a large extent on the correct idea of the enemy, in order to avoid unnecessary weakening of decisive fronts or surprises on secondary fronts, which could be disastrous for the general situation. At all the army headquarters within which the German troops fought, as well as at all the main headquarters of the Allies, there were, therefore, officers of the intelligence service of the High Command. For the most part, they also supervised all intelligence in the army area, thanks to which they could directly use all sources: interrogation of prisoners of war, captured [127] documents, aerial reconnaissance, artillery surveillance and reports from military units. General reports of individual army intelligence services were transmitted by them to the high command. The sending of spies was, due to its uselessness, prohibited for rare and short-term

exceptions.

Against this general background, the circumstances of reconnaissance work in each of the theaters of military operations should be considered separately, since they differed depending on the density of the front, on the natural conditions of the theater of operations, on the nature of the population, and on the energy of waging war by the enemy. In this case, it will be useful to first consider the eastern theaters of military operations, and only then study the situation in the western theater, which played a decisive role and therefore possessed the most developed intelligence in all its branches.

Russian theater of operations

Russian intelligence was in peacetime prepared only for the offensive. The booty at the Battle of Tannenberg provided evidence that the Russian army headquarters had such material about Germany as a theater of operations that no German headquarters could have better. After the conquest of Warsaw, printed lists of 120 strictly secret documents and plans of the German and Austrian armed forces were seized, which were delivered to the Russian General Staff by the intelligence department in Warsaw already in 1907-1910. We were acquainted with the successes of Russian pre-war espionage and documents seized in Vilna, Kovno, Riga, Kholm and other residences of Russian military and civilian authorities.

The road through the "Brandenburg Gate" was excellently prepared by the intelligence activities in Germany and the contacts established there. The Russians were, however, taken by surprise by the greatest [128] latent power inherent in the German army. Such was the devotion of the unanimous people to the cause of defending their fatherland. The leadership of the General Staff, created in the process of quiet and faithful to its duty work, was embodied in two commanders: Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The Russian army was pushed back by a much smaller German force back into Russia. Thus, all the grandiose pre-war work of Russian intelligence was devalued. The premises of Russian intelligence turned out to be unsuitable. For the new task, which required energetic and fast work, the excessively bloated peacetime organization of Russian intelligence was not prepared.

All the rumors that arose at the beginning of the war that the Russians used burning houses, bells, windmills and similar trifles should be classified as fairy tales, as well as such a view of the means of espionage in the theater of operations in general.

The Russians did not have sources of information at the beginning, except for testimonies of German prisoners of war.

They were a valuable source and, therefore, on the Russian front, for the most part, good treatment, which should have made them ready to testify. The martyrdom of prisoners of war began, for the most part, only in stages. Despite this, it was possible to establish

on the basis of captured orders that the German prisoners of war showed, in general, little. The Russians did not have that cunning treatment of prisoners of war, which we will see in the Western theater of operations. And since prisoners of war also came in unevenly and in small quantities, this source was not particularly plentiful for Russian intelligence. She then resorted to the means of leaving spies inconspicuously in the areas cleared before the Germans, or sending them under the guise of defectors to the German ranks. And here, as in peacetime, the case was carried out on a harmful mass scale. As a result, the specified kind of spies lacked the necessary preliminary training, and their choice was not sufficiently [129] thorough. Many of them were glad that they had avoided the war and did not show any desire to return to the ranks of the Russian army, the confidence in the victory of which, having been in the rear of the German front, they did not share. And, finally, this mass message was so noticeable that without much difficulty it was possible to almost completely detect and neutralize it.

Since the Russian front was not continuous long after the complete closure of the western front, and since large strips of forest and swamps made it possible for people who knew the area to pass, after the front had stabilized to some extent, work began with civilians trained for espionage. persons. This was done, however, so awkwardly that it was also immediately discovered. These spies, who became a source of information for German intelligence, brought more harm to the Russians,

than good.

The war in the east was fought not on Russian soil, but in Polish or Russified regions. The Russian command, therefore, did not meet in the population with that passionate support that we will see in the Western theater of operations. It is not necessary to speak, in general, about the hatred of the eastern population for the Germans - with the exception of Latvia. The locals used as spies were mostly Poles, Jews or Baltics, who had the same sympathy for Germany as for Russia. This does not mean, however, that they, from the very beginning, showed sympathy for the Germans: they behaved, including the Baltics, neutrally and thought only of their own benefit, which attracted them to where they could most expect it for their own vital interests. . Thus, only monetary motives remained as motives for really efficient spies. But it was they who encouraged them to willingly serve both sides and earn money from both.

The opinion, which was very widespread during the war and on the German eastern front, that the Poles carried out intensive espionage in favor of the [130] Russians, is completely wrong. With the exception of the urban intelligentsia and the landlords, the Poles were at first neutral and did not in any way try to harm the Germans. Only when there was hope for the independence of Poland, did Polish espionage and its own Polish intelligence develop, which, however, did not serve the Russians, but pursued Polish goals and sought connections with the Poles who were abroad - especially in America, and with the Entente representatives.

Russian Jews, even during the war, looked at espionage in the first place, as a gesheft. They did not take any internal part in the war. Therefore, although politically and religiously they lived better under the rule of the Germans than under the rule of the Russians, their sympathies were more on the Russian side. An interesting mixture of commercial abilities and national indifference was shown by one case, which was also characteristic of Russian reality, on one of the German sectors of the Austrian front. A Jew sent as a spy appeared, accompanied by many of the defectors whom he had served, He offered to repeat this maneuver. He was promised a comparatively high reward for every defector, fully equipped and armed, whom he brought. Indeed, a few days later he appeared, accompanied by a larger number of Russian soldiers. When he was to be paid the promised reward, he refused

him with the words: "Thank you, these gentlemen have already paid."

Convinced of the failure of their espionage across the front, the Russians soon stopped it. In the summer of 1915, the order of the commander-in-chief of the western front, General Evert, was captured, which stated the complete collapse of Russian intelligence in the theater of operations. All the more important for the Russian command was the intelligence that worked

against Germany in neutral countries. The strongest support for this intelligence was provided by the fact that France and England quickly informed her of everything they learned about Germany's military measures against Russia. The less satisfactory [131] Russian intelligence at the front turned out to be, the more this had to be taken into account, and questionnaires that fell into German hands showed that French and British intelligence gathered information for Russia in Germany and conducted intelligence from the same place against the Eastern theater of operations. It was important, therefore, to ensure that the German army advancing into Russia, first of all, from the penetration of espionage into it. It was convenient in this regard that the Vistula and other river barriers, flowing in the east in the rear of the front and parallel to it, made it possible, with

the help of relatively small forces, to control all communications. Especially diligently cordoned off the entire area in the rear of the German and Austrian armies during larger operations. This was crowned with success during the offensive against Romania, when Siebenbürgen was protected in the rear by the river. Teys, closed to any communication, except for the military. In addition, the southeast was secured from Germany by the penetration of espionage on the German-Austrian border. The duration of the war, the resistance of the population to the restrictions imposed on them, the lack of firm enforcement of these restrictions by the authorities, the demands of the political parties of the Reichstag for the relaxation of these security measures, all this prevented the full operation of said control.

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Allied espionage was also on the alert in Germany. Therefore, measures were taken to mislead him. Numerous transports, moving from the western front to reinforce the Austrian, first headed north, and, conversely, those moving north were directed to the south of Germany and only within the front line received their final direction. This was first used in the spring of 1916 during preparations for the breakthrough of the Russian front in Galicia under Gorlitsa-Tarnov. The success was complete. Despite the fact that significant masses of troops and artillery were launched from the German and Austrian side, the Russians were taken by surprise. The breakthrough handed Galicia into our hands and [132] shook the entire Russian system of fortresses. This victorious battle prompted the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Berlin to present an honorary doctorate to the Chief of the German General Staff, General von Falkenhain. The address specifically mentioned the successful preservation of the secret. Although this carries an element of exaggeration, since we are talking about an assessment of the importance of the commander, nevertheless, the German counterintelligence has the right to consider it its merit that it contributed to the success of military operations in the East, despite the huge, created in peacetime and supported during the war allies, Russian intelligence.

The common work led to the establishment of the closest connection between the German and Austrian intelligence services. The more senior strategic leadership passed to the Germans, the stronger the influence of their intelligence and counterintelligence became. At all the Austrian headquarters to which the German military units were subordinated, there were also intelligence officers of the German High Command, who tried to use in the East the experience gained by intelligence in the Western theater of operations.

Own intelligence stumbled, however, in the east on almost insurmountable obstacles. As already mentioned, the population nowhere especially did not meet us halfway. Added to this were the long distances of the Russian theater of operations, its weak population and the paucity of highways. The Germans also had to use, mainly, the testimony

prisoners. It was very difficult to find a sufficient number of interpreters and interrogating officers who knew Russian and were suitable for military interrogations, who could cope with a large influx of Russian prisoners of war and defectors. At first they had to be partly removed from the western front. Only in the winter of 1915-1916. the corps headquarters of the eastern front turned out to be sufficiently equipped with translators, and the divisions - only in the summer of 1916.

Judging by the Russian prisoners of war, the war did not arouse any enthusiasm among the Russian people. The soldiers testified that they were "driven" to [133] the war. Being, however, good soldiers, they were obedient, patient and endured the greatest hardships. They only surrendered when the fight was hopeless. Particularly faithful to their duty were soldiers of German origin and from the Baltic regions. They fought especially stubbornly, and as prisoners of war they showed very reluctantly.

The Poles fought badly, also ran across easily, especially after the occupation of Poland, and shared their knowledge, since they were indifferent to the war. The same applied to the Lithuanians. Stubborn, capable of resistance, hostile to the Germans and reserved, if not deceitful, were the Latvians and Estonians. From a purely military point of view, both these peoples, along with Siberia, provided the best Russian soldiers. The Mohammedans fought faithfully on the Russian side. In captivity, they showed a friendly attitude towards the Germans.

A real Russian prisoner of war was sensitive to good treatment and willingly, in general, spoke about what he knew. Since he was, for the most part, uneducated, he knew little and only local circumstances. Russian officers, including the Baltic ones, were true to their oath. They behaved with soldierly simplicity and refused to give any testimony. Many of them, like the commander of the 2nd Russian Army near Tannenberg, General Samsonov, escaped capture by committing suicide.

For deep reconnaissance in the rear of the army, inside Russia, there was only a narrow path through Sweden and Finland. In order to imagine the difficulty of this intelligence, it is enough to think about how long it took for the agent to travel to Russia, and what value his messages retained by the time he returned. Events are usually

Far ahead of him. All the more importance had to be attached to attempts to transmit information by telegraph. But even this means turned out to be unsuitable in such a police state as Russia. Difficulties in transmitting information from the front could not be overcome even when [134] the situation made it possible to transfer advanced assembly points to Finland, the Crimea and the Caucasus. Under these circumstances, espionage played only a secondary role for the Germans in the Russian theater of operations.

It could only be successful, at the very least, for narrowly limited tactical purposes. Not one of the regroupings of the Russian army was promptly reported by spies.

But a reliable source of information was intercepted Russian radio. All orders were, of course, encrypted, but the cipher system was simple and rarely changed. It was easy, therefore, to decipher.

Documents of the Russian authorities captured during the offensive of the German army were also a common source of information for intelligence. In military terms, their value was, for the most part, small, since they dealt with past events. But on the other hand, they always gave a complete picture of the mood that prevailed in the Russian army and among the people.

As I already mentioned when describing the outbreak of the war, reports from Russia even then indicated that there was no need to speak of a really hostile attitude of the people and the army towards the Germans. I also said that this impression was confirmed at the beginning of the war and by the testimonies of the prisoners, despite the fact that the defeats inflicted by the German army on the Russians entailed heavy sacrifices and hardships for the Russian soldier and made the course of the war different for him than he imagined it to be. , and how it was depicted from above. The unfriendly attitude of the Poles, Lithuanians and Baltics could be explained by the fact that

that the theater of war was their homeland. The indifference of the Russian soldier, however, had a downside. He lacked military enthusiasm, the prisoners did not know what goal the war with Germany should pursue. For the true Russian soldier, neither the ideas of revenge and the liberation of the fatherland from the Germans who had entered it, with the help of which the French government successfully raised the spirits of its troops, nor the economic and [135] political competition of Germany, in which every English soldier was convinced, played any role. He did his duty without asking questions. Under the tsarist government, during the first year of the war, no propaganda was noticed either on the Russian front or among the German troops.

It was only under the Kerensky government that propaganda hostile to the Germans began among the Russian troops. The old well-known revolutionaries began to serve her, like Plekhanov, Amfiteatrov and the famous Breshko-Breshkovskaya. They worked with word and pen in the troops for the continuation of the war. Everyone who uttered the word "peace" was immediately stigmatized as a corrupt German agent. It was prudently hushed up that Russian blood should continue to be shed for other people's goals. The successes of this propaganda were revealed very soon. Six weeks after the revolution, the army was in the hands of the new government, and the prisoners were decidedly hostile to Germany. Their confidence in victory revived again. Negotiations that were conducted during this revolution with many of the highest command authorities of the Russian army, including the commander-in-chief of the northern front, General of the Cavalry Dragomirov, and set themselves the goal of preventing this change, remained inconclusive. French propaganda won.

As a counter-revolutionary institution, Russian intelligence was, as such, first abolished during the March revolution. The place of intelligence was taken by the most ardent propaganda, which brought the intelligence service into frequent contact with it. Daily communication between the fronts led the Germans to know about all the changes on the Russian side. Therefore, Kerensky's offensive did not find them unprepared.

Military action interrupted propaganda. It became possible again only at the beginning of September 1917. The unsuccessful offensive, however, invalidated the old slogan about the unconditional continuation of the war. In many areas, the fraternization of German and Russian troops began. German intelligence got the opportunity to penetrate into the Russian ranks and there [136] agitate for peace between Russia and Germany. German intelligence officers were enthusiastically received by the troops and were carried on the shoulders through the trenches and camps.

In November, after the Bolshevik coup, a new situation was created. The military struggle is actually over. But in the East, the German front had to be preserved in order to keep Bolshevism out of Germany's borders. And on the Russian side, the propaganda of French intelligence continued in alliance with the Socialist Revolutionaries against the Brest-Litovsk peace, shameful for Russia, and for the resumption of the war with Germany. This propaganda could no longer achieve its goal. While the military struggle in the West was concentrated on decisive battles, in the East it turned into a purely political struggle. There was little Bolshevik propaganda among the German troops. The Russian rulers shifted the center of gravity of their propaganda not to the theater of war, but inside Germany. The idea of a coup was brought not so much from the front into the country as from the country to the front. The attempted coup by the Socialist-Revolutionaries with the help of the Entente in July 1918 in Moscow, the assassination of the German ambassador von Mirbach and the German commander in chief in Ukraine, Field Marshal von Eigner, were the last active manifestations of the activity of French intelligence, which worked before and during the war for the participation of Russia in the fight against Germany.

Balkans

Until the autumn of 1915, the Balkans had very little to do with the German

intelligence. Only after the Serbian army was defeated and contact was established with the Bulgarian army, in mid-November did the first meeting on Serbian soil between the German Chief of the General Staff, General von Falkenhayn, and the Bulgarian General Shokov take place. I joined the latter on his return to Sofia, with the aim of coordinating intelligence in the [137] Balkans with German intelligence.

With the highest military authorities, agreement was reached quickly. At the bottom, the work very soon stumbled upon the usual in Bulgaria "polecka, polecka!" - "slowly, slowly!". It was impossible to work there with German speed. There was no officialdom in the German sense of the word. In relations with foreign countries, they initially ran into significant difficulties there, which, however, they managed to overcome with the help of higher authorities. The police itself was satisfactory and inspiring fear, but was based more on party, foreign policy goals. There was no intelligence like German.

how on

With the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of Germany, the policy of King Ferdinand and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Radoslavov won, but the mood was not unanimous in favor of the Germans. True, the vast majority of the people stood on the side of Germany, whose national goal was Macedonia and Dobruja, as well as the official institutions of the army and government, confident in the victory of Germany. However, financial circles, banks and wealthy families were connected by their interests with the Entente and, in particular, with France, and did not agree with Radoslavov's policy. In these circles, the Entente had intelligence at its disposal, better than which it could neither desire nor create. Therefore, there was no noticeable economic or political intelligence activity of foreigners, but a very lively desire for travel to Switzerland was established on the part of circles friendly to the Entente. Here was the center of French intelligence in the Balkans. Only Austria could close this road, but she was not in a position to carry out this measure in relation to her ally energetically enough for political reasons. On the contrary, there were even suspicions that the Czechs promoted ties between France and Bulgaria, and high-ranking representatives of Austria and Bulgaria, who were Czechs by nationality, were even suspected of actively supporting these ties. [138]

The official Bulgarian institutions willingly wanted to support the interests of the military command, but they could only do so with difficulty and incompletely, in spite of the powerful financial and political groups that resisted.

Along with these major connections, Entente petty espionage was also highly developed within Bulgaria, which, however, played only a secondary role, since everything that the Entente was supposed to know about military incidents, in general, she learned through her connections and through Switzerland. Tactical espionage flourished on the front itself, which was favored by the natural character of the theater of operations and the German diversity of the parties. Intelligence officers, in cooperation with the Bulgarians, successfully transferred the German intelligence to the main theaters of military counterintelligence. On the other side of the front, in Greece, from the very beginning of the war, French and British intelligence stood guard. France receded into the background here, while England was in the foreground, giving

intelligence a large, highly political character characteristic of England. Greece was, moreover, a base for espionage and propaganda against Turkey through Smyrna. The Levantines delivered excellent material for further expansion towards Asia Minor.

In the rear of the Bulgarian army across the Danube there was a strong espionage of Romania, who was in contact with the Russians and led by French intelligence. Along with this, even before the revolution, important Bolshevik propaganda was going on in Russia. In peasant Bulgaria, it had no prospect of success, but it significantly contributed to the deterioration of mood.

Purely Turkish circles were loyal to Bulgaria, but the circles hostile to the Turks that are part of Turkey - Armenians and Levantines - did everything

what they could do to damage Turkey in allied Bulgaria. Both these peoples developed in Bulgaria a strong propaganda against the war, and they were in agreement with the circles of the country, friendly to the Entente.

Thus [139] predominantly political intelligence operated in the Balkans, striving to save military forces, to attack politically, first of all, the most sensitive place on the front of the Middle Powers and break through it. This goal has been fully achieved. The offensive of the Thessaloniki army on September 15, 1918 found the front abandoned. It was not a military, but definitely a political victory and a betrayal by Bulgaria. From the beginning of April of this year, it was clear that this was how things would end. German intelligence, relying on reports from Bulgaria, could predict this event in mid-July with an accuracy of one day. This outcome was brought about by a cancerous tumor, which consisted in the fact that Entente capital played a leading role in Bulgaria and that influential circles gravitated towards Paris. It should also be mentioned that the representative of the United States, accredited both in Bucharest and in Sofia, independently represented American interests with the help of successful propaganda directed against the middle powers. This was possible due to the fact that Bulgaria put forward and adopted the point of view according to which America did not declare war on Bulgaria. All attempts to eliminate the American agent crashed against this. The situation in the Balkans posed an immediate danger to Germany. With the help of strict monitoring of passenger traffic from Bulgaria, they tried to prevent Bulgarian circles friendly to the Entente from getting to know

Germany. This measure was brought to naught by a strong, almost outrageous movement from Germany, often under the flag of transporting gifts and the like, which served only to satisfy the passion for sensations and curiosity, and also influenced the mood of Bulgaria not in favor of Germany, due to its obsession and offensiveness. Another immediate danger was that the German troops under these circumstances were subjected to the influence of Entente intelligence. The German commander-in-chief, General von Scholtz, therefore, paid special attention to the teaching of homeland studies in his [140] troops. The latter remained in good condition until the very end. They were, however, powerless against the political success of the Entente and the political collapse of Bulgaria.

Also

And

Türkiye

As already mentioned, Entente intelligence found its way to Asia Minor in Smyrna. She found another base in the English fleet off Mitylene. British intelligence bureaus were then organized on a large scale in Galati and Syria. Another center was the English General Townsend, taken prisoner in Baghdad and living throughout the war near Constantinople on the Princes' Islands, to whom the Sublime Porte allowed complete freedom of movement and who freely visited neutral embassies. A calm harbor for reconnaissance was also one interned stationary ship of America. Against Russia's Black Sea and the Caucasus were a real barrier. On the other hand, Russian intelligence in Holland, the mobility of which I have already spoken about, made itself felt across the Mediterranean Sea as far as Constantinople. A lively movement of deserters from both sides also developed in the Caucasus. It happened that they changed the front four or five times, depending on which side had better containment conditions. But intelligence could derive only limited benefit from this, and only on local issues.

With the vigorous reconnaissance carried out in Turkey, at least one Turk was hardly caught. Türkiye is the only combat area where the woman did not play any role. The appearance of neutral spies was almost not established, since the Turkish situation was so peculiar that enemy intelligence apparently directed its attention only to those familiar with

her native inhabitants. The captured spies were, for the most part, Greeks, Armenians and Jews. The Greeks or Levantines were cowards, the Jews displayed a strong hostility towards the Turks, and of all the states of the Entente, they especially supported the British. The Armenians were [141] spies very resolute and fearful. Here, too, they caused a lot of difficulties for the Turks, which significantly contributed to the intensification of measures against the Armenians. Thus, enemy intelligence bears part of the blame for the fate of the Armenians during the war. A strong obstacle in the fight against espionage was the fact that the "Surete generale" and the police prefect of Constantinople were different institutions, and that official time was conscientiously observed in them, and outside of it, work was not carried out. As such, the Turkish police were agile and energetic, trained in political intrigue and therefore feared.

It was not easy for German intelligence to adapt to Turkish conditions, since it was not familiar with them. Nevertheless, thanks to the familiarization of Turkish intelligence leaders with German intelligence and the sending of German officers to Turkey, it was nevertheless possible to achieve a satisfactory

agreement.

It was possible to neutralize a large number of enemy intelligence agencies. It was so great that the trials were stalled. The punishments were harsh; the espionage law corresponded to the draft, which was presented to the German Reichstag and was not approved by the latter, but was taken over by Turkey. The state of Turkish prisons, overflowing with spies, was very deplorable; often typhus reigned in them. The massive nature of espionage and the resulting delay in a quick judicial decision, no doubt led to the death of many

innocent.

Many valuable messages undoubtedly reached the Entente also because the high dignitaries of Turkey showed an inclination towards her and maintained contact with her. So, for example, the commandant of Smyrna, Rahmi Bey, allowed the influence of foreigners there to a large extent, which was useful for the interests of the middle states. This indicated that the ties of these circles with the Entente were older than their ties with Germany. And the High Porte did not, of course, support the struggle against foreign influence so much. She seemed to leave the back door open just in case. All the more [142] loyalty to the union manifested itself in the army, the main representative of which was Enver Pasha, who satisfied all the needs of intelligence. The Turkish population, due to their religiosity, was immune to any kind of propaganda, including Bolshevik propaganda. The military leaders, therefore, doubly understood the danger from the corrupting propaganda that threatened Germany, and drew the attention of the German High Command to the visible harmful consequences of it. In general, it was striking how well they were aware of the situation in Germany in Constantinople. Political figures traveled constantly to Germany for personal observation. Austria-Hungary was treated badly. She was treated with restraint in intelligence, as she worked in Turkey before the war, trying to achieve, first of all, business influence, and did not stop doing this during the war. As a result, the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian state were less trusted than the representatives of Germany. Constantinople was well aware of the situation in Bulgaria and warned of noticeable successes in propaganda among the people and in the army.

Intelligence proper did not have a center: the theaters of military operations, which were far apart from one another, and armies fighting independently, each had its own intelligence service. A very extensive and deftly managed political intelligence extended under military

leadership far into Central Asia. However, it was considered an exclusively Turkish affair and its goals and results were hidden from German intelligence.

Austria-Hungary

The Austro-Hungarian army was thrown a lot of unfair accusations

regarding her behavior in the war, unjust insofar as the individual military units loyal to the monarchy had no lack of courage and fidelity to their duty. However, the entire building of the army did not correspond to the tasks of the world war. Since every army is only a component part of the people, no army can [143] exist when the people are divided into parties or into separate nations. Even before the war, large forces set themselves the goal of disintegrating the Austro-Hungarian Union of States. In order to correctly assess the impact of this phenomenon on the army, one should know its previous development. Beginning in 1908, corrupting propaganda was carried on at a brisk pace. Counterintelligence was to be handled by civilian authorities.

The highest military authorities limited themselves to trying, as far as possible, to protect military units from this corrupting influence. Although they did everything possible in this direction, they were not able to neutralize the long-term work of this propaganda. The military school could, it is true, weaken it, it was possible to prevent an open outbreak, but it was impossible to eradicate it. Enemy propaganda was not limited to the population, but also penetrated into the barracks, and it is a proven fact that it worked in close connection with the general staffs of states hostile to the monarchy. Already before the war, therefore, it was part of intelligence; during the war, she completely dissolved in it. The military establishments, which already in peacetime undertook the fight against this evil, were accused of exaggerating and were attacked by those political circles that worked in the interests of the opponents of the monarchy.

Russia has been spying on Austria-Hungary since the 1980s, when war with Austria seemed imminent. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russian espionage intensified against both Germany and Austria-Hungary. The only difference was that France was the driving force against Germany, while Russia had its own political motives against Austria. Russian espionage in Austria was perhaps even more intense than in Germany. In 1910, 19 Russian spies were brought to justice, in 1913 there were already 34, in 1914, before the outbreak of war - 36. Since Russia found many accomplices among various nationalities, its espionage was always characterized by the formation of entire [144] groups, of which some covered up to 20 agents. The Russian spy network extended throughout the monarchy, from the Carpathians to the Tyrolean mountains and to the plateaus of Bosnia. There were agents in all major cities. Over the past 30-40 years, almost all Russian military attachés accredited in Vienna have been forced to leave their posts as a result of their espionage activities. Colonel Marchenko, who had to leave the post of military attaché, had, by the way, one Austrian serviceman who had been spying for Russia for more than 20 years. Colonel Zankevich, who left in 1913, was especially compromised by his connections with one chief lieutenant of a military school, another officer, and with several military men. Along with Russian military attaches, Russian consulates were also active centers of espionage. It was proved that ambassadors and other employees of embassies also took part in espionage. In Eastern Galicia, Russian espionage was willingly rendered services by Rusyns related to the tribe. He was assisted by clerics, deputies, lawyers and judges. Ruthenian schools and unions were the centers of pan-Slavic and Greater Serbian propaganda and gave shelter to agents.

Russian agitators equally traveled not only in Galicia, but also in the rest of the Slavic regions of the monarchy, and prominent figures of the latter offered their services in Moscow and St. Petersburg. These were the same people who during the war supported the revolutionary committees, sabotaged war loans and considered Austrian military service a disgrace. During the first two years of the war, 140 death sentences had to be passed on Russian agents inside the country alone. Political leaders were also sentenced to death, such as Kramáý and Rašin, but then they were pardoned under an amnesty. Despite being a member of the Triple Alliance, Italy conducted extensive espionage against Austria-Hungary. Until 1902, this espionage was

turned almost exclusively against France. From the same year, Austria-Hungary became its main goal. The number of Italian agents caught and convicted [145] was comparatively small; this is explained by the fact that they were sheltered by the irredentist-minded population of the southwestern border regions. The union "Dante Alighieri" was especially engaged in supporting irredentism. Its official goal was to protect and spread the Italian language. In Austria it was forbidden, it is true, but still many Austrian citizens belonged both to the central union in Rome and to the local organizations of northern Italy. The Union was in close contact with the intelligence of the Italian General Staff. He had trusted people in Trieste, Rovereto, Trento, Pola, Hertz and other cities. Since he also delivered secret documents of the Austrian army to the Italian General Staff, it was clear that pro-Italian Austrian soldiers were also members of it. They were called "amici", i.e. friends, because they worked with the union not because of money, but ideologically. Before the war, the spies who were among the Italian workers who annually worked in the monarchy by the thousands worked successfully in small-scale intelligence. Numerous officials were also of Italian origin. A series of trials for treason that took place during the war revealed the real mindset of many members of the Lega nazionale, Giovanni Fiume and other unions, allegedly pursuing

only cultural goals. Captured during the war, Documents from an Italian army headquarters delivered a list of a number of persons, originating for the most part from South Tyrol, who informed the information bureau in Verona of all noteworthy military incidents in Tyrol. Just as Russia penetrated the monarchy to the Italian border, so Italy reached Budapest and Bosnia. In view of the allied relations, the Italian consulates were spared, although they took part in intelligence. Since Major Delmastro, compromised by espionage, was forced to leave Vienna in 1906, Italian military attachés no longer took part in intelligence. This ban did not [146] apply to the Italian maritime attaché.

The region of Serbia, contaminated by Greater Serbian propaganda, adjoined the region of the Italian irredenta. It found, in turn, its continuation in the Romanian irredenta, and the latter in the Czechoslovakian. The monarchy was thus surrounded by a belt, interrupted only at the border with the German region - with Bavaria. Greater Serbian propaganda, which extended to Croatia, Slavonia, southern Hungary, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia, after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched extensive espionage, which served the purposes of direct preparation for war. This preparation was part of a national program, the implementation of which was the duty of every good Serb, whether he lived in Serbia or Austria-Hungary. Propaganda was embodied in "Narodna Otbrana", which was headed by General Boro Janković, and whose ultimate goal was an uprising, and in case of war - to help the Serbian army. The comitage schools in Kupria and Prokuplije produced gang leaders made up of ex-soldiers, teachers, and Orthodox Greek priests. The Serbian intelligence officers were at the same time members of the Narodna Otbrana, which served the seemingly modest purpose of spreading a higher culture among the Serbs living in the monarchy - like the Dante Alighieri Society for the Italians. In close connection with "Narodna Otbrana" were other cultural organizations within the monarchy - anti-alcohol, sports and student unions. The fight against the Great Serbian propaganda was even more difficult than against the Italian or Russian, as it was hampered by the lack of education of the loyal elements and the indifference of the Mohammedan population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the documents of the Serbian intelligence agency were seized during the war, it was only then that many spies and traitors were brought to justice, and they were condemned.

After the outbreak of the war, Veliko Serbian propaganda was transferred abroad. Leaders like Dr. Trumbik, Burgomaster Spalato succeeded in timely

leave the monarchy. [147] The

Yugo-Slav Committee was formed, consisting almost exclusively of Austro-Hungarian citizens. He was first in Rome, then in Paris, and finally in London. He considered himself the only popular representation of all the southern Slavs. In 1917, he outlined in the Treaty of Corfu his political program, according to which the future South Slavic state was to be formed under the scepter of the Serbian royal house. Propaganda for this was carried out especially intensively in America, among prisoners of war and in Switzerland. Three great unions were formed in America; central unions

of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. They were led by the Yugoslav National Council in Washington. He worked closely with the South Slavic club in the Austrian Reichsraum, which recognized the program of Corfu. The result of this propaganda was numerous cases of desertion. The Montenegrins were able to form three battalions of deserters, the Serbs - the Adriatic Legion. In Odessa, it was even possible to make up two divisions, and in America military transports were formed from Austro-Hungarian southern Slavs. It goes without saying that intense propaganda was also developed among the prisoners of war stationed in France after the Serbian retreat.

Espionage and propaganda in Austria-Hungary were so closely intertwined that it is impossible to think one without the other. It goes without saying that the allied front against the Russians, Serbs and Italians must have, under these circumstances, many weak points. Like a state organism, the army was also eaten away by this enemy intelligence work. The seed that was sown for years in peacetime gave its sprouts in time of war. Like Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary is a formidable example of how systematic preparation for war works through the disintegration of peoples.

The collapse of both countries was hastened by the fact that in Germany appeared signs of decay. [148]

Western theater of operations

Despite all the espionage and involvement of the Germans in treason in peacetime, important military secrets remained hidden from the French, such as the introduction of the Big Bertha into the German heavy artillery and the German offensive with its details. This contributed to the amazingly rapid advance of the right wing of the German army. This offensive rendered unusable the entire French espionage system prepared for the war in Germany. Some of the preparations of French intelligence were put into action only on the southern flank, where either the Germans stood on their own land, or the French penetrated into

the German region. On the basis of pre-prepared lists, residents friendly to the Germans were arrested and taken to France. Many Alsatian-Lorraine crossed over to France and reinforced French intelligence. So, for example, one military driver, the son of a manufacturer from Wreustal, after the end of the German campaign, with which he, as a military man, familiarized himself in detail, moved through the Donon to France. He later showed up as a French intelligence officer in Switzerland. From the very beginning of the war, the Alsace-Lorraine supplied the enemy with such an amazing number of spies that the high command was forced to forbid their admission to all institutions where they could receive important information. In addition to the population, the southern flank was directly threatened by espionage from Switzerland. Although the authorities in Alsace-Lorraine were to some extent accustomed to the fight against espionage, it was still difficult to prevent it, both at the beginning of the war and later. Despite the fact that the front line was separated from Switzerland by a guarded wire fence, that the German border with Switzerland was relatively short, and the water frontier along Lake Constance offered a certain protection, nevertheless, during the entire war between the Alsatian theater of operations and Switzerland there was an intense espionage. It was facilitated by the fact that [149] four German

states: the imperial region, Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria, and it took a long time to coordinate the actions of the police of these states, which was independent in peacetime. When this agreement was reached, and the border guard became effective due to this, new difficulties arose, caused by the resistance of the local population in relation to the measure, which cut off its relations with Switzerland. The harmful effects of this were mitigated only by the fact that the southern flank was not decisive.

The advance of the right flank brought him into the area of the "Service de renseignement territorial" - territorial intelligence, which was prepared in France simultaneously with the "Service de renseignement étranger" - foreign intelligence, which has now become unusable. In May

1899, the chairman of the cabinet sent a secret circular to the prefects, according to which all employees working in the open air: field watchmen, village postmen, river and street watchmen, etc. subordinated for intelligence purposes to a special commissioner. The whole country was divided into 122 sectors, which, near the frontier and significant military posts, were smaller in size and more densely populated by employees than in the interior. Thus, from 1910, domestic intelligence was prepared in case France became a theater of operations. When the residences of the special commissars fell into German power during the offensive, searches in their offices brought extremely important material, including lists of all agents who, thanks to this, could be arrested and sent to Germany even before they had time to start their activities. . The picture was the same everywhere: after the first victorious German offensive battles, carrier pigeons and instructions were sent to agents by car. In peacetime,

agents were trained in the handling of pigeons, and the latter were accustomed to flying to reconnaissance rally points. These lists included many agents in [150] Belgium and Luxembourg, with whom, already in peacetime, communication by pigeon mail was rehearsed: at regular intervals, French intelligence officers sent them baskets of carrier pigeons. All the pigeons of the Sedan fortress were trained to fly to Luxembourg and Belgium. Long before the war, the head of the railway bureau in Luxembourg, Furiel, and the head of an intelligence agency in Brussels, were in personal contact with the head of French intelligence, Colonel Dupe. Obviously, Belgium was considered as a theater of operations and as a

ally.

The few spies left behind were arrested only after a long time. So, for example, the spy Gainey, originally from Upper Alsace, was discovered only in 1916 in the supreme headquarters. He was recruited at the beginning of the war and left in Charleville. He lived in hiding in the same family, who fed him for various services. However, when German supervision became stricter, and therefore danger arose for the owners, the latter decided to get rid of him. He was seriously wounded by his own people and was forced to flee to the German field police.

Numerous French soldiers fell behind during the retreat from their units. Since they managed to avoid captivity, they, like many young people who had reached military age during the war, were delivered with the help of residents through Belgium and Holland again to the enemy front and became valuable informants for French intelligence. When the Supreme Headquarters was transferred to Charleville on September 28, 1914, it was reported that there was a whole regiment of Zouaves in the forests of Rocroix, supplying and requisitioning in the surrounding villages. Only at the end of November it was possible to surround these abandoned ones. Under Singile-Pti capitulated, however, not a regiment, but still a combat-ready French company consisting of 2 officers, 233 soldiers and 4 Englishmen in uniform and in full gear. During these two months, the emperor repeatedly drove through these forests in a car. The fight against espionage in the theater of operations was [151] entrusted,

predominantly, the police, seconded as commissars to the army headquarters. Knowing the French language and French peacetime intelligence, they rendered great services. But French intelligence also infiltrated their ranks. The police commissioner of the High Headquarters, Veghele, protected by his position from any suspicion, was associated with French intelligence throughout the war. As a reward for this, he is currently in the French civil service. The rest of the police personnel working in the theater of operations were, it is true, worthy of trust, but they did not speak the language, were not familiar with the fight against espionage, and in general were not prepared for the tasks assigned to them. There were police commissioners who appeared in knee-length trousers, stockings and hunting hats and believed that in this outfit they could succeed with the French "secret" field police. These external moments could still be quickly eliminated, but the preparation remained extremely difficult. The enemy was far ahead in this respect too. His special police were scattered throughout France, accustomed in peacetime to the intelligence service of police units. But already in the spring of 1915, the entire intelligence system prepared on French soil was neutralized by the German field police.

It can be argued that by this time the theater of operations in France was, as it were, completely cleared of spies. Without a doubt, with intensive communication between the fatherland and the front, it was possible to again deliver spies to the western theater of operations and through Germany. It is a fact that, despite all precautions, even foreigners could reach the Supreme Headquarters without any legal pass and without being stopped by anyone. Other cases also pointed to the credulity of supervisory officials and military units. In the autumn of 1914, a woman was found walking around easily, thanks to the 1870 Iron Cross that adorned her. A few months later, [152] a woman "military doctor" was arrested, wearing a marching hat similar to a uniform blouse and a short dagger on an officer's sword belt, receiving all kinds of documents from infirmaries and misleading even many military doctors. In reality, the first was a severely punished criminal, and the second was a public woman. Both were driven not by the intention to spy, but by the passion for adventure. In general, all the stories about the fantastic disguise of spies belong to the realm of fables. The first rule for a spy is to avoid any conspicuous clothing. Excited fantasy owes its appearance to the numerous reports of suspicious light signals in the theater of operations. They caused a lot of trouble, but their explanation was always innocent. A large role was played in the imagination of many people and secret telephone connections. Back in 1916, one sapper company was busy for several months, contrary to the opinion of the field police, by digging up roads, looking for a cable that supposedly passed to the front at a depth of 6 meters. It goes without saying that the detection and neutralization of all telegraph messages going to the front was one of the first tasks of counterintelligence.

While intelligence prepared in advance in the theater of operations turned out to be incapacitated, it was necessary to look for new ways of settling spies in the French regions occupied by the Germans. It became clear that the enemy was trying to establish contact with his population by air. In 1915, it was first established that spies with carrier pigeons were landed by airplanes in the rear of the German front. These were people for whom the occupied region was their home, and who were landed in their homeland, where they knew all the ways and paths. Among them, however, there were also Germans, especially Alsatian-Lorraine, either living in France before the war and hiding from service in the German army, or deserting or taken prisoner already during the war. Spies [153] of German nationality had the advantage that they were better acquainted with the orders of the German army than the French and were able to move independently among the German military units. The French, for their part, were familiar with the population and could

count on his support. All spies of this kind were elderly people. Under civilian clothes, the French wore French, and the Germans wore German uniforms. The latter had to take off their civilian clothes upon landing, hide them and mix with the German troops. The French had to first remain in civilian clothes in order to be able to hide among the population, only in case of imminent danger did they take off these clothes in order to avoid the fate of spies when they were caught and, thanks to French uniforms, be in the position of prisoners of war. These spies were supplied with detailed instructions and large sums of French and, especially, German money. To send messages, they were given, for the most part, 6 carrier pigeons, the handling of which they were carefully trained. The landings were carried out at night, mainly in the rear, more calm, less densely populated by German troops and less protected zone. From there, the spies were supposed to sneak into the combat zone. They were promised that after some time they would fly to the landing site for them. The number of such enterprises increased markedly before major military events and made it possible to draw conclusions about where the enemies were preparing these events or where they expected them from the Germans. One could learn about the intentions or assumptions of the enemy both from the testimony of the spies themselves and from the instructions found from them. In 1915, 9 such flight spies fell into the hands of the Germans, including four in uniform, and five aircraft. There were also attempts to take back the landed spies. At the time agreed with the spy, the French craft repeatedly circled over the landing site under German surveillance. They kept, however, at a high altitude, perhaps because [154] there was no sign agreed with the spy that the air was free. More than once it was possible to state that the promised attempt to take away the spy was not made at all. And never once was it possible to notice that the flight spy was actually taken back. They were thus left to their fate, and they either fell into the hands of German counterintelligence or made their way with difficulty to Holland. Many of them were caught only far behind the lines, in Belgium. When they reached Holland, they reported there to the French consul, who was to take care of their return to France. Some of them were also given assignments to destroy railways and bridges in the rear of the German army, especially those parts of the front where a German offensive was expected or a French one was being prepared. The facts of such successful explosions have not been established. The usefulness of flight spies, therefore, consisted mainly in the forwarding of messages with carrier pigeons. One French pilot POW testified: "Attempts to take the spy back were rarely made: it was too dangerous."

For the German command, this path was closed. Enemy prisoners of war would never consent to such use against their own fatherland. It was absolutely impossible to land German spies in the rear of the French front, among the hostile population. And the French in Alsace-Lorraine did not dare to use this type of espionage, and it was limited only to the Franco-Belgian theater of operations. Here he was apparently successful, as the landings continued until 1917. This year, 7 more flight spies and one aircraft were captured.

Losses in aircraft during the landings brought to life in 1917 a new system: spies landed with the help of a balloon. This method had the advantage of stealth, due to the absence of the treacherous noise of French airplanes. The balloons were 8.5 meters in diameter and contained 310 cubic meters. meters of gas. They could lift only one face, and their flight range [155] was 40-50 kilometers. These spies were trained in England. For 26 days of training, six training flights were made, two of which were at night. They also carried carrier pigeons with them, but their task was not so much to transfer information as to organize reconnaissance in the rear of the German army and communications with Holland, which by that time had been turned into a front-line intelligence base. Four such spies were caught already in 1917.

The same goal was pursued by the third system introduced by French intelligence in 1917. It consisted in the fact that spies were dropped from airplanes by parachutes. For this purpose, special airplanes were designed, which had an aluminum box between the wheels under the tail, in which there was a spy with his parachute. The bottom of the box was opened by pressing the pilot's hand. Without knowing this moment in advance, the spy tied to the parachute fell out of the box. Already in 1917, three spies brought in in this way were discovered in the rear of the German troops. One of them was found completely crushed: his parachute was unusable. The danger from spies landed by balloons or parachutes was much greater than from those who landed from airplanes, since the landing took place in an imperceptible way, and the espionage itself was wider: its goal was no longer to report an individual spy, but to organize by well-instructed people reconnaissance through Holland.

In the same year, the fourth system also began to operate. Significant quantities of carrier pigeons and balloons began to be dropped from airplanes to supply the population with them widely for the purpose of reconnaissance in the rear of the German front. Carrier pigeons were placed in pairs, in small baskets, and the latter were released from airplanes on small silk parachutes. The baskets contained food, detailed instructions on the treatment of pigeons, a questionnaire, a sample message, French money, and an appeal of the following kind:

"The resistance of the Germans is weakening under the pressure of the allies, who have already liberated part of the French territory. In order to continue their advance, the allies must [156] be well aware of the position of the enemy and his intentions. You, good patriots, who are among the enemy troops, should render this service. Here are the means for this.

If you risk your life in doing so, then remember the allied soldiers who so generously sacrificed their lives for your release. By delivering information, you will render your country an invaluable service and hasten the end of the war.

Upon reaching peace, we will be able to reward you, and you will always proud to have acted like a good patriot."

In uninhabited areas in the rear of the German front, many baskets with dead carrier pigeons were found. In December 1917, 63 of them were found, in January of the last year of the war - 41, at the end of May of the same year with only one army - 45. These figures represent only an insignificant part of the carrier pigeons dropped. A significant part remained, no doubt, undetected and was used by the population. Flying carrier pigeons were constantly observed. No matter how hard it was to hit them, still managed to shoot eleven of them. All of them carried military messages under their wings. This useful system was improved by the enemy in 1918. Dropping was carried out not only from airplanes, since this was still considered too noticeable, but also from a very ingeniously designed dropping device on small balloons five meters in diameter. On these balls was a wooden cross, at the four ends of which baskets with carrier pigeons were attached. In the middle of the cross was an alarm clock that automatically unfastened small parachutes with baskets after a certain time and thus caused the balloon to empty. In order to avoid the treacherous effect of the found shell of the ball, there was an inscription on it: "The German ball can be destroyed." Subsequently, instead of an alarm clock, they began to use a burning wick, which caused the carrier pigeons to fall in a timely manner and then set fire to the ball itself.

Each dropping of carrier pigeons also served [157] for propaganda among the population. A similar appeal of June 1918 ended with the words: "The Germans fail to break the power of the allies. They cannot prevent us from winning and destroying forever this vile people, this enemy of mankind."

In this way, the German command learned about many outbreaks of hatred

and the determination to fight until the destruction of Germany.

It is clear that his thought must therefore have worked in a different direction than the thought of politicians in the protected homeland, who believed in the possibility of an agreement and treated such evidence of the true mood of the enemy as exaggerations of the military authorities.

Carrier pigeons were quite sensitive: they were threatened with death if they were not found immediately. Therefore, the enemy began simultaneously dropping special balloons for messages. Their diameter was 60 centimeters, they were made of pale blue silk paper, adapted to the air. They could be filled from each gas pipeline. Dropped packets contained one to three of these folded balls and a detailed description of how they were to be consumed. Chemical means were often applied, with the help of which the finder could immediately prepare gas to fill the balloon on the spot. Compared with carrier pigeons, balloons suffered from the disadvantage that they could only be launched with a fair wind.

Finally, it should be mentioned that in the same way the enemy supplied the population, by dropping in the rear of the German front, with wireless telegraph apparatuses. These were transmitters of the latest design from the Marconi factories, with four batteries, a four-hundred-volt dry battery, and an antenna 30 meters long, with which it was possible to telegraph at a distance of 50 kilometers. In addition to the usual material, the packages contained instructions regarding encryption. German field radio stations repeatedly reported that apparently small [158] stations were operating in the air. However, although dropped vehicles have been found on numerous occasions, operational ones have never been found. Despite the great danger that threatened the peace of the occupied regions of France, their own command encouraged them to spy through appeals of the following kind:

population

"Attention!

Are you a good patriot? Do you want to help the allies drive the enemy away?

Yes?

Then take this package, carry it discreetly home, open it in the evening when you are completely alone and act according to the instructions contained in it. If you are being watched, then leave him lying. note the place and

take it at night. Destroy the parachute immediately, it is useless for you.

If you do everything right, then you will act like a good patriot, render the allies a valuable service and help bring closer the hour of final victory. Patience and courage! Long live France! Long live Belgium! Long live

allies!

For the fatherland! In order to expedite his unquestionable release, write very carefully on this question sheet the required information. Ask true friends about what you don't know. To verify your identity, provide the name and address of two persons in non-occupied France. This number will help find you after your release, so that you can be rewarded. Every soldier of France and Belgium is with you in spirit. Support him in his tasks and show him once again that the courage of the oppressed is not inferior to his courage. Long live allies."

From the end of December 1917, the enemy dared to drop carrier pigeons and balloons both in Alsace and in German Lorraine, and attached to them the following appeals in [159] French:

"To all Lorraine patriots. By communicating the following information, you will provide invaluable

favor and hasten the end of the war. France will be able to reward you after the war, and you will be proud of what you did as a good patriot."

The enemy organized not only air espionage, but also air propaganda. Until 1916, the dropping of newspapers and leaflets in French and German, intended to cheer up, excite their fellow citizens in the occupied areas and suppress the mood of the Germans, was carried out exclusively by pilots. Since the high command considered these actions as not part of military operations, and accordingly dealt with the caught pilots guilty of dropping propaganda literature, a dropping balloon was put in the place of the pilots. It was designed like a ball designed to drop reconnaissance assets. Its flight range, however, was greater and reached 600 kilometers by the end of the war. Thanks to this, the balls flew as far as Germany itself and fell mainly into the northeastern industrial region. Each balloon carried up to 400 newspapers. Dropping took place automatically in small batches with the help of a smoldering incendiary cord, which burned out the supporting thread. For the population of Belgium and France, they dropped mainly new French newspapers, fake numbers of the Gazette of the Ardennes, as well as specially compiled flyers like "La voix du pays", "Courrier de l'air" ... Flyers intended for German troops, contained calls for defection, strike and revolution. The false numbers of German newspapers portrayed the state of the homeland in an exciting light. False letters from German prisoners of war in France and England, as well as images of the enviable treatment of German prisoners of war in both countries, were intended to induce German [160] soldiers to defect, and exciting images were supposed to have a corrupting effect on the mood of the German troops. As early as 1917, the German High Command, during its stay in Kreuznach, had extensive material on this side of enemy intelligence activities. The collection of this propaganda material included extremely cleverly composed pamphlets, notebooks with poetry and prose, individual leaflets and paintings. It covered, and moreover in several layers, the entire table for 12 people in my lecture room, although each individual work was represented in this collection by only one copy. General Ludendorff ordered this material to be shown to a group of members of parliament who visited the Supreme Headquarters shortly after. Since they belonged to a trend that believed in the possibility of resolving the war not only by means of weapons, this collection aroused incredulous doubts in them. It was impossible to

convince them of the enemy's hatred of us and of his desire for our destruction. At the front, intelligence officers had to see to it that the troops turned in enemy propaganda material. They were authorized to pay special remuneration for this. However, there was no need for such an incentive. The troops themselves rejected enemy propaganda. Enemy intelligence began to enjoy success in this area only since its propaganda gained influence in the homeland, and its ideas began to penetrate the soldiers in letters from the homeland and during vacations.

The longer the individual German divisions had to be in combat, the longer they were exposed to the influence of airdrops dropped by aircraft, the more the increasing hardships contributed to this influence. But even during the rest, the divisions did not avoid this influence, since they had more leisure to delve into the discarded printed works. In July 1918, one army surrendered 300,000 enemy flyers. The number of surrendered should have also been considerable. [161] At first, they mainly dropped flyers, cartoons and leaflets, in which they called for running across and created a mood that lowered military enthusiasm and confidence in victory;

from the 17th year they also began to drop political books and pamphlets, which were supposed to prove guilt

Germany in the war and promote the revolution. Among them were the works of Likhnovsky, Mulon, Grelling, Balder, and others. One of the saddest pages of this enemy propaganda is the fact that the Germans took part in it, or at least served as its instrument, because the influence of propaganda based on German sources on German representatives was much stronger. The airdrops that were being dropped had a strong effect on the French and Belgian population from the very beginning. The leaves were hidden with passionate greed and kept like a treasure.

But it also happened that prudent persons from the French civil authorities took care to issue exciting proclamations, trying to avoid rash speeches that should have brought serious misfortune to the population. Be that as it may, aerial propaganda created in the population an admirable confidence in victory, which made an overwhelming impression on a part of the German military personnel, especially when they compared it with the mood suppressed under the influence of enemy propaganda and other influences in their homeland. The basic mood of the French population, which was affected by this exciting propaganda, became especially clear to me after the following example: on the way from one army headquarters to another, I somehow had to pass through a vast forest area. Only one road ran perpendicular to the front from it. The area itself remained completely unaffected by military events. Along the way, there was a castle in complete solitude, in which the driver of my car wanted to draw water for the radiator. In front of the castle was a large courtyard, at the entrance to which stood two gatekeepers' houses. Outside the window [162] of one of them I saw a gray-haired woman sitting. I entered the house, wanting to ask permission to inspect the castle while the chauffeur fixed the car. In a quiet, comfortable room, I found, besides this old woman, a young Frenchwoman of unusually tall stature and beauty. While she was looking for the key, I asked if the old woman was her mother. She answered that it was her grandmother and confirmed that she still remembers the war of 1870-71. When I asked her grandmother about the current war, I received an answer that the Germans had become much more cruel than they were then. This statement surprised me. It was absolutely impossible for these women to receive any direct impressions of the war, since they were unable to receive any communication from the theater of operations, due to the cessation of human and postal communications. I tried to convince the young Frenchwoman that it was not the Germans who had become more cruel, but the war itself, and that looting was an inevitable companion of war, despite all the strictness of the authorities. I could tell her that already at the very beginning of the war, I entered, together with the first German units, into the French city of Buzières, and that we found the city already completely plundered by French soldiers. The young Frenchwoman, who had silently listened to my speech in defense of the German way of warfare, straightened up sharply at this story and threw back at me: "Non, monsieur, ce n'est pas vrai. Si vous voulez ma vie, mais ce n'est pas vrai. Jamais!" (No, sir, it's not true. You can take my life, but it's not true. Never.) I could not inwardly deny her respect for such a deeply rooted loyalty to her people.

The enemy prepared for war also in regard to propaganda. The French population endured much suffering when they left their homes in panic during the offensive of the German troops, portrayed as some kind of barbarians. When these troops overtook the refugees, the latter began to regret that they had listened to exciting propaganda and began to scold the authorities of their country, which prompted them to flee, "instead of calling for calm and staying in [163] place. The secret field police immediately interests of counterintelligence took up these circumstances. It turned out that even before the war, the authorities, and primarily the burgomasters, incited the population against the Germans. Upon the outbreak of the war, they were the first to leave their posts, and carried away the rest of the population in a frantic flight. general flight and most of the French judges. The local police are partially

remained in place and continued her duties. The prisons, which at the beginning were also abandoned in many cases, gradually filled up again with criminals. But there were only a few French courts left to try them. Many arrested for misdeeds and crimes subject to French jurisdiction were therefore compelled to remain in French prisons throughout the war. Under the conditions of the war, and as a result of the indifferent attitude on the French side, the situation of those arrested in many of these prisons was deplorable. On the part of the Germans, efforts were made, to the best of their ability, to alleviate this situation. The imperial decree, according to which German judges were to judge according to French law, where there were no French courts, did not apply.

The propaganda that brought about this situation and depicted the Germans as barbarians even before the war, was deeply guilty before its own people. As far as Reims and Chalons, one could find entire villages abandoned by their original inhabitants and densely populated by families from the borderlands. Since the region of Reims and Chalons subsequently became the scene of battles, one can easily imagine the fate of these families, which becomes even more touching when compared with what would have been destined for them if they had remained in their native places, which lay far away, behind the battle front.

A similar misfortune was brought upon the Belgian people by pre-war propaganda. It aroused hatred and systematically pushed the population into the service of the war. This unceremoniousness in relation

to its own population was distinguished by propaganda in the future. The population [164] was aroused by all means. This was done not only through airdrops, but also through messengers and proclamations from Holland, through the printing and distribution of so-called false newspapers in the occupied regions. The mood created in this way was at the same time the best breeding ground for espionage. Numerous secret printing houses were discovered, hidden in the most careful way. These printing houses were engaged in the production of fake travel and vacation certificates for German soldiers; with the help of these testimonies, they tried to persuade soldiers to desert and make it easier for them. False newspapers upheld the honor of their name. During the greatest victories of German weapons, they reported heavy German defeats. The Russians, long since pushed back abroad, were still reported to be moving on Berlin. From the population, this propaganda was transferred to the prisoners, who, in turn,

distributed it to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany. Her action was unusually stubborn. For example, Russian prisoners of war working near Metz, who heard the cannonade from the French front, could not be convinced that they were already almost on French soil. They remained confident that they were close to Berlin and that the thunder of guns indicated the advance of the French. Many Germans tried to explain to the population the true state of affairs on the fronts. Outwardly, they responded to this with respectful amazement and confidence. In fact, however, it was possible to establish that by this explanatory activity regarding martial law, many Germans unconsciously contributed to espionage. To rebuff propaganda among the population of the occupied regions, the Ardennes Newspaper was created. The prudent French collaborated in it and it was read in the occupied areas by wide circles of the population. Its French employees were after the war sentenced to heavy punishments and even [165] the death penalty for rendering services to the enemy. If there were German propaganda like that of the enemy, then it would have to give up the idea of getting any kind of support in the ranks of the enemy. The enemy peoples, including the international Social Democracy, maintained the national front.

Thus, for example, among the organs of enemy intelligence rendered harmless in Belgium, there were a significant number of leaders of the socialist

movement. A Belgian Social Democratic deputy from the large workers' center of Charleroi, who worked in Vlissingen during the war, wrote to the head of Belgian intelligence: "I consider it necessary to express to all my employees the gratitude of the General Staff. I am very pleased with their work and thank you for the valuable assistance that you provide and thus the liberation of the fatherland." In 1915, it was reported that one of the leaders of the socialist movement in France had been captured as a corporal. On request

from our side, he declared his readiness to go to France and act there in favor of ending the war. In order to verify his statement, Berlin was requested to send a knowledgeable person familiar with the French Social Democracy. Deputy Südekum arrived and, after a detailed conversation, established that the Frenchman's reports about his political situation were true and that it could be assumed that he would carry out his plans. The Frenchman was instructed, dressed in civilian clothes, informed about the route through Germany, about the situation in it, escorted to Basel and released there. No sooner had he arrived in France, than all the French newspapers were again clamoring about this German attempt to destroy the unity of the French people and their will to fight. This French socialist himself took part, mockingly, in condemning the stupid Germans. Deputy Südekum was scolded as a "Kaiser socialist", while in Germany he was forced to hide under camouflage clothing for his patriotic activities. [166] While spies were sent to the theater of war by air through France, and propaganda was carried on among their own population and among the German troops through Holland, the same was done in Belgium by land. All the allies took part in this work, and each of them, for this purpose, maintained central offices in Paris, Le Havre, and London. The jointly organized and English-led institution at Folkestone took care of preserving the unity of this extremely complex and large apparatus. There was an English organization in Holland, separate from the

Franco-Belgian one. The British organization set itself the goal almost exclusively of reconnaissance along the Belgian coast, while the Franco-Belgian directed its activities more towards Belgium itself and the battle front in France. Each organization covered several independent groups. The main English groups were the Tinsley

group, the Comte de Leden group and the Reiter organization in Amsterdam, the van Tischlen group and the Courbuin group in Vlissingen, the Bazin group in Maastricht and Major Oppenheim's group in The Hague. Groups of the French organization were in Rotterdam under the leadership of Colonel Lele, in The Hague - gene. Bucabeil, in Maastricht - Emile Fouquenot. Working in close connection with purely Belgian personnel was the group of Major Gaiman in Breda, the group of Victor Ernest in Flissengein, the group of Alfred Lamen and Lieutenant Michel, as well as the group of Consul Wismael in Maastricht, the group of Consul Roover and engineer Moreau in Rosendaal and the group of Jacques Schaeffer in Rotterdam. All of these major groups contained a number of subordinate groups along the Belgian frontier in Holland. Like this, counterintelligence was also organized, the task of which was to paralyze the activities of German intelligence. She watched train stations, hotels, German trade enterprises and all Germans in general, as well as consulates and embassies of all states. British counterintelligence was centralized in [167] The Hague and Amsterdam, French - in Rotterdam, Belgian - in Maastricht. Joint meetings took place in The Hague, at the Bellevue Hotel. The general leadership was in the hands of England in the person of a central body advanced from London to Southend.

The Belgians of all social classes and professions who fled to Holland entered the service of both these large intelligence groups. Being closely allied with the country and with the population of Belgium, they put their connections at the disposal of these organizations. By the beginning of the 17th year of the German

about 500 Belgian espionage officers working in Holland were known to intelligence; from them, espionage threads led to their relatives and friends in Belgium, converging for the most part at one central point and diverging further in the form of a system of agents called "Service". In view of the abundance of espionage, it was not difficult to detect him. When this was successful, the communication with the border was cut first by arresting the couriers. They were, for the most part, merchants, in order to conceal their activities, who actually carried out trading operations. Often the couriers were smugglers and an unimportant public, but just right for this dangerous frontier and courier service. After the arrest of the couriers "Service" was left untouched. Not knowing that his communication with Holland was interrupted, "Service" continued to work and deliver its reports to the German counterintelligence, which thus learned about all the institutions subordinate to it in Belgium and the North. France. Only after that they were taken into circulation. By the beginning of the 17th year, 79 such "Service" had already been destroyed and, in addition,

4 large organizations were liquidated before they had time to start their work. The number of those arrested was measured in thousands, since in some groups more than 30 people from all social classes worked. By the same time, 507 people had been convicted. 179 of them were, due to the severity of the crimes, sentenced to death, which, however, in most cases was commuted by way of pardon. Despite these successes of the German counterintelligence and the [168] severe punishments, the enemy intelligence continued to work with increased energy. The length of the border did not give the German high command the opportunity to prevent the establishment of more and more ties between Holland and the Belgian population. The longer the war went on, and the more energetic the efforts of the enemies became, the weaker became the human forces on the German side. After the cordon between France and Belgium had to be

abandoned because of the reasons indicated, it was then necessary to reduce both quantitatively and qualitatively the military units that protected Belgium from the side of Holland. More and more, therefore, had to resort to technical measures of fencing at the border. A triple high wire fence was set up. The middle row was charged with high-voltage electric current in particularly dangerous places. Posters warned the population not to touch the barrier, which was guarded only at long intervals by old soldiers of the Landsturm. But all this, despite all the supervision of warnings and danger, was not an insurmountable obstacle. Enemy reconnaissance envoys found means and ways to break through the barriers. They crossed them with the help of ladders and even overcame an electrified barrier, dressed in rubber boots, jackets and gloves; using rubber-covered frames to spread the wire and rubber-insulated ladders to cross it. Undermining and crawling under the barrier were also simple means. Dead agents were found almost daily, having misused their safety devices and being burned by electricity. And the old soldiers of the Landsturm did not always remain inaccessible to the requests of seemingly harmless frontier residents. Often out of good nature, and often bribed with large sums of money or increasingly tempting items of food, they became unreliable, so that after a short standing on the clock, they had to be fired or transferred to another section of the border. Each shift, however, [169] reduced the familiarity of the sentry personnel with the area and with the population. It turned out that the border, located in an enemy country, could not be hermetically closed in any way.

Nevertheless, a stream of enemy conscripts, prisoners of war, landed pilots and spies escaping through Belgium stagnated in front of the border barriers. This also prevented numerous German deserters from crossing the border, and thereby reduced this source of information for the enemy.

Depending on whether individual intelligence agencies or entire districts facilitated the movement of these elements, uniform routes were formed for them in Northern France and Belgium.

German counterintelligence was not particularly interested in disrupting these routes. It did not attach much importance to the fact that the Dutch authorities interfered with the work of organizations known in Holland, because the movement of enemy intelligence along already known paths made it easier to counteract this intelligence. The members of each "Service" had their own nicknames, passwords and identification marks, with the help of which

they recognized each other. Their reports were written on small strips of paper and hidden in food or other items. To achieve their goal, they did not stop at violence and often showed the strongest armed resistance during arrest, so that many field police officials were killed in the process. While the French could not use either the railway or the post office in the occupied areas, and leaving their place of residence depended on the permission of the local commandant, great freedom reigned in Belgium: for the purposes of the economic activity of all Belgian enterprises, railways, bicycles and mail could not be completely closed to free

use.

Every verdict on spies was pronounced publicly. But this did not deter the population. This only motivated him [170] to repeatedly use unpunished children as couriers.

On the Dutch border, a peculiar road was opened for German intelligence, originally intended not for it at all. In Liège and in Lille, collection points were found for letters from the population to their relatives in France. The shipment was made by messengers through Belgium, Holland and England. On the Belgian-Dutch border, many persons were caught making a lot of money in this way; among them were

women who carried whole bundles of letters under their skirts in a roundabout way through Holland and England and back. They were extremely pleasantly surprised when their arrest did not entail the severe punishment required by law, but, on the contrary, led to the legalization, so to speak, of their postal business. They faithfully and gratefully fulfilled their duties, handing over their mail from France and England when crossing the Dutch-Belgian border; upon viewing, they received it back and delivered it to their recipients in northern France and Belgium in a more convenient and safer way than before. The same was done with the mail they collected from local residents, which was to be delivered to relatives at the front. After viewing, she returned to them, with the exception of letters containing inadmissible information. On the other hand, many messages desired by German intelligence were also sent to France and England. Both parties were thus satisfied. The enterprise, originally conceived to the detriment of German interests, began to benefit them. The mail coming from France, in which many letters were hidden from censorship, contained a number of useful and genuine information. The outgoing mail did not harm the Germans, but, on the contrary, gave them the opportunity to get acquainted with the mood of the population, with its attitude towards the German troops? contributed to the discovery of treacherous elements and finally made it possible to deliver tendentious information to the enemy, since even there letters were checked by intelligence before they were issued [171] to the addressee. Under the pressure of need, the German high command had to agree to various measures that undoubtedly helped the enemy's espionage. In the interests of nourishing the population of the occupied regions, it was repeatedly necessary to send the most respected citizens to France. It goes without saying that they were also questioned about the situation on the German front and that they did not hide their knowledge. The command had to decide to send women and children to France, who could not be properly

way to feed, and who were useless eaters. Many thousands of them thus became transmitters of information, in spite of a conscientious search of their insignificant baggage. It was not until the last year of the war that the deportees were subjected to a six-week quarantine. After this period, the information that was in their memory could no longer harm. Indigenous food need

caused ^{and} V help from the Spanish American Committee. Its delegates had to be allowed a certain freedom of movement, so that they could make sure that their food really arrived as intended. They had many meetings with burgomasters and with trusted representatives. Although all this happened in front of the watching German officers, it is still clear that these strangers saw and heard a lot about which they were not obliged to remain silent on their return. The Church and other religious institutions, as well as the clergy, were, thanks to some timidity of the German authorities, under more protection than the interests of the fight against espionage required. Residents very quickly noticed and used it. Churches have in many cases become rallying points for enterprises hostile to the Germans. That the clergy took part in espionage was repeatedly established

when large spy organizations were discovered in Belgium. But even in northern France espionage was used [172] by church institutions. Care about the soul was abused. There were particularly strong suspicions about the archiepiscopal palace at Cambrai, that it was a spy center. Separate similar cases were also discovered in France. For example, secret maps with the location of German troops marked on them were stolen from one army headquarters. The thief hid them with one priest, and the latter handed them over to enemy intelligence. The only secret wireless telegraph station that was discovered in the western theater of operations was owned by a priest in Flanders and operated by a young girl. However, the use of this station for espionage purposes remained unproven.

Since the spiritual attire provided such real protection to its wearers, it was also worn by spies who did not have the right to wear it. Already during the first advance, counterintelligence reported that the German troops had captured a French priest engaged in espionage. However, the next day it was reported that this spy turned out to be an infantry captain left by the French. This was discovered due to the fact that he wore a medallion with portraits of his wife and daughter under his cassock around his neck. Already at the very beginning of the war, these items attached to the report brought the idea of \u200b\u200bthe readiness for victims that existed among the French in the field of espionage.

It goes without saying that over the long period of occupation, their services as spies were offered by locals in Belgium, but not in France.

The Walloons, thanks to their cunning, proved to be very suitable for the profession of spies also on the German side. They were not particularly versed in military matters, were superficial in their observations and reports, had a bad memory and were vain. For them, it seemed to be important, first of all, to give themselves interest, to experience something interesting and to feel important. The Flemings, in spite of their Germanophilia, less frequently offered their services [173] for espionage than the Walloons, but when they undertook any task, they carried it out conscientiously. Every Belgian who worked in German intelligence had to simultaneously offer his services to enemy intelligence and, at least apparently, to render these services to her, since every Belgian who got abroad and, moreover, who had the opportunity and wished to return back to Belgium, not being at the same time in the service of enemy intelligence, he was already suspicious of her and, thanks to this, was already a person who had died for intelligence.

Belgian women, who worked selflessly for their fatherland, were completely inaccessible to German intelligence. In this respect they were superior to French women. Although the latter did not suffer in the non-occupied areas as much as Belgian women in the occupied

Belgium, yet the Belgian was more tempted to work for the benefit of German intelligence than the French. Among the French women there were quite a

few who helped German intelligence - partly out of hatred for foreign oppressors, the British and Americans. In addition, the fact that the British considered it possible for themselves to serve German intelligence in French combat sectors, and the French in English ones, was to the benefit of German intelligence, lulling their conscience with the fact that they did not act directly against their nation. On the contrary, no one was a citizen of the United States of America in the service of the German General Staff. Thus, despite all the difficulties, German intelligence was able, using the narrow path that remained open to it through neutral countries, to acquire observers even in the ranks of enemy troops that sent their reports through the same route. And if German intelligence was forced under the given conditions to impose certain restrictions on itself, especially with regard to the number of intelligence officers far behind the number that was at the disposal of the enemy thanks to flight spies and the population, then, obviously, this was not harmful to her; this compelled her to attach increased importance to the selection, training and management of her few [174] organs, thereby increasing their reliability, reliability, competence and dexterity. It avoided, therefore, the obscurity that is caused by any mass intelligence, due to the fact that it gives huge amounts of information that is difficult to evaluate, in the total mass of which a few, perhaps important and accurate reports are drowned.

German intelligence successfully imitated the French intelligence method of encouraging deserters to return and spy at the front. In France, there was also the possibility that deserters circulated many times between the front and Germany and delivered the most important messages. It was not difficult to induce them also to persuade their comrades to desert and to the intelligence service. These phenomena of dissolution, which had already existed in peacetime, only reappeared, however, in the second half of the war. The same was observed among the population in the rear of France. But here it was not so much the lower circles of the people who were doing this, but its higher layers, infected with internationalism. As an example of the accuracy with which, despite the difficult conditions, German intelligence could work, I will point out that each hit of a giant gun aimed at Paris became accurately known after 24 hours, so that through the medium of intelligence a kind of artillery pickup was possible. . Under all these circumstances, however, German secret intelligence in the rear of the enemy army remained so limited that it could not fully satisfy the intelligence needs of the army headquarters and the high command. The largest and most important source for German intelligence in the Western theater of operations and the only one on the front itself, therefore,

became enemy prisoners of war. This source acquired the main importance due to the possibility of its rapid use during the battles. It was not easy to find the necessary [175] number of suitable translators for this purpose. auxiliary forces forced the most careful preparation of this branch of intelligence, so that friction would not increase the already existing difficulties. The fact that colored soldiers would also have to be interrogated was not at first considered at all. Subsequently, however, suitable translators were found for them as well.

All prisoners of war turned out to be well-supported and equipped, if we take into account the consequences of the battle that had just taken place. If we exclude the shocking impressions that had just been transferred, then their mood turned out to be, on the whole, good and even excellent, especially since the help of the Americans became materially noticeable. This is not the place to refute the slanderous insults of the German troops for their mistreatment of prisoners.

Not to mention the fact that this was already contrary to the very spirit of the German troops, good treatment of prisoners as valuable

and almost the only source of information in the theater of operations, also corresponded to the interests of the Germans. At the first opportunity, in order to avoid personal insults and anger, the prisoners were taken away for the agreed thirty-kilometer strip. In addition, they kept their money, valuables and papers, which often contained valuable information. Naturally, it was not possible to completely avoid that the German troops, suffering from extreme hardships, did not appropriate valuable pieces of clothing as military booty, especially the excellent leather jackets and coats taken prisoner by pilots, it was not possible. In the same way, English high rubber boots, which, however, were the cause of long-term leg diseases, often found lovers in the German trenches earlier than their owners would have wished.

The prisoner had the right immediately, at the latest - in the army prisoner of war camp, to write an open letter to his relatives. His dispatch was taken care of quite conscientiously. And just this permission unleashed the tongues of even the most secretive. The content on the German side, for [176] understandable reasons, was significantly different from that to which the prisoners were accustomed until then. It also often happened that with an unexpectedly significant influx of prisoners, there was not enough food on the spot in a timely manner, there were not enough clothes, linen and shoes. As a result, the possibility of placing prisoners in our favor by good treatment decreased: the enemy had this opportunity, but, as far as it was possible to establish, did not use it. There they acted in the opposite way: a prisoner who did not want to talk was brought to obedience by poor treatment and food. The enemy, who knew from the experience of his own use of the testimonies of prisoners what a valuable source of intelligence they were, made every possible conceivable effort to instruct his soldiers in case of capture. The captured orders introduced us to this and made it possible to treat the prisoners in such a way that the instructions they received would lose their influence.

The means, which was predominantly used by the enemy until the very end of the war, and consisted in instilling fear in the troops of the barbarians and of captivity, often had the opposite effect. It was precisely the prisoners, who were still under the tremendous impression of the battle, who then met with human conversion and the satisfaction of their hunger and thirst, spoke out even more willingly than the defectors. The latter were treated, of course, with great care, since it was impossible not to suspect that they had come for espionage, would try to win favor with false reports, and escape again at the first opportunity.

The pilots of both sides were connected by a technical interest and a well-known sports spirit. Added to this was the fact that many of them were still very young and that the English and French pilots were often recruited from low-value material. Until the very end of the war, enemy pilots did not cease to respect the German ones. In a friendly conversation, they spoke frankly about everything, and [177] the information received from them was all the more valuable because it was the pilots who were often familiar with the strategic circumstances and, thereby, with the most important issues. As a matter of fact, only officers and non-commissioned officers gave deliberately false and deceitful testimony, since they understood all their military value. The English officer did not do this either. He was exemplary silent, and he was surpassed in this only by old-time English non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The influence of injury or nervous shock was different. After the English suffered a severe shock, the better trained prisoners of war naturally showed greater resistance than the French and Belgian. While the latter exhibited, after such experiences, a nervous talkativeness connected with an excited fantasy, in the English the same circumstances caused a quiet isolation, often reaching complete silence.

The lightly wounded, who were already convinced at the dressing station that things were not so bad with German barbarism, often showed out of gratitude in the best way. The same was the case with the seriously wounded, since they had to be left in the front lines, because they could not be transported, or because the fire of their own artillery prevented them from being sent to the rear. Their testimonies were then for the benefit of only the military unit, but not the command.

The gassed were, for the most part, very garrulous, as well as the febrile ones, apparently using their last strength to describe their last impressions in great detail.

Some prisoners gave downright classic testimony. So, for example, one Frenchman, captured shortly before the battle of the Somme, gave out the entire plan of the offensive, down to its details, with such accuracy that they did not believe him. In the same way, in the spring of 1918, an English sergeant gave evidence so extensive and incredible - for his horizon - that they were [178] left in doubt and only later turned out to be correct. This happened to one of the first captives from the tanks. He got out unharmed from the exploding car, trembled from this hellish ride for a long time, and in this state he told in the most detailed way about all his activities in one tank factory, about the details of their design and about the size of the production of these new combat weapons. Here, too, the intelligence report was greeted with suspicion until further evidence confirmed it. The readings were so detailed that it was possible to construct a tank model from them.

In addition to purely military issues, the prisoners gave a good and true picture of the mood of the enemy. On the question of

their political views, they declared, for the most part, that they adhered to the views proclaimed by the national parties of their fatherland. It was very rare to meet those who recognized themselves as socialists and behaved accordingly.

The first French prisoners were completely under the impression of inciting propaganda that was conducted in the French army against the Germans. They trembled with fear that the Germans would torture and kill them and inspired contempt. Reassured on this score, they showed, for the most part, joy at their withdrawal from the battle. Their mood on the issue of the outcome of the war was completely confident. It could be seen from them that a different mood in the French army was not allowed. If a few of them turned out to be weak, then they were still embarrassed to admit it to others. The discipline lagged far behind the English. There was no respect for the officers and non-commissioned officers, who, for their part, did not differ in the superior appearance of the English ranks. During the riots in the French army, the prisoners were in a grouchy mood. The French colonial troops, in which French whites were mixed with blacks, were an irreproachable military unit, as well as Negroes and Madagascars, raised by the French government to [179] French citizenship. They were cruel and despised life, as prisoners they were unyielding and hardly yielded to the work of an interpreter. Among the Madagascarians were highly intelligent people who, when treated well, turned out to be good-natured and easily testified. It was indicative that they repeatedly complained about the filth prevailing among the French. Annamites and other colored peoples were used mainly as labor units in the front line. They were therefore captured only during breakthroughs that reached this zone, or alone when they were too far away. The Mohammedans were all friendly to the Germans and declared that they fought against the Germans only under duress.

The Portuguese made a bad impression, their mood was depressed, they had a rather vague idea about Germany and they did not understand the reasons for their struggle with it. They spoke indifferently about everything they knew.

The Belgians, because they were Walloons, were full of

hatred, and the Flemings, on the contrary, did not hide their sympathy for Germany.

The British observed the strictest discipline even after the capture. Until the very end of 1916, they were trained to stay out in the open at night without cover. Iron discipline, supported by strict punishments, entered into their flesh and blood. From one captured English order, it followed that in the eleven months of 1917-18, 65 people were shot, including many officers, mostly for cowardice before the enemy, but also for smaller reasons. All the prisoners were sure that their government would win this war as well as all the previous ones. Rarely did they show any inclination to think that England might come to an agreement with Germany. Among the French, too, this thought in relation to France met with an echo only in rare cases, and even then only almost exclusively among the southerners. It was noteworthy that the Irish also spoke out in the fight against Germany for Great Britain. The English battalions from South [180] Africa, which were selected troops, brought many Germanophiles among the prisoners. The prisoners from the British colonial troops, however, completely showed a bad mood due to the fact that their especially valuable divisions were placed on the hottest sectors of the front and used to the last man. The Australians pressed with malice that, having supposedly been assigned to Egypt, they were sent to the theater of operations in France. But all these colonial troops, like the Irish, were, in general, pro-Great Britain, and were sure that England would never have entered the war if she had not counted on winning it for sure. Before its entry into the war, the American army was for political reasons, repeatedly represented in Germany and in the theater of operations by deputies of its officer corps, although it was difficult for headquarters and military units to explain why American officers should be on the German front when shells manufactured by America kill German soldier. The active duty officers gave the impression of being friendly and, in any case, not hostile to the Germans. The same attitude could be detected in captivity, although their highly developed sense of duty precluded any manifestation of this mood. On the contrary, officers mobilized during the war from other professions showed a mood hostile to the Germans. The mood of the lower ranks did

not seem the same either. They saw in the war something like a crusade, they repeated, for the most part, the current phrases of the English propaganda carried out in their homeland, and took it for granted that the war would be brought to the complete annihilation of shameful Germany. There were, however, those for whom the war with the Germans was a war with fellow tribesmen, especially when they saw the colored troops of the French or were forced to fight the Germans side by side with them. They had a contempt for colored people that bordered on disgust. They reacted differently to the war itself. Soldiers on active duty exhibited a modest military character, which was best expressed by one prisoner from the first American division: [181] "Our task is to kill or be killed." Among those mobilized for the war there were many who considered the war, as such, an injustice and did not hide their joy at avoiding it. The American prisoners were perhaps even stronger than the British. But it goes without saying that at first their endurance was less. Since the divisions arrived one after the other and there were always newcomers, the picture of the mood of the American prisoners was not uniform. The first newly formed divisions sent to France were apparently made up of the inhabitants of those states which were hostile to the Germans, in which English propaganda had put down strong roots, and on which the government of President Wilson considered it possible to rely first of all. The prisoners from the divisions that later arrived from the states of Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Illinois and other states of the West were rather friendly towards the Germans. The prisoners of one of the divisions formed in these states unanimously testified that they went to war with Germany only under duress and against their will.

The testimonies of the prisoners made it possible to look into the relationship

various allied forces among themselves. They were not comrades, the greatest punishment was and led to riots if they were placed together on transports and in prisoner of war camps. The indignation was especially great when the coloreds came into close personal contact with captured Europeans. The French refused, too, from the too close society of Russians allied to them. Judging by the behavior of the prisoners, it was impossible to speak of true brotherhood in arms between the enemy troops. Rather, one could think that only the policy towards Germany binds them together. If the German government were interested in this area, and if political propaganda were carried out on the German side, then the data from it would give a lot of things that could be successfully used for front-line propaganda. The English looked down on the French, [182] complained about their uncleanness and mocked their weak discipline. In the English front line, the French population was treated, according to the British prisoners, with draconian severity. On the other hand, there was much more order in the rear of the English front than in the

rear of the French front. Significant detachments of the British police and gendarmerie took care of the unconditional implementation of all orders caused by the war. With regard to the population, the British were undemanding only insofar as their headquarters avoided, if possible, being located in castles, but rather settled in premises that could only be found with difficulty by pilots and artillery, mostly in asbestos barracks. With difficulty, therefore, on the basis of the interrogation of prisoners, it was possible to establish on the map the location of the British headquarters. English prisoners spoke of occupied France as an enemy country, and of strict measures against the population as something self-evident. British officers told German intelligence officers that they did not understand the humane attitude of the Germans towards the French population. Their surprise was all the greater because they, too, were saturated with propaganda about the cruelty of the German conduct of the war. If you think about how many different human races passed through the French front line during the four years of the war, you can understand the impression of many prisoners of war that the population of the German front line had a much easier life than the population of the French. The same applies to the Belgian front line. The Flemish prisoners especially complained about the lordly behavior of the British and their ruthless method of destroying the Belgian localities. The French prisoners did not outwardly protest against the disrespect on the part of the British, and the French officers, whom the British did not salute in captivity, showed a certain embarrassment towards them. At the same time, at first the French felt themselves, as soldiers, superior to the British and often disparaged [183] spoke of the low value of the British divisions, for the most part, newly formed ones. The national pride of the French seemed to suffer from the fact that they were forced to recognize the English as the saviors of France. The best food of the English aroused envy in them. They complained about the impudent, lordly behavior of their allies in France and the obsessive harassment of English soldiers on French women. They

hated them for the merciless destruction by British artillery and pilots of French settlements on the German front and in its rear. They often expressed their anger against the Allies and declared that they would be most willing to throw them out of France together with the Germans, especially when the opinion spread in the French army that the British would never again clear the French harbors on the canal.

When America declared war on Germany, the confidence of the prisoners in victory increased significantly. They eagerly awaited the arrival of American troops. Soon, however, a turn in the opposite direction became noticeable among the French and English prisoners. Their vanity suffered from the recognition of Americans as saviors in need. It goes without saying that the insignificant value of the newly formed American divisions and their initial helplessness in almost all military matters entailed a certain disregard for

American troops from the British and French, accustomed to war. True, after the Americans quickly and successfully completed military school, they won the recognition of the Allies by their courage, but since now it was they who really became saviors in need and clearly expressed their American pride, the estrangement that always existed between American and other prisoners remained unchanged. . When asked about the attitude of the American troops towards the French population, it was reported that they tried to behave correctly and cautiously and showed a more natural and voluntary discipline. Since they received large salaries and poured out handfuls of money, the suffering population saw them as advantageous and [184] more desirable guests than English soldiers and even than their own troops.

It rarely happened that prisoners deserted. It happened, however, that they did this in order to mix with the population and stay there. On the way to Holland, and therefore again to the front, very few of them were caught. If they managed to reach Holland, they became dangerous informers, since they could report everything they saw in the German ranks and what they learned from the population during the flight.

German prisoners of war who were in an enemy country were almost completely deprived of the opportunity to escape, since they could not count on the support of the population. Nevertheless, it happened that such fugitives appeared. They had to be treated with the greatest caution, since it was quite natural to suspect that they were sent back with the support of the enemy in order to reconnoiter and desert again at the next opportunity. After this suspicion was repeatedly confirmed by the voluntary testimony of the fugitives themselves, the latter began to be sent to the German eastern front. This means of espionage, used by the enemy, however, brought him some harm, since the fugitives reported very important information about the situation in the deep enemy rear and, in particular, about the methods that enemy intelligence applied to German prisoners. Knowing this was important, as it made it possible to warn their own soldiers against these methods. Soon after being taken prisoner, an interrogation took place first on points that were primarily of interest to the military unit, after which a detailed interrogation was carried out at the assembly point. The interrogation continued in the army camps. For prisoners of war

with the participation of knowledgeable persons, mainly Alsatian-Lorraine and trusted persons dressed in German uniforms. In the large camps, these spies did not pay attention to themselves, since prisoners from various military units gathered here. [185]

Prisoners, about whom it was assumed that they knew a lot, were separated separately and tried either to persuade them kindly, or to force them to testify with the help of strict treatment. When the prisoners were in the barracks, their conversations among themselves, especially the conversations of officers, were overheard by trusted persons. In addition, in the barracks, microphones were hung in inconspicuous places, behind hangers and cabinets, connected to the room of an interpreter or intelligence officer. The latter thus listened to the conversations of the prisoners, who, considering themselves among their own, often spoke about the questions proposed during interrogation and about which they kept silent. Only gradually was it possible to warn the troops about this method and instill in them that before talking about military affairs, they should carefully tap the walls of their dwelling and make sure that all the inhabitants of the premises are reliable.

But even in the camps located inside the country, the prisoners were not safe from espionage. The same means were used there, not only to control the mood, but also to clarify certain issues.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the captured maps depicted the German front quite correctly. The same thing happened with German maps with the enemy front plotted on them, since, in addition to interrogating prisoners, there were also a number of means that served intelligence purposes: captured maps and documents, marks on the dead and

other materials. A favorite means was to stun the prisoner with an exact knowledge of their own front, so that they had to get the impression that the enemy already knew everything and that it therefore did not make sense to hush anything up from him. Thus, an accurate knowledge of the enemy front did not present any particular difficulties and was not, as such, a great success. It was more difficult for intelligence to find out the number and location of the reserves and the intentions of the command. In this regard, Allied intelligence, despite its vastness, did not achieve success at the front. [186]

VI. in the rear

Allies are protected. Germany is the main battlefield of espionage. French spy rabble. German deserters as spies. Workers from neutral countries. espionage schools. Prisoners of war as spies. Sabotage. Questionnaires of the Intelligence Directorate. Science in the service of espionage. Postal and telegraph supervision. Fake passports. Domestic shipping. Espionage convictions. Internationalists in the service of intelligence. Aristocracy, large merchants, financiers. Political parties. Neutral Embassies. Consulates and military attaches. Press. Transports of food and gifts. Political attempts.

Strictly speaking, we can talk about special enemy reconnaissance in the homeland only in relation to Germany. The intelligence of the German General Staff in France and Russia was exhausted by the theaters of war into which these countries had become. Since she could work farther inland, her work proceeded under the conditions already described in relation to the theater of operations. England and America were, one might say, completely protected by the sea from intelligence penetration. For the same reason, both countries could minimize the release of any information abroad. The more noise they raised because of the few spies who managed to penetrate there, and who were, in most cases, discovered. The number of them cannot be even approximately compared with the number of spies caught in Germany, which will be reported later.

This is because the conditions for the development of extensive espionage and all other areas of intelligence in Germany were completely different. Surrounded by enemies on all sides, it was in contact for long distances with neutral neighbors. It was even less possible to close the borders with them than to close the border in the rear of the operating Western army. In addition, Germany was forced in its own interests to maintain communications with foreign countries. The enemy did not put up any obstacles to her in this respect, so as not to block the way for her own agents. Germany was cut off from neutral countries only on the Dutch, Danish and Norwegian coasts and on the border between France and Switzerland. It is significant that in Germany not a single citizen of any neutral state lying outside this ring of belligerent powers was captured as a spy. Anyone passing from the west through England or through France was subjected to the most careful surveillance. True, agents were recruited in Brazil, and in Argentina, and in Spain, and in general throughout the globe and among all [187] nationalities. It must be assumed, therefore, that they also took part in the reconnaissance of Germany, but not one of them was captured.

The more fully the population of Switzerland, the Scandinavian states, Holland and Luxembourg was used. A rich choice of agents of the lowest grade was delivered by a dark gang, the rallying point of which was during the war the border, neutral states.

Many connections were also imposed with the porters of large hotels and waiters, who in Germany occupied the places of German employees called up for military service. The same applied to the staff of small theaters recruited from abroad during the war. In this way, female dancers and other elements came to Germany as spies.

The enemy had his representatives also in the highest circles of society. He recruited them among neutral students who were in Germany, and for economic intelligence, among Germany's numerous business partners in the border, neutral countries. Numerous cases became known when the Entente, especially England, forced neutral merchants who were dependent on her to take part in intelligence, since it was already more difficult to recruit suitable spies for economic issues. To elucidate the general economic situation was, it is true, easy, but in order to ascertain the position of individual branches of the military industry and agriculture, well-informed people were already needed, whose reports would be of real value. Romanian Jews repeatedly acted as Russian intelligence officers - as long as they could still, in the first half of the war, freely move around Germany. The reasons for their trips were especially numerous in the first half of 1916, when Germany was allowed to export medicines and cars to Romania in exchange for the issuance of Romanian bread already paid for by Germany. In addition, commercial enterprises were founded by enemy intelligence in the name of neutral foreigners, especially Swedes and Danes, [188] specifically in order to be able to send salesmen to Germany for espionage.

But military intelligence also needed competent authorities. Transports passed through Germany from one front to another. By sending spies into Germany with clearly formulated military questions, the enemy supplemented through them the information collected in neutral countries, for the most part random and received from the theaters of military operations, when events were already in the final stage of preparation. To carry out these tasks, the enemy found many agents among German deserters in neutral countries. During the war, it was easier to desert to Holland than to Switzerland, since the former's frontier with Germany was longer and more difficult to guard. Most of them deserted there also because Holland was located in the rear of the German army in the field. Since British intelligence, working against Germany, played the main role in Holland, it was to her that the German deserters supplied most of the agents. In Switzerland they fell, on the contrary, into the net of French espionage. A case was known when in 1917 only one Alsatian recruiter delivered more than fifty German deserters to French intelligence for espionage against Germany. Deprived of their means of subsistence, cut off internally from their struggling people, these deserters easily succumbed to temptation. As German soldiers, they were knowledgeable people and had acquaintances in the German troops. All the necessary, excellently forged, documents they received from enemy intelligence. Only relatively few deserters went to Denmark. Here recruited German deserters for French intelligence hostile to Germany, South Jutland

union.

Numerous Russian emigrants living in Switzerland and expelled, apparently out of hostility to the tsarist government, provided only insignificant support for intelligence, but took an active part in it after the fall of Russia, when its intelligence turned into socialist propaganda [189] directed against Germany.

An abundant source of espionage was the German workers' center that existed in Switzerland, especially in relation to the intelligence of the German military economy. The reliability of the French agents remained, no doubt,

insufficiently tested. The reason for this is to be found in the high bonus that recruiters received for each agent, and insufficient instruction was a consequence of gullible selection. The spy school organized in Dijon for agents who were to be sent through Switzerland to Germany had the opportunity to train only a relatively few of them. In the Anglo-French spy schools in London, training was better, since British intelligence gave a very large

the importance of thorough preliminary training of spies sent specifically to the naval unit. Judging by the training plan delivered by German intelligence at this school, agents in five courses got acquainted with all the details of espionage, both materially and personally.

One might think that these sources covered the entire need for spies for Germany. But recruitment was carried out even among prisoners of war in Germany. At the same time, they acted quite systematically. Special, detailed envoys were sent to prisoner of war camps, or prisoners who voluntarily surrendered took over the instructions, or, finally, a trusted person was recruited in the camp with the help of letters of this kind.

"Dear comrade! Arriving here, I had the opportunity to speak with a Frenchman who was entrusted with the task of collecting as much information as possible (you understand me). He asked me to find a correspondent for this camp. I thought about you. I know that you have several faithful and intelligent comrades, who will consider it their happiness and duty to help in this work, if [190] you assume the leadership of it in your camp.

even minor data that can provide interesting clues.

I will never write to you under my own name (in case of need, you can perhaps get the right to an extra letter if I ask you in my letters about the missed one). You will generally write in sympathetic ink. There is no need for my messages, as they will be hidden in the canned food boxes. It may, however, happen that I shall have to write you a word in secret in a letter, which I shall be able, by unforeseen circumstances, to send you in a package. In this case, the corners of the letter or card will be slightly notched. Do not share the recipe with anyone.

Each postal parcel will contain a box. Correspondence will, however, be placed only in sealed boxes. Each box will be accompanied by a bag for making chemical ink. As for the developer, we will send you some in case you need it, but it will rarely be needed, since the bag method is much safer and takes almost the same time. Burn all letters after first extracting the necessary instructions from them.

At the last moment, I was instructed to tell you that if you are serious and actively engage in this, you will not be forgotten."

It can be assumed that in each prisoner of war camp there was one or more trusted intelligence people. They questioned the newly arrived prisoners about everything that they had seen in the German troops and in Germany since the moment they were taken prisoner. The exchanged patients, prisoners participated in the delivery of the collected information abroad. Since information often traveled too slowly on this route, the preference was given to the transmission of messages encrypted and written in sympathetic ink by mail. Therefore, it was necessary to carefully monitor all the mail of prisoners of war and treat it with chemical means. [191]

The dangerous elements in this group were POW officers. The prisoner of war camps served as French intelligence starting points for sabotage. You can best learn about its goals and methods of work from the text of the instructions. First, a general assignment:

"Find a few loyal, silent and cautious friends, tell us their names and let them know so that they mark their letters with the letters a, b, c, so that they can then be recognized and selected. You will receive all packages and letters. Work in secret, direct, distribute the work among friends. We are talking about collecting information and sending it, about fleeing, about indicating saboteurs and about destruction. Use alternately the addresses that I give you, look for

a friend who would be busy censoring letters. If you wish to have the censorship stamp of the camp, I will send it to you.

You must hold your camp firmly in your hands. For the destruction of Germany, perhaps you will all be needed. The whole organization must be regarded as an official matter, which is entrusted personally to you and the French who have proven their reliability. You must always be able to deny contact with us.

Undertake destruction at railway stations, military camps, government buildings, stables, military factories. Look for only determined and very cautious people for this. Tell me by secret letter areas where you can work, hangars for aircraft, military factories, etc. I will send you everything you need. Never touch the items in the food bag without first reading the enclosed instructions. Handling them is dangerous.

To escape, demand everything you need, maps, compasses. The fugitive must tell me his route and the place where he wants to cross the border. Never talk about it, even in neutral countries. After a successful escape, the appropriate [192] persons will be used inside France and by no means on the northern front. Point out to me those who have forgotten their duty: they must be punished, while the brave will be rewarded. The instructions are to be regarded as military orders."

After the organization of groups had been started in this way for sabotage, they received more detailed instructions of the following kind:

"Every person going to work in the field must necessarily receive the following instructions from mouth to mouth and carry out these orders, remembering that he is a Frenchman and that he is thus helping the coming victory.

Find out the people, show them how they should look after the cattle on the estates. Pouring, for example, sand into cars, short-circuiting electrical wiring, etc. How to cause a military train crash.

Where it is possible to get sulfuric acid, water potatoes with it to prevent its growth. All these manipulations can be done without the Germans noticing anything. A bad harvest is worth a lost battle. You work for the fatherland. Carry on propaganda among the workers in the peasant yards and teach them to gouge glasses and sprouts of seed potatoes with knives and pieces of wood; in bundles of chocolate, cookies or biscuits you will receive small apparatus for this.

Respond immediately if you may need arson material and pastilles to infect livestock. If you answer in the affirmative, pastilles or other products will be placed in special vessels in the following packages. Read the instructions for them. You can also get small incendiary devices, which, when put in place, cause a fire only after 3-5 hours. Put

them in big yards, in railroad cars, in trains ready to go. In the yards, first give pastilles to the cattle, and then put on a fire. [193] The animals will then be placed in another place, and they will also infect another barn. Weigh and choose wisely. Your deeds will be rewarded according to merit. After each destruction, let me know by letter or postcard so that I can add it to the award list. Write about everything you need: then I will send more materials. You must, in the end, bring to the point that in all districts the yards burned down and the

cattle perished in the flames. Try everything. This should overtake the enemy and will overtake him like a scourge that strikes the German people. Involve true friends in this, if possible. You will then

great work for the victory and for the fatherland."

The French prisoners of war who were in Germany, therefore, were not free from their military duty in captivity. At the same time, the danger that threatened individual prisoners, and how these actions would affect the situation of prisoners in general, were considered as little as when organizing espionage by local residents in the theater of operations. In a number of cases of sabotage, however, it was possible to establish that agents sent from neutral countries, from Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, were engaged in it. Attempts to destroy the Emperor Wilhelm Canal, bridges, railways and industrial enterprises were prevented from Copenhagen.

It is difficult to say how many explosions, fires, accidents, destruction of factories and harmful phenomena in the field of public nutrition actually depended on sabotage, since in cases where attempts were successful, the traces of the perpetrators were almost always erased by the destruction itself.

Intelligence and preparation for sabotage and progress reports were a constant part of French intelligence activities. Its goals are, however, best of all from the questionnaire of 1916:

"The value of the information delivered is determined, in particular, by the accuracy of their indications and their sources. [194] It is necessary to constantly insist on these points. The information relates to politics, economy, finances and the troops. Political information should be understood as differences in the opinions

of the parties, the socialist movement, the views of the Reichstag and the Chancellor and the policies of the latter, the plans he has and which he could carry out General mood, strikes, uprisings Relations between allies: Germans, Austrians, Turks, Bulgarians Propaganda in hostile and neutral countries; measures of the German Government with regard to the latter. Experience has shown that in Berlin there is a great deal of chatter in the appropriate circles, and that news is often blurted out which should have been kept secret. There is, therefore, the possibility of learning something there. By economic information one should understand all general data Information about mines, about state and private factories, about the lack of raw materials, about wages, about the smuggling of provisions into Germany through neutral countries, Sweden, Holland, Switzerland, is always of interest. Financial information covers loans, balance sheets of large banks, state gold reserves, etc. Military information should be understood as: the expenditure and condition of military units, the mood in the army, the question of whether political or strategic considerations played a major role during the change in the high command . The relationship between the political world and civilian elements on the one hand, and the command on the other. Human losses, material costs on

land and on water, large transfers of troops from one front to another.

The information must contain details in which it would differ from ordinary stories, which can always be easily heard from travelers returning from Germany. A single one of these points, carefully worked out, is of more value than a long report containing only ordinary [195] reasoning.

From this question sheet it is clear that military information was mentioned only in the last place. As the enemy placed more and more of his hopes on the internal disintegration of Germany, this information receded more and more into the background. This is quite clear from a question sheet sent to a French agent in September 1917:

1. The mood in the western industrial region and in the cities: Cologne,

Berlin, Leipzig and Munich. In particular, do you hear anything about secret revolutionary propaganda, whether there have already been arrested or put on trial for her.

2. Is it true that a large Polish conspiracy was discovered in Poznań and that many noble Poles were arrested, including two deputies.

3. What military units are currently located in Tondern, Gusum, Gadersleben, Sonderburg, Schleswig, Kiel, Rendsburg and Neumünster. What is the name of the present temporary commander of the IX Army Corps. Is it true that a new commander has been appointed to Flensburg as well? You should try to make acquaintance with the sailors."

It follows from this question sheet that the enemy knew about the revolutionary currents in Germany and that even then he paid special attention to their centers. The American questionnaires were almost exclusively political in nature and contained questions such as the following:

"Do the Germans expect to win the war? Do you think that a revolution will break out in Germany? Do the Germans love their emperor?"

The English question sheets dealt primarily with the German navy and economic matters. Moreover, in questions like the following, they found that England was the instigator of air raids on German cities:

"Precise details of the air defense in the Rhineland, the results of the damage caused by the air raids organized by the Entente [196] on various cities. The number of people killed in this."

Question sheets of English and French economic espionage, in view of their large size, cannot be transmitted. They contained the most detailed instructions and questions on all branches of the military industry.

During the long years of the war, the struggle between intelligence and counterintelligence led to phenomena that were impossible to foresee in peacetime. Germany, which was most threatened by intelligence, was forced to wage the most bitter struggle in the field of counterintelligence, at least in so far as the General Staff had enough strength. In his hands was concentrated and monitoring the mail and telegraph, and issuing, and checking passports at the passport office.

When the paths used by the enemy to overcome the obstacles set were discovered, the General Staff very quickly began to lack the means that the police had at their disposal. Under Division III-b, the organization of a scientific division proved necessary, and along with it a division arose to ensure both the constant testing and the assurance of the reliability of the cipher systems used. Scientists, chemists, physicists and mathematicians entered the service of military affairs. First of all, there was not enough existing means to test the mail in relation to secret letters. Ordinary sympathetic ink, already known in peacetime, was easily detected

using the commonly used method with iodine vapor. They had the disadvantage that the liquid eroded the surface of the paper. These destroyed places easily became visible during development, as particles of iodine settled on them and stained the writing in a brownish color. This ordinary ink was used, however, throughout the war only by private individuals. In particular, correspondence between prisoners of war and their relatives contained much information written in this ink, regarding which the senders believed that [197] the censorship of their own country would not let them through. All outgoing and incoming mail therefore had to be chemically processed at postal checkpoints. However, shortly after the start of the war, organized intelligence resorted to

chemical ink, which was not affected by the usual method of development. The chemical ink used by Russian intelligence was the least improved. The most stubborn of all, until the very end of the war, French intelligence sought out new ways. The simplest remedy, which consisted of a complete interruption of the postal communication, could only be used during periods of the strongest military crises, since other considerations prompted Germany to maintain communication with foreign countries. The position of the enemy was more advantageous. He only had to keep track of the postal communication to and from Germany, but communication with the rest of the world could not harm him. In the scientific struggle between chemical inks and developers, the latter won. It was impossible to invent such ink, the development of which would be impossible.

All mail had to be read, however. Parts of the letters that were supposed to be hidden from the enemy were censored with a special substance, regarding which it was assumed that it was impossible to remove it without damaging, in any case, what was written. The intelligence of the destination country, on the contrary, was interested in finding out what the censors wanted to hide from it. Science therefore looked for means to dissolve the covering substance without damaging the writing, and, on the other hand, looked for substances that could not be dissolved. Intelligence won this competition: not a single coating material proved to be unconditionally reliable. Intelligence also constantly showed ingenuity in finding a means for sending information: under postage stamps, between glued postcards, in the shell of packages. The counterintelligence collection contained

examples of fabulous ingenuity and hard work. In the telegraph message, the use of conditional abbreviations [198] was prohibited everywhere [198]. However, apparently harmless telegrams could also contain important messages in conditional expressions. It was therefore necessary to observe them, and in particular to check their senders.

A completely new phenomenon in the World War was the wireless telegraph, which made it possible for each belligerent to intercept enemy telegrams. Therefore, in wireless communication almost exclusively ciphered telegrams were given. Just as the chemist played an important role at the post office, so here the mathematician entered the circle of intelligence officers, who was supposed to decipher them. The Russians were the most careless and the most unwieldy in their cipher systems, and this often did their military interests the worst harm. On the other hand, the organization and careful handling of ciphers were outstanding among the other hostile powers. Systems and keys changed at short intervals. It was clear that the enemy intelligence was most carefully engaged in the German method of encryption, and that the successes achieved in this case prompted it to be careful at home. And yet, judging by the progress of German science during the war, it can be considered established that no cipher system can remain unsolved for a long time. The frequent permutation of the letters increases the difficulty of deciphering, but does not eliminate it, if only there is a certain number of telegrams equally encrypted. Espionage, therefore, hunted for encrypted telegrams everywhere, not only in the enemy country and in the air, but also in neutral countries.

They were mined for big money. In 1918, Swedish judges sentenced two British agents to lengthy prison terms for taking telegrams addressed to the German envoy from a telegraph messenger and handing them over to a representative of British intelligence. Similar sentences for stealing political telegrams for intelligence came to light in Holland and, especially, in Switzerland. A consequence of the fact that in [199] Germany intelligence was limited to the General Staff, was that the use of military experience was, unfortunately, used only for its own encryption. Unfortunately, he failed to induce the Foreign Office to put to the test the methods of encryption used by him, and adapt them to the current state of science. This explains the fact that secret political telegrams could repeatedly become known to the enemy. Achievements in cipher,

used only by the military organization, turned out to be lost for Germany simultaneously with the disbandment of the General Staff. Therefore, the victorious countries have a huge advantage in this area.

The more the transmission of information by post and telegraph was restricted, the more importance intelligence was forced to attach to keeping the frontiers open to passenger traffic. Strict personal and passport control was established at the borders, espionage ran into new obstacles, agents had to be supplied, first of all, with sufficient documents. On the basis of the passport system, a fierce struggle broke out between intelligence and counterintelligence. Forgeries, prosecuted in peacetime as criminal offenses, now developed with the support of the state and with the cooperation of first-class scientific forces to the highest perfection. Documents were found that did not differ from the real ones either in the type of paper, or in the signatures, or in the seal, and which were nevertheless fake in all respects. German passports were the easiest to forge. They were made of relatively ordinary paper and bound in the form of a book, so that individual pages could be easily taken out of them and replaced by others, and the rubber seals that were used, for the most part, were easy to fake. Passports of other countries were better protected from abuse and forgery, due to the mere fact that they consisted mostly of one sheet or were folded according to the Leporello system, so that it was not so easy [200] to remove one part and replace another. According to the type of paper and external decorations, they were partly works of art and were equipped, for the most part, with chased seals. All this, however, did not prevent the appearance of forged, neutral passports, where everything, starting with paper, was made by the intelligence itself. The forgery of signatures was striking. My professional knowledge is not sufficient for a detailed description of these very interesting machinations. I can only state that the ordinary control of passports at the present time does not guarantee against anything, and that the agent sent by the state power will, probably, first of all, be provided with all the necessary and, in appearance, genuine documents. Spies, however, were provided with real passports, which were originally intended for other people. Beginning already in 1905, circulars were issued in France to take away from German deserters their personal documents in order to use them by intelligence agents. During the war, for this purpose, they began to resort to the theft of German passports. The photo and signature of the passport holder had to be aligned with the photo and signature of the agent. Science came up with glue for counterintelligence, which made it impossible to peel off a photograph. In response to this, intelligence invented a method by which the image on the card was destroyed, once used photographic paper was turned back into photosensitive paper, and a new image was printed in place of the old one - all this was done without peeling off the cards.

In order to combat the forgery of passports, science has turned its attention to the production of paper. Grades of paper were invented on which no erasure or change became possible.

Finally, mention should be made of the use by intelligence of the smallest photograph. They achieved that what was printed on a sheet of a typewriter was placed on a card the size of one square millimeter. Agents [201] could thus receive instructions that were almost impossible to detect, and which they read with a magnifying glass. The extent of espionage against Germany led to the fact that by the end of the war chemical bureaus were created in each military district, supervising, according to their specialty, all institutions that monitored postal, telegraph and border traffic. All these measures could, however, be carried out only at the main passages through the land border and at the landing sites along the coast of the North and Baltic Seas. Large sections of the border had to be left unattended, in view of the increasingly

limited number of employees. Yet here, too, everything possible was done. But the more done here, the more

the methods of crossing the border by spies and the means of concealing information became cunning. And here it happened to discover the most improbable things. It was not enough to limit one's attention to boundaries. For example, navigation on the Rhine opened the way for spies to penetrate into Germany. It remained open to neutral skippers during the war. The cash river police were content with monitoring the execution of police orders. As a result, military supervision of the river had to be organized from motor boats, the crew of which consisted of knowledgeable people. This observation of the river proved to be especially necessary when the Supreme Headquarters was in Kreuznach and, therefore, within the sphere of action of all enemy intelligence working in Germany itself.

It also turned out to be necessary to organize military counterintelligence along the border with Switzerland, passing through the middle of Lake Baden. It was carried out by motor boats, armed and equipped with searchlights. They had to endure more than one battle with decisive enemy intelligence agencies trying to penetrate through the lakes into Germany. Propaganda material was also prevented from being imported into southern Germany, which set itself the goal [202] of restoring the south against the north. In view of these circumstances, the complaints of the Dutch and Swiss governments about restrictions on the freedom of neutral navigation had to be ignored. It was very important that the industrial area in the north-west of Germany closely adjoined the Dutch border. Only with difficulty, and even then not completely, was it possible to protect it from the penetration

of revolutionary propaganda from the enemy intelligence from Holland. All the circumstances I have mentioned above represented an extreme danger to the German military command. The military command of the enemy was protected from these dangers, both by the geographical position of their countries, and by the fact that

German propaganda did not exist. True, at the beginning of the war, in Germany, due to the lack of state propaganda, many private individuals and propaganda unions created for this purpose took up it. Deprived of government support and leadership, and unable to raise the funds necessary for this on their own, they were, however, forced to liquidate one enterprise after another. True, for some time, under the leadership of Deputy Erzberger, there was also official, shamefully hushed up propaganda. But their works revealed their German origin both by grammatical errors on their title pages and by other signs, so that they were recognized abroad from the very beginning and, as a result, were not successful. Whole heaps of them must still lie in the cellars of German representations abroad. Although the number of captured spies is only a small part of those who actually worked, although, on the other hand, the captured and convicted spies represent insignificant and less dangerous elements, while the big spies and traitors were able to avoid the police network, which worked only in the field of military counterintelligence, although finally, the number of captured spies is not [203] evidence of a good counterintelligence organization, which is proved only by the successful preservation of state interests in secret - nevertheless, in view of the interest represented by their national composition, I want to give here figures on the number of persons convicted in Germany during the war for crimes against the laws of military and

treason. Among them were:

- 225 Germans, including 67 Alsatian-Lorraine, - 46 French, - 31 Dutch, - 25 Swiss,
- 22 Russians, - 20 Belgians, - 13 Luxembourgers,
- 5 Danes,

- 4 Austrians, - 3

Englishmen, Italians, Swedes, - 1 Peruvian. The crime was committed 175 times

in favor of France, 59 times in favor of England, 55 times in Russia, 21 times in Belgium, 2 times in Italy and 14 times in favor of several of them together.

In 33 cases, the perpetrators were convicted of sabotage, and in all but one of these cases, France was the instigator.

convicts Germans supported predominantly England, Alsace-Lorraine - exclusively France. The Dutch fell almost all victims of British intelligence, the Swiss and Luxembourgers - French, the Swedes - French and Russian. The extent to which the goals of intelligence were pursued under the cover of German uniforms can be judged by

the fact that during the first three years of the war 1,785 people were detained in Berlin for illegal wearing of uniforms, including 384 self-proclaimed officers.

According to data officially published in 1919, 6,000 people were employed in the British counterintelligence, which worked exclusively against [204] Germany. German intelligence, which had to fight the spies of all enemy powers, by the end of the war, had 1,139 people in full-time positions. If counterintelligence were in the hands of the government and energetically used by it, then traces of economic and political intelligence could be discovered, and it would be rendered harmless, at least in large part. This statement seems to be contradicted by the fact that in France all counterintelligence in 1917 was merged with military intelligence. However, the reason for this was mainly that they were convinced that in France one had to fear only military German intelligence, and not active political intelligence, that is, not propaganda and not sabotage. The fact that some of his allies became open enemies of Germany only during the war brought great benefit to the enemy. Until then, they could, as neutrals, move freely in Germany. Especially a lot of information about the development of the political situation was delivered to the enemy by the Americans who were in Germany before America's entry into the war. All sorts of international ties are a constant danger in times of war. They existed in all circles of society, but they were all the more dangerous, the higher and more influential these circles were. Postal control gave rise to constant surveillance even of some members of the higher nobility. Being in many cases connected by

marriage and property with other countries, having hereditary possessions abroad, its members are accustomed to spending part of the year in foreign, lovely places at this time. Conversations and correspondence with relatives were conducted, for the most part, on the topics of politics. The ensuing war broke the threads and raised obstacles of which some of them were not fully aware. What could be said in peacetime easily came into conflict [205] with the interests of the fatherland in time of war. Many did not seem to realize that conversations in neutral countries and the exchange of letters can border on high treason in time of

war. Of particular importance was the circumstance that secrets were often blurted out to persons close to enemy governments.

The situation was exactly the same with the international relations of the big merchants. The enemy could receive information in this way, acquainting him with major decisive questions and freeing him from the labor of obtaining information through small single enterprises. In the same way, it was possible to achieve influence in economic and political issues, that is, to conduct propaganda and high-style politics. The exchanges were also a dangerous intelligence center and a gathering of numerous enemy agents who collected information there and conducted

propaganda.

Completely uncontrolled relations between international political parties should have been considered highly doubtful. It was impossible to avoid the fact that at conferences in neutral countries there would be no talk about matters to which enemy intelligence attached importance and which were influenced by its propaganda. This was especially dangerous for Germany, since her international parties took their internationality seriously, while the representatives of the enemy countries actively supported the national goals of their military command, and the parties of neutral countries represented supranational and, in any case, non-German interests. Therefore, the German High Command, as far as possible, fought with the participation of representatives of international parties in foreign conferences.

In this regard, neutral representations in warring countries should also be considered. The military attachés of the neutral states accredited in Germany enjoyed, however, quite deservedly, the full confidence of the supreme [206] command. Nevertheless, there is a danger associated with this institution, that through it competent judgments reach neutral countries, which there are not always properly kept secret. It was not difficult for intelligence in neutral countries to extract the most valuable information from this source. The same can be said about the use by economic and political intelligence of reports to their governments of neutral embassies and consulates. Therefore, lively relations between leading political and economic circles and prominent representatives of the German press with neutral embassies were undesirable. It is a different matter if, as was the case with the enemy, they used their relations to propagate the military aims of their government. It was also very undesirable that the intelligence source of the neutral embassies drew its data only from Berlin, while the rest of Germany and its moods remained closed to him. During one of the longer breaks in military operations, neutral military attaches were given the opportunity to tour Germany and familiarize themselves with military activities in the country. This was connected with their acquaintance with the centers of German culture and science, with social security, with the high level of the peaceful economy of Germany, and many others. They were very satisfied with this acquaintance, their respect and sympathy for Germany became even greater. The General Staff also had to take the initiative to similarly acquaint the political neutrals. Enemy intelligence was constantly interested in events in Germany and, in particular, in the German Reichstag. It was impossible to hide them from her. When events were taking place that were to revive the enemy's confidence in their victory, I was advised to close the frontiers to mail and newspapers. Such a measure, however, would have been only an aimless burden on the population, since everything that happened in the Reichstag took place before the eyes of neutral representatives sitting in the diplomatic box, [207] whose ciphered reports the next day went by telegraph all over the world and found the way from there to the enemy. True, the press, in all the warring countries, was under censorship. Nevertheless, the main German newspapers were systematically monitored in London and Paris, the provincial and special ones - intelligence in Holland and Switzerland and agents in Germany itself, and the largest newspapers were interested in because of their political and economic content, and small ones, on which censorship paid less attention, they were interested because from them it was possible to get quite a lot of useful military information if they were carefully examined. Large newspapers

going to neutral countries in their advertising department were transmitters of many information on conditional

political

language.

Large outrages were created during the transfer of transports with gifts. They served for many Germans and neutral foreigners as an occasion for satisfaction.

his curiosity in the theater of war. Based on the foregoing, it

can be said that with the bitterness of modern warfare, the battlefield is not limited to one area of operations. Not only a soldier at the front is under threat of death, but also a leader in the rear, and a statesman at home and even in neutral countries, if only the interests of one of the warring parties so require, and if this side is inspired by boundless energy directed towards winning victory. . It is significant that the world war began with the political assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne. This side of modern warfare was also entrusted to intelligence, which scouted out ways and possibilities to eliminate politically harmful persons, recruited tools for its implementation and set them in motion at the desired moment. It is clear that here the connection with the official institutions was kept strictly secret. German intelligence does not have any positive data in this area, it can only judge on the basis of [208] received reports and warnings. Judging by them, the German emperor was in constant danger. His protection was entrusted to the supreme headquarters of the special police, but security measures had to be taken very carefully, since the emperor forbade them as soon as he noticed them. The situation was similar with Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who endured the guards with his characteristic condescending humor. General von Ludendorff was best protected by the fact that he never found time for walks or vacations and, because of this, was always under military protection. Field Marshal von Eigner fell victim to enemy assassins in Kyiv, where security was very difficult. In the Balkans, in a classic land of political assassinations, the Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand was under constant threat. German intelligence also received warnings about him. The German intelligence itself was offered its services in removing the leading persons from the enemy by bodies whose energies could be trusted and which tried to plausibly indicate the path to the realization of their goal. The proposals came, for the most part, from Russian and Turkish circles and were directed against Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Venizelos. I especially remember one case when a Russian prisoner of war, convinced that a war between Germany and Russia would bring misfortune to his fatherland and blaming Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich for this, offered to penetrate him in the clothes of a monk and kill him. On the German side, they did not agree to these and similar proposals, although one cannot deny the well-known reason behind the repeatedly carried out principle that not only a soldier in a trench, but also a leader, must risk his life, and that eliminating him can often bring more benefit than sacrificing many thousands of soldiers.

About these phenomena, it was necessary to mention at least briefly in order to have a complete picture of the scope of modern intelligence activities in the rear of the warring parties. [209]

VII. results

Foch reserves. American military forces. The last word in the field of intelligence belongs to the commander. Misleading the enemy. German intelligence is superior militarily, the allied intelligence - politically and economically. Revolutionary propaganda in Germany.

The value of intelligence should be judged not by its size, but by its success. In this respect, German intelligence can bear comparison with the enemy's, although, it is true, only in the field of military intelligence. In this area it can claim that, despite all the difficulties, it has surpassed the much more extensive and more favorable intelligence of the Entente. Starting with the Battle of the Marne, during the decisive breakthrough at Gorlice-Tarnov, during the offensive against Serbia and Romania, at the Isonzo and in all major offensive battles on the Western Front

the enemy command was taken by surprise by German military operations. The retreat of the German front to the Siegfried position remained hidden from him, despite significant preparations, it was noticed by him only after it was completed. The German offensive stumbled upon a well-informed enemy for the first time in mid-July 1918 near Reis. The unfortunate consequences of this proved both the importance of keeping the intentions of the command secret, and at the same time the whole benefit of successful intelligence. The sources by which the enemy was aware in this case could no longer be clarified from the German side. It seems, however, that in this case, too, the enemy owed his information not to his espionage, but to the testimony of German prisoners of war. On the other hand, it must be stated that the German High Command was not, on any important occasion, taken by surprise by events. Despite the limitations of intelligence, it produced a large amount of information. Since they were of military content, they were not transmitted directly to the operational branch, but were previously reviewed and evaluated by the "alien armies" branch, as they often contradicted one another, and constant comparison was required in order to distinguish correct data from false ones.

Messages useful to the fleet were transmitted to intelligence [210] of the naval headquarters. Messages with technical data were sent to the relevant German institutions, and messages of political content - the political department of the high command for the discretion of further forwarding to the office of foreign affairs. Economic messages were sent to Berlin, to the central bureau organized at the General Staff, which was in connection with the interested economic authorities,

Since the military command was competent and responsible only for military affairs, it used and compiled reports exclusively on military information. After the collapse of Germany, the assertion that German intelligence was

unsatisfactory became one of the weapons of the revolution. The leader of one of the bourgeois parties also joined this opinion, and thereby strengthened the impression that the collapse of Germany was military and was caused by an incorrect assessment and underestimation of the enemy fighting forces. This false assertion was especially widespread in relation to the reserves with which Marshal Foch waged his last offensive, as well as in relation to the American fighting forces, the overwhelming number of which allegedly broke the resistance of the German army. Both of these statements are false, since on both issues the high command was correctly informed by German intelligence.

On March 21, 1918, when the German offensive began, 16 British and 35 French divisions were in the rear. They were distributed along the entire front. The enemy expected an attack, but did not know where it would happen. These units on the enemy side were reserves, but not a cohesive reserve army. Intelligence established that by the beginning of April all but one of the British divisions, and by mid-May all of the French reserves, with the exception of two divisions, had been brought to the front. At the same time, intelligence reported that the enemy had pulled divisions away from calm fronts and that by mid-May he had 40 fresh French [211] divisions in reserve, while the British remained almost completely without reserves. This second reserve was gradually used up during the second German offensive in May and June 1918. By mid-June, no more than ten combat-ready French divisions remained in reserve. Thanks to the influx of American and Italian divisions and the replenishment of French divisions withdrawn from the battle, their number increased to about 30 by the beginning of July. By this time, the British also created a reserve of 18 divisions. Now these reserves were more concentrated than in March of this year. Their location was known. Thus, neither the French offensive on 18 July at Villers-Cotres, nor the English on 8 August, was unexpected. It was only unexpected

instability of many German military units. In the ensuing battles, the enemy units again melted strongly, so that by the end of September, when the German high command demanded a truce, the enemy had neither significant reserves in the rear, nor even a large reserve army, with the help of which Marshal Foch supposedly dealt the last decisive blow. It would be more correct to say that he was marching on a collapsing front, or even more true, that he was putting pressure on a front whose supports in the homeland were crumbling.

As far as American fighting forces are concerned, before the American declaration of war, all assumptions about their numbers and about the timing of their arrival in Europe were an object of calculation and were therefore not a matter of intelligence. These estimates of the German General Staff led to the conclusion that by the spring of 1918 15 American divisions and numerous stage and working military units could arrive in France. Intelligence established, however, that by this time there were only 6 divisions in France. This caused great disappointment to the French and British. Pressure on their part led to the acceleration of American transports, so that in mid-May German intelligence discovered 10 American divisions in France, in mid-June - 16, in mid-July - 22, in early August - 28, in mid-August - 31 and by the end of the war, 36. In fact, [212] consequently, the American combat forces until the spring of 1918 were not only not underestimated on the German side, but even overestimated. The arrival of the Americans was also always known long before they entered the front. It was also known about their training in France. While the first American divisions that arrived in France were first trained for several more months and then, before getting into big battles, were sent to calm sectors of the front, starting in July, after two months, and then even after a month of training, they began to be used in hot battlefields. Here they distinguished themselves by their brave behavior, but they had to pay dearly in blood for their inexperience, with which they were, out of necessity, thrown into battle.

As far as the statement that the German command was taken by surprise by the enemy forces is false, and constructed in order to justify the revolution, it is true, however, that certain sections of the German front were really taken by surprise by enemy enterprises. Intelligence, however, timely and correctly reported here as well. This does not mean, however, that the leaders or troops in every case believed her reports. For they are not the only thing: the last word remains with the commander. True, only the most important messages reach him directly, for the rest he has to rely on the judgment of his employees. I fully imagine that the opinion of the Allies has always been the same. German intelligence was therefore not interested in limiting the mass nature of enemy intelligence. On the contrary, she tried to further strengthen this excess of intelligence and even allowed the flow of information to the enemy, along the already established routes, of such information that obviously should not have been correct, not sometimes, namely in those cases when there were grounds for believing that the enemy these messages will not be believed, they have been true. In view of the vast number of spies who fell into German hands, it was not [213] difficult to find a suitable weapon for such a deception. Being recruited indiscriminately, enemy spies did not take their task seriously and willingly agreed to work as doubles. Under such conditions, they got what they needed without any risk, and earned double the money, receiving rewards from both parties. In order for numerous unknown agents of the enemy to automatically receive false information and for German prisoners to

give similar testimony, false information was deliberately disseminated among military units, in the occupied regions, at home and in neutral states, which should have been received by the enemy. Such misleading of the enemy was a difficult and important branch of work. It was strictly concentrated in the hands of the intelligence department and the high command, but all subordinate institutions were prohibited from independently disseminating false information,

for indiscriminate use of such could lead to harmful consequences. By taking into their hands the systematic deception of enemy intelligence, German intelligence at the same time, to the extent possible, defended itself against similar attempts by the enemy. German military intelligence owes its success partly to the fact that it did not

have to prove, but only ascertain. She was not at all interested in the results of what she discovered. She did not have to report what they wanted to hear, and could be indifferent to what she reported. If there was any tendency in her, it was by no means in the direction of underestimating the enemy, since it was precisely on the clear consciousness of the enemy's superiority in terms of men and materials that the high command demanded that the forces of its own people be deployed to the maximum for the fight. The results of economic and political reconnaissance should be assessed in a completely different way: here the advantage turned out to be with the enemy. Economic intelligence was led by England. One cannot but agree with the words in which the head [214] of British intelligence, saying goodbye to his

headquarters, described the results achieved by it as follows: "We owe your efforts that not a single destruction, not a single fire was caused by enemy agents. This is all the more "It is significant that there were many enemy agents. You have delivered information of immeasurable value to naval, military and commercial intelligence. The Minister of Blockade believes that your work contributed greatly to the success of the blockade. With regard to the suppression of enemy trade, your information has greatly contributed to the discovery enemy goods on neutral ships. You will be interested to know that in all cases of smuggling that have come down to the draft court, evidence was delivered by you. The significance of this fact will become even more evident if I add that the value of these cargoes, not counting steamers, is 30 million pounds sterling You also prevented the transfer of valuables worth 70 million pounds and completely upset the enemy's transatlantic relations, insofar as they could be upset at all. In political intelligence, success belongs entirely to the Entente. True, there was also German political intelligence, which the Foreign Office entrusted to Deputy Erzberger. The latter was concerned, however, not so much with finding out the political situation in the surrounding world and influencing it, but with proving the correctness of his own political direction. And since the latter was to maintain in Germany faith in the agreement and the desire to implement it, it favored the goals of enemy intelligence. Many of the information that appeared during the war about the readiness of the enemy for an agreement and about the possibilities of making peace owe their appearance to this trend. The High Command received a different impression through its intelligence: the impression of the enemy's will to destroy, which could only be

broken in the event of a German military victory. [215] Deputy Erzberger, whose activity was at least semi-official, nevertheless never entered into official relations with the high command and with its intelligence.

Until the autumn of 1917, no decisive struggle was waged against the positive results of the activities of enemy political intelligence. They began to pay attention to it only when signs of revolutionary ferment appeared by that time among the broad masses of the people. But their discovery, in the absence of any other intelligence, was forced to take over the military intelligence. Already by 1918, many facts had been discovered. Broadly conceived attempts to deliver revolutionary leaflets to Germany from Holland were repeatedly identified and prevented. Along with this, French intelligence in Switzerland tried to create a mood hostile to the North in South Germany: a large number of proclamations of the corresponding content were detained on the South German border. During 1918, more and more

evidence that the powers to revolutionize Germany were greatly surpassed by the intelligence of the Russian Entente By embassy in Germany itself. There was also increasing evidence that the Entente was preparing coups in Russia, Vienna, Budapest and Sofia. It was not difficult to establish that the diplomatic couriers of one government were impeccable German, which surfaced in all industrial regions of Germany and differed from the propaganda material of the Entente only in their more revolutionary and international demands. It was difficult, however, to convince the circles that had achieved political influence in Germany of the dangerous nature of these carriers those numerous proclamations written phenomena. Intelligence had to resort to the fact that one of the 12 boxes, the size of a cubic meter, with which the courier arrived, fell down the stairs of the station on Friedrichsstrasse, broke and revealed its contents, consisting of hundreds of thousands of proclamations. Only after that were passports [216] handed over to the ambassador of this state. {62} It happened on November 5, 1918, 4 days before the revolution. I received a report about this during a trip to the intelligence department of the eastern theater of operations on the Russian border. The frontier official who reported this to me announced at the same time that he had received an order to prevent Bolshevik propaganda. After these brief examples characterizing the state of Germany, there is no need to explain the reasons why political intelligence was able to fully achieve its goal in Germany. This also canceled all the successes of military intelligence.

VIII. After the war

control commissions. New French intelligence system. Mass espionage in Germany. Sentences.

After the collapse of Germany, the continued existence of intelligence under military leadership became impossible. Her connection with the press bureau and with patriotic propaganda brought on her the hatred of the new rulers, who believed in the possibility of an agreement.

During the chancellorship of Prince Max of Baden, both these branches of work were removed from the high command. Thus, what the high command had long and repeatedly demanded of the former chancellors was fulfilled. But the purpose for which this was done was not the one that was meant by this requirement.

The press bureau and patriotic propaganda were not imbued with a spirit of resistance. And intelligence, as such, did not fit this new system. Her non-political way of presenting the facts as they were did not fit the picture they wanted to see: agreement, general disarmament, no more war.

During the war, I repeatedly asked to be appointed to the ranks. However, due to the uniqueness of my position, this request was never granted. I resumed it again after the resignation of Ludendorff, under the circumstances described above. But his successor as first Quartermaster General [217], General Groener, also refused my request, given the importance of intelligence during an armistice and peace negotiations.

When the revolution that followed finally betrayed Germany to the enemy, I began to insist on my leaving my post, as I considered it my duty, caused by the enormous danger of unlimited penetration of enemy intelligence into Germany. However, the high command considered the political burden of military intelligence too heavy for me to stay. The War Ministry did not even agree to my appointment to the border guard. I was retired. The High Command, which had been transferred to Kolberg, tried to get me to cooperate, if only with regard to the use of my experience. However, from the political side, this was not allowed.

With the cessation of German intelligence, all the measures taken by the military command against the penetration of enemy intelligence into Germany also disappeared. Since there was only military counterintelligence, and the army was to be disbanded, it was believed that there was nothing more to hide from abroad. Moreover, under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany undertook to report herself on all the most important military and economic developments, and was forced to endure the existence of control commissions.

Thus, the enemy intelligence officially made its entry into Germany. At the end of the war, cooperation between the

victorious countries in the field of international intelligence ceased. Only in Germany itself did they continue to pursue their goals together for some time. There was no longer any talk about the exchange of information and their joint use that existed before and during the war. Differences in interests soon led to differences in paths. The United States of North America has completely ceased to take part in joint intelligence. Belgium lost the support of France. Its reconnaissance is no longer working so closely with the French and English, as during [218] the time of the war. It goes without saying that Belgium, insofar as she takes part in political and

military events, also takes a significant part in intelligence against Germany. The area of interest to her is apparently limited to the Rhineland, Westphalia, Hanover and Hesse. Belgian intelligence is working extremely intensively in the occupied regions against any activity of nationally minded German circles. She keeps an eye on all former officers and eminent persons.

In 1920, France and England made proposals to increase public funds allocated for exploration. The French Parliament voted for this with the justification that the idea of revenge is gradually becoming stronger in Germany and that one should be aware of the activities of the German chemical and aviation industries. The limitation of French armaments will become possible, and will not pose a danger to the country, only if there is full knowledge of everything that is happening in Germany. The British Government also proposed a doubling of covert intelligence credits, albeit with limited intelligence in Germany. It can be assumed that since 1920 these loans have been increased even more.

British intelligence was subjected to only minor organizational changes. She appears to have been discontinued in Switzerland, where she worked against Germany. On the contrary, in Holland, in Rotterdam, Tinsley's main spy bureau continues to exist. It shows considerable interest in military-technical innovations. In addition, British intelligence pays special attention to German attempts to re-conquer foreign markets. She has thus returned to her original field of activity. However, experienced, war known and trusted agents have been retained and are apparently destined for other assignments. Apparently, reconnaissance against France is not yet considered necessary at the present time, both because the military forces of the ally are still fairly well known, and because everything that could [219] give rise to a violation of the agreement is carefully avoided. Surveillance of the northern states has been maintained, and the office at Copenhagen is still under the leadership of the very active Captain Sommerfeldt, who is assisted in political matters by Captain Goodson. There are also intelligence agencies set up during the war at the British consulates in Stockholm and Helsingfors. Surveillance of the East is expanded through a military mission in Kovno.

The leadership of the inter-Allied control commissions in Germany was entrusted to General Dupont. Thus, this former head of French officially French intelligence was the organizer of recognized intelligence
became agencies scattered throughout the state.

French intelligence has undergone a significant change, since its center, which was before the war at the General Staff, was transferred to the Ministry

foreign affairs. This shows that the main role is no longer attributed to military intelligence, but rather diplomatic, political and economic intelligence is coming to the fore, while military intelligence plays a secondary and subordinate role in relation to it.

Intelligence Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the branches, Diplomatic, internal political, military, technical- consists of from six industrial and economic intelligence, propaganda and protection of these areas in their country from the intelligence of other countries. Diplomatic and domestic political work are at the head of the rest. This means world and internal political propaganda for French policy in that state, which should be used at the given moment for the political purposes of France. In addition to the division according to the content of the work, a geographical division was also carried out. Intelligence against Germany is conducted by the "Section Europe Centrale", abbreviated as "Sec". Its main intelligence center is located in Aachen. Attached to it is a school of espionage and a workshop for forged [220] documents. The latter produces, under the guidance of an engineer already known during the war, all passports in use. For this purpose it has at its disposal a paper mill and the seals of allied and neutral states.

Military espionage is entrusted to the headquarters of the occupying troops in Mainz. All information, transport, liquidation, reparation, coal, etc. bureaus located in the occupied region are subordinate to him. Purely military intelligence agencies have been moved from Mainz to Cologne, Dusseldorf, Wiesbaden and Strasbourg. They maintain agents subordinate to them in Germany: the Düsseldorf office alone maintains 15 bureaus in the Ruhr area. In addition to this permanent organization, individual enterprises also operate constantly. So, for example, a commission was sent from Kassel to Germany in a car, the official task of which was to take care of the graves of French soldiers in Germany. However, for intelligence purposes, well-known spies disguised as officers were attached to it. Attempts

are also being made to recruit sources among the security police and the Reichswehr.

Secret political intelligence must follow the intentions of the German government, everything that happens behind the scenes of parliamentary life, the mood of the population, strikes and unrest and influence them.

After this system had been laid down through the control commissions in Germany, General Dupont went to Warsaw in order to organize intelligence in the east on the basis of new state formations to replace the retired Russian intelligence. At the same time, he was supposed to link the French vassal states with French intelligence and create a base in Poland to monitor his former employee - Russia. At the same time, France can now restore its old intelligence ties in Soviet Russia.

With the active cooperation of France, the new Poland by 1920 organized its intelligence. It is divided into [221] intelligence, intelligence, diplomatic and counterintelligence departments. The leadership is in Warsaw in military hands. In Vilna there is a sub-department for Lithuania, in Brest-Litovsk - for Russia, in Krakow - for Czechoslovakia, in Poznan - for Germany. Danzig is handled by a sub-department under the Polish General Commissariat in Danzig, which simultaneously conducts reconnaissance for East Prussia. Under French leadership, Polish intelligence adopted the completely crude method of French work. Spies are trained in special schools. In Warsaw, the successes achieved

during the war in the field of forgery are being widely developed. Diplomatic missions and consulates abroad participate in political and propaganda work and are strongholds for agents sent from Poland. One Polish consul in Berlin had already had to be recalled because he had gone too far in espionage.

Polish intelligence detects a strong fear of a new military or national strengthening of Germany. It works closely with powerful

French intelligence organizations in Warsaw, Posen and Upper Silesia and reaches the western border area and Bavaria. Agents against Germany in rare cases come from congressional Poland, but for the most part come from the former German regions. Thanks to this, they are educated, familiar with the language and the country. And since they are supplied, in addition, with large sums of money, they represent a great danger. However, French money is already showing its corrupting influence here. Already, the "Polish economy" is occasionally beginning to penetrate into the intelligence service: scandalous cases caused by the waste of funds entrusted to them by intelligence officers and officials. Under such circumstances, espionage on the Polish border is in full bloom. It surpasses Russia's pre-war espionage and is especially dangerous because of its use of former German officers, as well as acquaintances and family [222] ties of all sections of the population of Germany and Poland.

The intelligence of Czechoslovakia is also perfectly organized. The cooperation of diplomatic, military, economic and political espionage is also excellent here. The leadership is in the hands of the cabinet office in Prague. Subordinate to it are the propaganda bureaus under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working under the guise of trade missions, and the intelligence department of the General Staff. Its agents are particularly intelligent. These are, for the most part, officers of the legions and students of higher educational institutions, acting in neighboring countries under the guise of businessmen.

The espionage school at Hollashowitz, like all intelligence, is under French leadership. Some signs indicate that the Czechs are beginning to find this guardianship uncomfortable for themselves, especially in view of the enormous funds that have to be donated to the maintenance of intelligence in the interests of France.

Lithuanian intelligence is poorly developed and works mainly not against Germany. Organized intelligence and Latvia, with a center in Riga.

The creation of an organization in Germany and in the eastern border states required, first of all, all the forces of French intelligence. Work, both in and out of neutral countries, could at first be limited, and consequently receded into the background. Only recently has it begun to expand again. The shift of the center of gravity to Switzerland is especially noticeable, where it has the character of a widely organized and actively led intelligence bureau in Strasbourg, and where its most prominent representative is the French officer of the General Staff at the Consulate in Basel. Equipped with large sums of money, this bureau is increasingly becoming the starting point of intelligence in southern Germany, especially since the work in Munich has become less, due to the repeated failures of the envoy Darba. Recently, there has also been an intense activity in Holland and Copenhagen. [223]

Surrounded on all sides by this newly formed intelligence, Germany is subjected to espionage and the manipulation of public opinion to an extent that was even approximately out of the question before the war. France, having revealed its injustice both during the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, and in its subsequent policy in Germany, has no opportunity from her

refuse.

The situation in Germany meets her aspirations; French citizens live in boarding houses and hotels and freely come into contact with wide circles of the population. Foreigners of all nations can, without arousing anyone's attention, travel through Germany and work for intelligence. The economic espionage carried out by Britain, America and Japan can develop indefinitely. He works all the more successfully because there are no German laws that could interfere with him. There is also no such central institution that could warn threatened industrial enterprises and firms and instruct them. But even from the midst of the German people forces are also emerging that contribute to enemy reconnaissance. Increasing unemployment and poverty caused by the world

and the political consequences of the revolution give rise, thanks to the lack of counterintelligence, people who, for selfish purposes, put themselves at the disposal of the enemy. The state itself limits the development of national consciousness from internal political considerations. How stupid the people have become is evidenced by the absence of that general fear of spies, which existed at the beginning of the war and which would now be quite appropriate. When Schlageter was shot for the national cause in the Ruhr region, even then the excitement of the German popular mood was limited only to certain circles of the population. While the wartime execution of Miss Cavel's sentence aroused worldwide outrage, albeit under the influence of propaganda, the peacetime execution of Schlageter's sentence was greeted with silence. It turns out that the conscience of the world has also fallen asleep. [224]

Enemy agents, however, represent a great danger to every kind of national movement. There is no such stupid swindle that would not be believed in Germany. Thanks to this intelligence, it is easy to provoke and bring about phenomena that are desirable for its political goals.

These circumstances, however sad it may be, are still in favor of France. More and more persons, whose existence was wrecked in Germany, are now turning to the Foreign Legion. Among them are both educated people and people from privileged strata. France organized 10 assembly points along the border in the occupied area and turned Grisheim into their center. Those who can be used in any way for espionage are declared unfit for the Foreign Legion by the testifying physician. Since here they are dealing, for the most part, with desperate elements, then among them French intelligence mainly draws people for large enterprises in Germany.

Everywhere in French intelligence there are Alsatians-Lorraine - both as agents and in leadership positions. This army of spies and agents, which France, thanks to her expensive currency, can maintain in Germany for little money, is opposed by the German counterintelligence, deprived of almost any means. Since the revolution, she has enjoyed even less support in her homeland than before. Surveillance of espionage is impossible due to currency conditions. France accepts all agents for service without testing. Therefore, the quality of agents does not match the size of the organization. This also reduces the value of

intelligence. However, the street bastard working in it provides the services France needs. She delivers fictitious information and therefore remains unpunished if caught. An example is the case of the document forger Anspach. France does not exaggerate the real value of this mass espionage in Germany. She promotes him for political reasons, but at the same time she takes care [225] that serious intelligence does not suffer from him. Real intelligence is conducted according to the old tried and tested principles, and its

leadership is increasingly being transferred to neutral countries and to the eastern border states. An example of this is the activity of the French Major Richard in Munich. This case also shows that the German counterintelligence is not in a position to counteract the large undertakings of enemy intelligence. Only in East Prussia and Upper Silesia has it been possible so far to smash all significant organizations. In Upper Silesia, the organization was discovered due to the fact that the attack ordered by French intelligence was carried out in the wrong

place. At the same time, it was established that the assassination of the local head of counterintelligence was planned. In other cases after the war, judgments were given only in cases of secondary importance, the number of which, however, indicates the extensiveness of French intelligence in Germany.

1920 103 171
1921 225 419
1922 175 241
1923 211 293

Given the insufficient activity of counterintelligence, these figures are very eloquent. Almost all the convicts are Germans. Foreigners encountered among them are French, Swiss and Czech. Since 1920, it can already be proved that French intelligence has taken root in the Reichswehr. This year, 6 members of the Reichswehr were convicted in 5 trials, and in 1921, 19 of its members were already convicted in 13 trials. In 1923, for the first time, six people serving in the security police were among the convicted. Judicial punishments reveal not an increase in sentences for the harm done to Germany, but, on the contrary, rather a softened attitude towards criminals, probably because the number [226] of espionage crimes is increasing, and judges are getting used to them. Strictly judges only the people's court in Munich.

IX. Spies and traitors

National spies are worthy of respect, international and traitors - contempt. Small spies are punished, big spies and traitors go unpunished.

In a work like secret intelligence, there are only two elements that can be relied upon: those in charge and those spies who work out of pure love for the fatherland, and whom I would call "national spies." German military intelligence owes its success primarily to the devotion and efficiency of its officers. They had to work in much more

difficult conditions than enemy intelligence officers. While these latter had to be familiar only with the situation in Germany, the German intelligence officers needed knowledge of the military, political and economic situation, the possibilities of leaving and moving, police and other security measures in several great powers, as well as in border neutral states. While the enemy intelligence already before the war had a much larger number of experienced officers and could unite them during the war, while the enemy was supported by all his institutions and citizens abroad - German intelligence could not count on such help, and she had to choose for themselves leaders, and train them only in time of war.

The mass of agents shimmering with all the colors of the rainbow requires, first of all, as a leader, an outstanding personality in all respects. Here, of course, knowledge of people is necessary, a sober attitude towards them, as well as the ability to deal with them. It is characteristic that in German intelligence the best way to deal with agents, even the most stubborn and hardened of them, was one cavalry officer from an old family and one very educated lady. Intelligence is a master's business (Der Nachrichtendienst ist ein Herrendienst), where it is transferred into the hands of other persons, it will be unsatisfactory. The leader must in all respects stand high above [227] the agents, otherwise it is not he who is the master of the situation, but the agents with all their negative properties. The dangers associated with intelligence are great for everyone who comes into contact with it. They consist in the impossibility of control over actions and over information, and, in particular, in the great temptation caused by money. In intelligence, strict discipline is necessary, assimilation of the view of the political opponent as an enemy, and faith in war. This, perhaps, explains why intelligence in all states is organizationally predominantly in military hands, although its purely military goals are increasingly receding before political and economic goals.

Honest exploration brings many disappointments. The reason for this is that peculiar feature of it, that many bad agents offer their services, but few good ones. Good agents wear out faster because they are indeed exposed to major dangers associated with this profession. Bad agents, on the other hand, endure indefinitely as they avoid danger. In view of this, it is rarely possible to appreciate good intelligence from a large number of its agents. Leaders must have a strong character in order to constantly purge and destroy with their own hands what might impress, but which in reality is only tinsel. These principles formed the basis of German intelligence. British intelligence was also guided by them before the war, and also, apparently, after it. Russian and French intelligence did not follow them either before the war or during it, and French intelligence does not do this even after the war, since it is interested not only in factual data, but also in messages corresponding to the political goals of France,

The sweeping, contemptuous condemnation of spies is unfair. Absolutely not subject to it are "national spies" who, out of pure love for the fatherland, render invaluable services to the political and military leaders of their people and risk their lives for the fatherland. [228] Such spies were encountered during the war in all camps. And the German General Staff was besieged

at the beginning of the war by Germans of both sexes, unfit for military service and thus wishing to fulfill their military duty. Among them there were people from educated and wealthy circles. Their idea, however, of their abilities was often quite naive. Only a few of them could be subjected to a serious test and put into action, which, after only two or three assignments, almost without exception, led everyone, including women, to the end, which consisted in the death penalty. So, for example, one sister of mercy, who grew up in an enemy country and had all the data for successful intelligence activities, was discovered and shot in France after a short time. The will she left passed on the money she earned to help the wounded. In another case, only with difficulty was it possible to dissuade the mother of two officers who were at the front from returning as a spy to the enemy country in which she was brought up. German merchants also sacrificed their lives and property to serve their homeland. It would probably never occur to anyone to despise such acts.

The people of Belgium and France also deserve the greatest respect for the support they gave in intelligence to their fighting brothers. It was inspired by ardent patriotism and never lost hope for the victory of its people during the long years of the war: despite the already heavy burden of the war, and perhaps precisely because of this, it never lost the desire to contribute to the achievement of this victory. Many French and Belgians of both sexes were convicted of assisting fugitive soldiers and espionage, as well as espionage itself, and were severely punished under the laws of war. In this case, they were all, without exception, heroes, and in the face of death, only a few of them showed weakness. They died without flinching an eyebrow, often with the last word about their fatherland. The death sentences against women were never carried out, although often it was they who worked [229] most ardently. Thus, for example, a young French milliner took over the theater of operations as a forward rallying point for a large organization marching through Belgium to Holland; she knew at the same time that this organization had already been defeated twice, and both her predecessors at the forefront had been sentenced to death. Despite all their personal respect for such an active love of the fatherland, the high command, responsible for the welfare of its own troops, could not agree with the lenient judgments of the German field courts in Belgium, nor with the Governor-General von Bissing's widely used right of pardon for political motives. On this basis, disagreements often arose between them.

Grateful recognition, however, deserves only those national spies whose only driving force was the desire to contribute to the victory of their people. But there were others. The intelligence department was besieged by many who sought to use intelligence for their own purposes. For the most part, they expected to secure business advantages and other privileges by making it easier for reconnaissance to pass through the border. The intelligence service also bears a share of responsibility for the presence of moral instability in society.

This group is very close to the third group of international spies. They also have no right to moral justification. They abuse the hospitality of a neutral country, for the most part inspired only by the thirst for monetary gain. With such a psychology, they are unreliable and cowardly. This impression was confirmed in all the cases in which they were put on trial. German intelligence, however, had to meet several such cases when neutral foreigners selflessly rendered services to it, being sincerely convinced of the injustice committed against Germany. Treason is a sad chapter in the development of intelligence. The interests of the state are greatly harmed by the [230] circumstance that only military treason against the country is punishable. Since the war between peoples takes place not only on the battlefield, treason in the field of politics and economy acquires at least the same, and in the so-called peacetime is even more important than military treason. Such a phenomenon that a spy who sacrifices himself for his people is subjected to contempt and severe punishment, while a traitor,

knowingly or not knowingly harming his people, escapes punishment and even often derives material or political benefits from his course of action - contradicts our sense of justice. In the future, peoples with a healthy national feeling should remember their spies with respect, while traitors to the state should feel the deepest contempt and in the strictest way

punish them.

High treason did much more harm to Germany during the war than enemy espionage, despite the enormous scale of his organization. Deliberately committed high treason before the war, during and after it, those who were convicted for this, and the number of which I have

already cited. But the real number of them is far from exhausted.

Those German traitors who supported the enemy in his propaganda abroad, directed against the German victory, remained unpunished. In the realm of high treason, intelligence shifts entirely to politics. At this point we must stop our presentation, so as not to be forced to raise all the political questions about the outcome of the war.

X. Looking Back and Forward

Germany is given over to the power of France; England and the Commonwealth. States of North. The Americas are under threat.

The resulting picture shows that against the shining backdrop of the military debt fulfilled on both sides, the political debt was fulfilled during the war only by the enemies of Germany. A dark spot in this picture is the recognition that in the ranks [231] of their own struggling people there were so many state

traitors.

No matter how extensive the enemy intelligence may seem here in comparison with the intelligence of the German General Staff, the reality undoubtedly surpassed this image, which I could give only to the extent that the enemy enterprises became known to the German counterintelligence. It would be very valuable if our opponents would now report exactly what

what they actually knew about German intelligence. Up to now they have boasted only of the success of their intelligence service and at the same time complained about the alleged enormous work of German intelligence in preparing and conducting a world war, but they have not proved the latter with any facts. Establishment of the facts would prove unfounded the accusation that Germany was aiming for war, but it would not disprove that she missed the preparation of the war and carrying it out to its final goal, i.e., to victory. The saying: "If you want peace, prepare for war" was carried out by Germany only in its first part.

At present, there is no longer any doubt that the military party of Russia, which depended on France and led by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, won and decided to fight as early as February 1914. If the German government had political intelligence at its disposal and knew about all this, then the preparations for war could, at least at the last moment, be different, and, above all, the question of who is to blame for the war would have been correctly covered from the very beginning. . It is highly probable, but could not be proved, that already in 1913 Russia, thanks to her intelligence, had full information about the German plan for the war in the east and west and reported them to the French government, but that in Paris this was met with distrust, since they considered it improbable that the Germans intended to resist the Russian army with such weak forces. If the assumption is correct that the German war plan was known, then the advance Russian mobilization and the slowdown [232] of the French movement become understandable. All this was supposed to contribute to the use of the weakness of the German army in the east.

In Germany, they knew about the preparation of the war by enemy intelligence, but they believed this only in the General Staff. Politics tried to avoid this grave necessity. The people were not told about the enemy's espionage, for fear of intensifying the evil even more and thus drawing new forces into the service of enemy intelligence. Now one can doubt whether this path was correct. Opponents went the other way. Already in peacetime, they brought up among the people a hostile attitude towards Germany, and warned him against the penetration of German intelligence. They protected their people from the dangers of their own intelligence and entrusted it to neutral citizens, systematically and expediently preparing war in this respect as well. Military intelligence, and thus all military affairs in general, was for them already in peacetime a political tool. The situation was different in Germany. The essential difference between German intelligence is precisely its purely military character and the fact that it not only did not enjoy the support of political factors, but, on the contrary, was forced to pave its way in spite of them. The consequence of this was the need to concentrate their forces in contrast to the enemy, in which they spread over the boundless spaces. In itself, this concentration was not harmful; but it only served the negative purpose of intelligence. Intelligence found its positive use only in the victorious course of military operations. For positive political work, German intelligence lacked not only political leadership, but also the necessary mass of agents.

The war freed military intelligence from the shackles of peacetime and gave it the opportunity to develop freely. But even during the war, German intelligence remained purely military. Under circumstances that could not be foreseen, the General Staff had to reorganize it against France and Russia and create it out of nothing against England, and then against America. [233]

The successful accomplishment of this shows that if there were the same determination in the field of economic and political intelligence, something could be done there, and that the combined forces of these intelligence services could, under decisive political leadership, achieve a lot and achieve a lot.

Instead, however, military intelligence was also charged with the maintenance of the press, and then it was entrusted with the care of the mood of the people and the army. Both led to not political support for intelligence, but political hatred for it.

An increasingly wide gulf opened up between military intelligence and political views in Germany. While politicians believed in the enemy's readiness for agreement and talked about the possibilities of peace, military intelligence never reported any evidence of the weakness of the enemy's military leadership or the readiness of its political leaders to agree. True, there were reports of fatigue and a weakening of discipline in individual military units. At the same time, however, there were also reports of the most merciless measures taken by governments that were democratic, but, despite this, imposed their will on the masses.

called

In Germany, however, all signs of weakness were not only not corrected by the government, but, on the contrary, were intensified by its compliance. Enemy intelligence easily figured out what points it should press with its propaganda. She knew how to increase discontent and weakness and increase delusion. The spirit of August 1914 remained alive in the end only at the front. It contained the deepest secret of the success of the German army. On

September 28, 1918, Field Marshal von Hindenburg was visited at the Supreme Headquarters by a foreign officer mission returning from a military front in France. The head of the mission, a colonel of cavalry, spoke with special respect for the spirit of the troops they [234] saw during heavy fighting. He said that their heroic behavior would guarantee final victory. It was the same day on the evening of which Hindenburg-Ludendorff were compelled to decide to give up the fight. On October 26, 1918, I was with the military leaders in Berlin. After arriving there, I fell ill with the then raging influenza and was bedridden for several days. At this time, I was visited by a neutral citizen who was in Germany in a high official position. He said that the position of Germany compelled him to give up his neutrality for the benefit of Germany. He knows the reports of his country's representatives in France and conjures the high command not to lay down their arms, since the enemy's forces are also exhausted, and in the event of surrender, Germany does not have to expect mercy. I could only answer him that I had just been informed of the resignation of General Ludendorff. Belief in the agreement won over the will to defend.

Intelligence is like a barometer showing the tension between states. Before the war, during the war, and even after it, he showed Germany a storm. The more thoroughly, however, intelligence has solved this problem, and the more the victorious countries again enter into economic and political, and therefore into military competition among themselves, the greater will be their intelligence, raised by the experience of the war to hitherto unknown heights and against the former friends. This will happen especially if the idea of peace between peoples ever begins to be put into practice, because it is then that it will be important to find out through intelligence how seriously disarmament is being carried out by other countries. The idea of disarmament definitely does not apply to intelligence, since its positive part, i.e., propaganda, would become, instead of an instrument of military struggle, an instrument of political struggle to an even greater extent than at present. Intelligence is, therefore, in any case, on the threshold of new tasks. It is no longer necessary to dismiss it contemptuously with the word "espionage". Nor should [235] be mistaken about its absence on the basis that its existence is officially denied or little is said about it.

"War in peacetime" - this is the best definition of the current role of intelligence in the competition of peoples. Since future wars will take place only between large states, for which the bonds of the League of Nations, which bind only small states, are of no importance, the more time will be required to prepare for war; the more important will be the outcome of these wars for all peoples; the larger their military equipment will be as a result; the more difficult it becomes to endure for a long time the heavy burden of armaments; the more easily technological progress can give one a stunning advantage over the other, the less will it be possible to do without

peaceful intelligence work. The common interests of the victorious countries disappeared. Each of them will try to be the first to use the common experience. A competition of unprecedented intensity will begin in all areas of intelligence. Her goals will be pursued even more intensely and unconditionally than before, and that is why they will try to plunge her into the darkness of mystery again.

Only that state can be calm for its future, whose political, economic and military leaders and in the field of intelligence perform their duty jointly. However, the mass nature given to intelligence by France should be considered a gross outrage and fought against, unless the goal is to infect other peoples with the poison of espionage and treason.

If it is true that intelligence will acquire in the future a much greater significance than it had before the world war, then it is necessary that the bureaucracy and the army, first of all, the whole people and, in particular, their upper strata, be warned, learn to be silent and more attentive than was the case before the war in Germany and in neighboring countries, primarily infected with espionage. After intensive military, political [236] and economic intelligence entered, thanks to its successes in the world war, into the ranks of official state functions, it became timely and the need to bring this circumstance to the consciousness of the peoples. The war transferred counterintelligence from the hands of the police to the hands of the supreme state power. The future places it in the hands of the whole people. However, only peoples with a healthy national feeling are capable of this self-defence; only those governments that support this feeling among the people do their duty and will be successful in the fight against intelligence. It is Germany who knows from her own experience that material resources alone are not enough for this purpose, that a moral struggle against intelligence is necessary.

Accordingly, the essence of intelligence, we see that its implementation is everywhere in the hands of the military, but the leadership is in the hands of the political.

Only German intelligence has so far been deprived of political leadership. With the defeat of Germany, "cordial agreement" (Entente) lost its common goal. A new grouping of powers will take its place. The Russian problem is not solved for the great powers interested in the restoration of Russia.

On the path to future development, intelligence is ahead, striving to recognize this path and influence it. The present time is, as it were, created for intelligence. This applies to both England and the North American United States. The structure of the British world empire, immigration and racial issues in America really encourage the use of the art of intelligence in them. The secret power of intelligence will be much more significant in the future than it was in the past and is at present.

Notes

{1} Nicolai W. Geheime MGächte. - Berlin, 1923. {2} Nicholas V.

German intelligence and counterintelligence in the world war. Ed. RU at the headquarters of the commander of all armed forces of Ukraine and Crimea, 1921; Nicolai V. Attack from the rear (actions of the partisan detachment of the 6th division of the Reds at the front against Yudenich) // Red shooter. - M.: VVRS edition. - 2.; Nicolai V. German intelligence and counterintelligence in the world 1922. -

war. Ed. RU headquarters of the Red Army.

B / g. {3} Zvonarev Konstantin Kirillovich, (1892-1938), real name Karl Krishyanovich Zvaigzne, b. in the Courland province, a Latvian, a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1908, a participant in the First World War and the Civil War, the suppression of the Kornilov rebellion in August 1917, a fighter and commander of the Red Army. In 1923 he graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. An employee of the Soviet military intelligence, one of the first Soviet historians and theorists of military intelligence. Repressed during Stalin's purges. Rehabilitated posthumously in 1956. {4} World history of espionage / Auth. M. I. Umnov. - M.: Olimp;

LLC "Firm" Publishing House ACT ", 2000.

{5} Boyadzhiev E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1 / Per. from Italian. L. Korina. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2003; Volkov A. Slavin S. Admiral Canaris - "Iron" admiral. - M.: Olimp; Smolensk: Rusich. - 1998. ("World in wars"); World history of espionage / Ed.-comp. M. I. Umnov. - M.: Olimp; LLC "Firm" Publishing House ACT ", 2000; Gelen R. Service / Translated from German by V. Chernyavsky, Yu. Chuprov. - M.: TERRA, 1997. - (Secret missions); Gilensen V. M. German military intelligence against Russia // New and recent history. - 1991. - 2. - P. 153 -177.; Kavtaradze A. G. Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets 1917-1920 - M.: 1988; Melnikov D. E. , Chernaya L. B. Two-faced Admiral. M.: Politizdat, 1965.; Web: The German espionage system. Translated from German - M.: Portugalov Publishing House, 1915.; Polmar N., Allen T. B. Encyclopedia of espionage / Translated from English by V. Smirnov. - M.: KRON-PRESS, 1999; Riviere L. Center for the German Secret Service in Madrid in 1914-1918. Translated from French - 2nd ed. - M.: Voenizdat, 1938.; Rinteln F. Secret war 1914-1918. Notes of a German spy. - M.: Voenizdat, 1943; Seidametov D. German-Austrian intelligence in Tsarist Russia. - M.: Voenizdat, 1939.; Sergeev F. Secret operations of Nazi intelligence, 1933-1945. - M.: Politizdat, 1991.; List of colonels by seniority. - Pg., 1916; List of generals by seniority. - Pg., 1916; Faligo R., Coffey R. World history of intelligence services: T. 1: 1870-1939 / Per. from fr. A. Chekmareva; Foreword P. Payol. - M.: TERRA, 1997. - (Secret missions); Bardanne G. Le colonel Nicolai espion de genie. - Paris, 1947; Buchheit G. Das Deutsche Geheimdienst / Geschichte der militärischen Abwehr. MGjuchen, 1966. {6} Until 1906 {7} The intelligence historian E. Boyadzhiev names V. Ulyanov-Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sumenson, Kozlovsky, Kollontai among Nikolai's agents. {8} Boyadzhiev E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1 / Per. from Italian. L. Korina. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2003. {9} Ibid. {10} The Military Intelligence Service (Geheimer Nachrichtendienst des Heeres), otherwise known as Department III-b of the General Staff of the Army. The name of the department dates back to the Franco-Prussian War. Then, in the Prussian General Staff,

the entire collection

of intelligence information was entrusted to section "b" of the French (III) department.

Since then, according to tradition, the department of intelligence and counterintelligence of the German The General Staff acquired the designation III-b.

{11} A. Ivanov, researcher. Material from the personal archive of V. Fedko. {12} Polmar N., Allen T. B. Encyclopedia of espionage / Per. from English. IN.

Smirnova. - M.: KRON-PRESS, 1999.

{13} Alfred Victor Redl (1864-1913), Colonel of the Austrian General Staff. In 1901 he was recruited by Russian intelligence. Redl played a decisive role in the failure of the Austrian intelligence network in Russia. Moreover, his actions practically paralyzed the Austrian counterintelligence. In 1913 he was exposed and committed suicide. Before his death, Redl told Major Ronge about his activities as a Russian agent.

{14} Present the name of Margaret Gertrud Zelle (1876-1917). Arrested in Paris on February 13, 1917 on charges of espionage. On July 27, 1917, Mata Hari was sentenced to death by a military tribunal, which was executed on October 15. The controversy surrounding the execution of Mata Hari did not stop for a long time. It remains to be added that all the materials of the investigation in her case remain classified until now.

{15} Boyadzhiev E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1. {16} Ibid.

{17} August

Schluga (1841-1917), baron. He studied at the Polytechnic Institute in Vienna, after which he went to serve in the Austrian army. He bravely fought at the Battle of Magenta (Austro-Italian War of 1859) and eventually received a position on the General Staff. However, he soon decided to end his military career and become an Austrian landowner. In 1866 Schluga

was recruited by the chief of the Prussian General Staff, Count Helmut von Molke, and under the guise of a journalist went to the Austrian headquarters. It was largely thanks to the information received from his intelligence officer that Moltke managed to crush Austria in just seven weeks. Schluga again served Moltke on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. By that time, he already had the operational pseudonym "Agent 17". For many years (from 1870 to 1914) "agent 17" was "mothballed". His last boss was V. Nicolai, who restored contact with him on the eve of the First World War. On the 5th day (!) after the announcement of the mobilization in France, Schluga handed over to Germany the strategic plans for the deployment of the French armies. Some military historians are inclined to regard this information as the greatest success of a lone spy operating in enemy territory in all the time that intelligence has existed. He sent his reports to Nicolai every two days. It took the couriers only 48 hours to get out of France and through neutral Switzerland into Germany. In March 1916, Schluga sent his last report, retired due to deteriorating health (he was already 73 years old at the start of the war), returned to Germany and retired. {18} Elisabeth Schragmüller (1887-1940?), an outstanding intelligence officer during the First World War (intelligence number I.4.GW). In 1916, she organized a reconnaissance school in Hannover, combining leadership with sorties into enemy territory to complete missions. Its numerous graduates brought a lot of trouble to the command of the Entente. {19} Boyadzhiev E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1. {20} I.V. Gessen transmits the following statement by A. N. Khvostov, the tsarist Minister of the Interior

(dated February 1916). "I did not interfere in his (Rasputin's) behavior before, but then I became convinced that he belongs to an international espionage organization, that he is surrounded by people who are registered with us and who invariably come to him as soon as he returns from Tsarskoye, and ask him for details." Cit. according to the preface by K. Zvonarev to the Russian edition of the book by V. Nikolai.

{21} Details about the cooperation of the "leader of the world proletariat" with German intelligence can be found in the book of the famous researcher A. Arutyunov, who devoted many pages to this issue: Arutyunov AA Lenin's dossier without retouching. Documentation. Data. Evidence. - M.: Veche, 1999., as well as Boyadzhiev E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1.; Heresh E. The Secret Case of Parvus. Bought revolution. - 2001. . {22} Boyadzhiev E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1.

{23} W. Nicolai. Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung im Weltkrieg. Berlin, 1920. {24} Ibid. {25} Kann D. Hitler's spies.

"Hitler's Spies",

1978. {26} According to von Papen in his memoirs, Herwarth was recalled

from the post of military attaché in the United States at the initiative of Bernstorff for sending political reports to Berlin bypassing the ambassador.

{27} F. von Papen. memoirs. London, 1952. {28} From a letter from Herwarth to Tempoo, July 19, 1915. {29} One of the leaders of Amzink. {30} June 1915

{31} Th. A. Bailey. Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace. New York, 1945. {32} Vselensky M. S. Secret ties between the USA and Germany. Bloc of imperialists against October (1917-1919). - M.: "Science", 1968.

{33} Ibid. {34}

Ibid. {35} Ibid.

{36} Ibid. {37}

Ibid. {38} Ibid.

{39} L. Rouquelle. La propagande germanique aux Etats Unis. paris,

1916.

{40} The weekly "Fatherland" was published with a circulation of 100 thousand copies. and published his bulletins 2-3 times a week. {41} As an example of Eustice's propaganda, one can point to his letter to the editors of the Washington Post demanding that the Entente powers not export military materials from the USA.

{42} Correspondent for the Minneapolis Journal. Arrived in Berlin with a letter of recommendation from the German envoy to Norway, Oberndorf. Stromme came to Germany with the aim of "opposing English fabrications in the American press." {43} Correspondent of "Associated Press" in Europe.

{44} G. Bernstorff. My 3 Years in America. New York, 1920. {45} Parvus [pseudo; name and surname Gelfand (Helphand) Alexander Israel, Russian version of Gelfand Alexander Lazarevich (Lvovich) or Israel Lazarevich] (1867-1924), politician of the Russian Empire and Germany, businessman. {46} The original document is stored in the archives of the German Ministry

foreign affairs.

{47} Already in 1912, Lenin dreamed of a big European war. Referring to the resolution of the Basel (1912) conference, he formulates the slogan: "The transformation of the modern imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan ..." Lenin told about his secret dream (European or world war) in a letter to Gorky in early November 1913 : "The war of Austria with Russia would be very useful for the revolution (in all of Eastern Europe), but it is unlikely that Franz Joseph and Nikolasha will give us this pleasure." Based on this, Akim Arutyunov comes to the conclusion: "I admit the idea that Lenin and Radek were really involved in the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, committed by the Serbian student Gavrilo Princip on June 28, 1914. Perhaps the first played the role of an ideologist developing a plan to incite a European bloody slaughter to turn it later into a civil war of nations. As for Radek, I do not rule out that it was he who found and prepared the murderer."

{48} Arutyunov A. A. Lenin's dossier without retouching. Documentation. Data. Evidence. - M.: Veche, 1999. {49} From V. Ustyuzhanin's interview with E. Heresh, author of the research book

"The secret affair of Parvus. Bought revolution." - KP, 04.04.2001.

{50} Ibid. {51} So

Boyadzhii calls department III-b of German intelligence. {52} In his memoirs, Nicolai wrote: "... and about Lenin, I only knew that he lives in Switzerland as a political emigrant" Ulyanov ", who delivered valuable information to my service about the situation in tsarist Russia, against which he fought." But Dzerzhinsky is more frank.

{53} Boyadzhii E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1. {54} Ibid. {55} At the end of October, uprisings

began in Kiel in the imperial fleet, which turned on November 3 into a general armed uprising of the fleet and the formation of a workers' and sailors' council.

{56} Boyadzhii E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1. {57} W. Groener took office as Quartermaster General on November 1

instead of General Ludendorff, who had left a few days ago.

{58} Sergeev F. Covert operations of Nazi intelligence. 1933-1945. -M.: Politizdat, 1991. {59}

Boyadzhii E. History of espionage. In 2 vols. T. 1. {60} Faligo R., Coffe R. World

history of intelligence services: T. 1 : 1870-1939 / Per. from fr. A. Chekmareva; Foreword P. Payol. - M.: TERRA, 1997. - (Secret missions). {61} T. Gladkov, Secrets of the secret services of the III Reich., M., EKSMO, 2004. {62} We are talking, of course, about Soviet Russia. (approx. V.K.)

notes

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